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Abstract 
The subject of how to finance Higher Education (HE) has been on the agenda of 
successive UK governments since the 1960s. The UK has moved from a situation 
where the taxpayer footed the entire bill for HE, to a system where students 
themselves must contribute part of the cost of their education. This so-called 
`cost-sharing' has always been a subject of controversy, with fears that it would 
lower participation, particularly among poorer students. 
This thesis is a quantitative analysis of the UK's system of HE finance (defined 
here as maintenance grants and upfront fees) and its impact on individual 
university participation decisions and Higher Education Institution funding levels. 
The thesis comprises two main strands. 
The first is an econometric analysis of the causal relationship between HE finance 
and university participation. I use individual-level Labour Force Survey data over 
the period of 1992-2005, during which many major changes in HE finance policy 
took place, to estimate the impact of upfront fees and maintenance grants on 
individual participation decisions. I use a variety of econometric techniques 
exploiting variation in policy by income-group, over time, and by UK constituent 
country arising from Scottish devolution. I find a positive impact of maintenance 
grants on participation, and a negative impact of up-front fees. 
In the second strand of the thesis, I draw on Scotland as a comparison group with 
the rest of the UK. I use HESA data on university funding and volumes of 
students, and Higher Education Funding Council of England / Scottish Funding 
Council funding formulae to analyze the impact of tuition fees in terms of relative 
funding per FTE in Scottish and English universities. I find English universities to 
have caught up with Scotland in terms of funding per head as a result of the 
increased income from fees. 
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Chapter 1 Why investigate the role of 
higher education finance? 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the impact of higher education (HE) funding on 
university participation in the UK. The specific focus is on the impact of upfront 
fees and maintenance grants on participation. The thesis presents evidence on the 
way that the HE funding reforms of the last decade, in particular the introduction 
of up-front tuition fees in 1998 and the abolition of grants in 1999 impacted on 
HE participation, and which types of students have been most affected by the 
reforms. 
The UK Higher Education sector has undergone several major expansions in 
recent decades. Student volumes have more than quadrupled, rising from around 
100,000 full time equivalent students in the 1960s to just under 2 million by 
20071 . The increase in student numbers accepted at UK institutions is shown in 
Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 - UK domiciled degree students accepted at UK institutions, 1963-2006, 
(Figures compiled by Carpentier, V, Institute of Education) 
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The dramatic increases in participation illustrated above have prompted debate 
about the nature of HE funding in the UK. In particular, the questions of how the 
HE sector should be funded, who should pay and who benefits and loses from 
different funding arrangements have become more urgent. The next two sections 
(1.2 and 1.3) of this chapter outline the historical changes in HE funding and 
participation and the economic principles on which these have been based. 
Sections 1.4 and 1.5 summarize the existing empirical evidence on the impact of 
these reforms on HE participation and university funding levels, respectively. The 
final section (1.6) gives an overview of the rest of the thesis. 
1.2 Higher education funding reform and participation in the UK 
1960-present 
The massive increase in university attendance discussed above occurred 
intermittently and for complex reasons. In the 1960s the recommendations from 
the Robbins Report2 (1963) led to a dramatic expansion of the sector as all 
colleges of technology were reclassified as universities and 17 new universities 
were built. Further increases in participation occurred during the 1980s as the 
economy shifted towards the service sector and relative wages for graduates 
improved. The establishment of the GCSE in 1988 led to significant 
improvements in exam results, which also encouraged more youths to enroll in 
university courses, as discussed in Blanden et al (2003). 
By the end of the 1980s the higher education sector was in financial crisis. The 
rise in numbers had brought with it an increasing taxpayer burden; the 
Government was entirely responsible for funding university entrants at a cost of 
around £800034 per student. Furthermore, despite the significant expansion in 
numbers, the UK's higher education participation rate, at 19% of 21-30 year 
olds,5 was still one of the lowest in any advanced industrial country and 
participation among the working classes was extremely low. The Government 
wanted to address both these problems, and to respond to the climate of rapid 
technological advancement, by growing the HE sector even further. 
2 Officially known as "Report of the Committee Appointed by the Prime Minister under the 
Chairmanship of Lord Robbins" 
3 Source: Carpentier, Institute of Education, University of London. 
4 All figures that follow are in 2006 prices unless otherwise stated 
5 Age Participation Index (IFS) 
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However, given the level of investment required, this was no easy task. Increasing 
university places would result in the taxpayer facing a growing financial burden, 
both in order to fund universities and also because of the costs of paying 
maintenance grants to students. 
The Government's response to the problem was to begin the process of examining 
ways in which students themselves could contribute to the cost of their education. 
After much debate (for a summary see Barr and Crawford, 2005), the first student 
loan system was introduced in 1990, and the UK Higher Education finance 
system has been in a state of change ever since. 
The introduction of maintenance loans was followed quickly by the major 
reclassification of HE institutions in the first years of the 1990s. Polytechnics 
were given university status and with it, additional funding. This led to a huge 
increase in the supply of university places which were filled by the rapidly 
growing demand. 
By 1997 the sector was once again in financial crisis. University funding had not 
been maintained by the Government, so that funding per FTE (full-time 
equivalent) student had fallen to a historic low of £4,850. The Dearing report 
(2007)6 was at this time commissioned to recommend ways to tackle the funding 
crisis as well as look at the additional issue of widening participation; despite the 
huge increases in enrolment, participation of the poorest groups had not 
improved. The gap between rich and poor was still extremely wide in comparison 
to other developed countries. Rather than narrowing, it was in fact widening 
(Blanden et al, 2005). 
As well as highlighting these concerns, the principal recommendation of the 
Dearing report was the introduction of upfront tuition fees of £1200, which were 
introduced in 1998. This was accompanied with the complete replacement of 
grants with maintenance loans, fully realized in 1999 (Barr, 2004). This reignited 
the debate concerning the under representation of lower social classes. Those 
worried about widening participation opposed the introduction of tuition fees and 
6 Formally known as "The National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education" 
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the replacement of grants with maintenance loans, claiming that these changes 
would serve to put off lower class children who might otherwise have gone to 
university. 
Despite these concerns there was still very little evidence on the impacts of these 
major financial changes on participation and the gap between rich and poor, and 
further major reforms soon followed in 2006 when the £1200 up-front fee was 
replaced with a so-called "top up fee" of £3000 which was accompanied with a 
loan to the same value, meaning repayment could be deferred until graduation. 
Grants were also increased for poorer students at this time (Goodman and Kaplan, 
2003; Dearden et al, 2008). 
Thus, the UK has moved from the system of the 1960's — where only a small 
number of youths went to university and the taxpayer footed the entire bill for a 
students' education, to the current system of cost-sharing, where contributors to 
higher education include taxpayers, parents, institutions and students themselves. 
As a result of devolution, Scotland (in 1999) and Wales (in 2004) have been 
granted powers to decide their own Higher Education finance legislation, and 
both countries have done so, with Scotland in particular departing from the rest of 
the UK by abolishing tuition fees in 2000. The impact is that where the UK once 
had a single, free for all, HE finance system, there are now three separate, 
evolving, and quite different systems in England and Northern Ireland, Wales and 
Scotland, all of which require some kind of contribution from the students 
themselves. 
1.3 The economic principles behind the reforms 
The subject of how to finance Higher Education has been debated by economists 
for many years. The government policies described above have largely focused on 
increasing the financial contribution made by students — so called "cost sharing", 
with the aim to increase university funding per student. As mentioned above, this 
continues to be a pressing matter — by 2006 government expenditure had reached 
£8709m and projected expenditure for 2007 is £9179m7. 
7 (DIUS departmental report, 2007) 
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There are a number of economic and social reasons why governments may want 
or need to intervene in the HE market (Johnstone, 1972; 1991; 2003, Barr 2004, 
Goodman and Kaplan, 2003, Barr and Crawford, 20054). These different reasons 
are discussed below: 
1 Capital market failures. With no intervention in the market for HE, all 
students would have to bear the full cost of their higher education. Given their 
age, most students would be unable to pay for themselves and would have to 
turn to their parents, or to capital markets to raise the money. While banks 
may be willing to loan students the money to pay for their education, they 
may not operate efficiently — banks do not know what individuals' future 
earnings will be and therefore may not want to loan them money or may only 
do so at a cost that is prohibitive to the student. Consequently, the government 
may wish to intervene to help those who cannot afford to pay for their 
education (particularly those from low-income backgrounds) by offering fee 
remissions or loans. Further intervention may be required if particular groups 
of students are debt-averse, and so do not wish to take out loans to pay for 
their education. Low income students may again be more likely to fall into 
this category (Callender, 1998). 
2. Information inequalities. Certain groups of people lack information about the 
benefits of higher education, both as an experience and in terms of the likely 
wage return. They may choose instead to go straight into employment if they 
believe the costs of university are high compared to the benefits. Again, such 
individuals tend to be from poorer backgrounds (Goodman and Kaplan, 2003) 
and will therefore be under-represented in HE. The government may wish to 
intervene to encourage such people to attend university by providing them 
with incentives such as maintenance grants and loans, and by offering fee 
loans or remissions, as well as by providing them with additional information 
about the benefits of university. 
3. Social returns. While there is a good deal of evidence that individuals gain 
personally from participating in HE (Blundell et al, 2000) there might also be 
social returns — such as improving economic growth and international 
competitiveness through a more educated workforce, improving the nations 
health or reducing crime (Dolton, Greenaway and Vignoles, 1997; Wossman and 
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Schultz, 2006). Therefore it may be in the interests of the government to 
encourage university attendance even at a high cost to the taxpayer. 
4. Inequality in costs incurred and benefits received. Despite the gradual move 
towards sharing the cost of universities with students, public expenditure on 
the HE sector has continued to grow. Thus, there is a sizeable cost to the 
taxpayer, but not all taxpayers reap the benefits of HE. As described in 
Section 1.2 the majority of those attending universities are from upper or 
middle class backgrounds, but taxpayers are from all backgrounds. Thus, 
those from low socio-economic groups are contributing taxes for a service 
they are less likely to use than those from other groups, meaning providing 
free education in this way is economically regressive. One way of improving 
this situation would be to make changes to the tax system so that poorer or 
non-university educated taxpayers contribute less. Another way would be to 
ask those attending HE to contribute to the cost of their education. 
5. Other equity reasons. Finally, and related to point 4, the government may 
want to intervene to encourage certain groups of people to go to university 
who are under-represented. Indeed the UK Government remains committed to 
increasing participation rates across the board, and in 2003 the Labour Party 
set themselves a target of achieving participation of 50% of young (18-30 year 
olds) people by 2010. A key factor in achieving this goal is clearly to 
understand how to increase participation, and in particular to encourage 
attendance among low income groups, who make up a large proportion of 
society. 
One of the most important aims of the UK Government's interventions is to 
increase funding to universities and to reduce the taxpayer burden, which is seen 
as economically regressive, by making individuals contribute to cost of their 
education through fees and loans. However, this must be achieved without 
sacrificing the desire to increase absolute numbers of students and improve 
relative participation by under-represented socio-economic groups. 
This thesis focuses on these issues in particular, examining whether the 
introduction of up-front fees in 1998 and the abolition of grants has impacted HE 
participation, and which types of students are most impacted by the reforms. 
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1.4 How has Government intervention impacted HE participation? 
Despite years of debate, there is little empirical evidence that maintenance grants 
encourage students towards higher education, or that tuition fees dissuade them. 
Research for the UK in this area has been limited, partly because the reforms 
themselves have only been in place for a short time, but also because of a lack of 
detailed data on participants and non-participants. 
As was evident from Figure 1.1, growth in overall numbers of students has 
apparently continued, despite the increases in costs faced by students as described 
in Section 1.1. The only obvious response to the reforms are the peaks in the rate 
of acceptances (and by inference, applications) in the years immediately before 
the 1998 and 2006 major reforms, both of which increased costs of going to HE, 
presumably as students who may have postponed their start at university for a 
year or more, enrol on courses early to avoid the increase costs (it certainly 
implies some sort of aversion to the reforms). While Figure 1.1 illustrates the 
continuing growth in university participation over time, it says nothing about the 
distribution of participation among rich and poor or the differing rates of 
participation of individuals of differing socio-economic status, an issue which, as 
mentioned, has been firmly on the Governments agenda for several years. 
In order to understand how the reforms have impacted the relative participation of 
youths from rich and poor backgrounds, it is useful to examine how the 
proportion of students from different socio-economic groups has changed over 
time. A small number of UK studies have focused on this question, such as 
Glennerster (2001) and Blanden and Machin (2004). 
Unfortunately, UK socio-economic status has been subject to two major re-
classifications, the first in 1978 when the four major classes of unskilled or 
manual workers (I-XX), skilled workers (XXI-XXIII), administrators and 
managers (XXIV) and professional, technical workers and artists (XXV) were 
reclassified into six new classes of Professional (I), Managerial (II), Skilled non-
manual (IIIN), Skilled Manual (IIIM), Part Skilled (IV) and Unskilled (V). A 
further re-classification was carried out in 2001, so that there are now seven 
classifications — Higher Managerial and Professional (1), Lower Managerial and 
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Professional (2), Intermediate (3), Small Employers and Account Workers (4), 
Lower Supervisory and Technical (5), Semi-routine (6) and Routine Occupations 
(7). This has resulted in two series breaks which make analysis of the time series 
problematic. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that there is a distinct gap in participation between 
those from high and low socio-economic groups. In general those from 
professional and managerial backgrounds are disproportionately represented 
among the student population, with those from routine and unskilled backgrounds 
under-represented. This trend appears to have continued up to the present. Table 
1.1 illustrates this.8 
Table 1.1 - Socio-economic status of UK domiciled HE students accepted at English 
institutions, with working population 1970-2006, (UCAS)  
Year: 
Socio-economic status: 	 1969/70 	 1980/81 	 1999/00 	 2005/06 
1. Higher managerial 
& professional 
Acceptances 
Population 
30% 
9% 
21% 
5% 
13% 
5% 
18% 
11% 
2.Lower managerial Acceptances 14% 48% 39% 26% 
& professional Population 7% 20% 25% 22% 
3.Intermediate Acceptances 28% 10% 14% 12% 
Population 21% 10% 20% 10% 
4.Small employers Acceptances 28% 13% 12% 6% 
& account workers Population 62% 40% 17% 8% 
5.Lower supervisory Acceptances 7% 7% 4% 
& technical Population 18% 14% 9% 
6.Semi-routine Acceptances 1% 2% 11% 
Population 7% 5% 13% 
7.Routine Acceptances 4% 
Population 9% 
Note: in 1999 and 2005, working population statistics include long-term unemployed, making up 
14% and 18% of the population respectively. Note also, that since 1999 the proportion of students 
whose background is unknown has risen. 
For example, in 1969/70 30% of students were from professional backgrounds, 
though these occupations made up only 9% of the working population. Those 
8 Corresponding classifications Pre-1978 — 1.XXV; 2.XXIV; 3.XXI-XXIII; 4.I-XX 
Corresponding classifications,1978-2000 — 1.Professional (I); 2. Managerial, technical (II); 3. 
Skilled non-manual (TIN); 4. Skilled manual (HIM); 5. Part-skilled (IV); 6. Unskilled (V) 
Equivalent data for Scotland not available 
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from unskilled backgrounds made up 62% of the working population, but only 
28% of students were from such backgrounds. In 2005, the three highest socio-
economic groups made up 56% of acceptances and 43% of the population, while 
those from the lowest socio-economic groups are under-represented, making up 
31% of the population but only 19% of acceptances9. 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the changes in socio-economic status of UK domiciled HE 
students from 1968 — 2006 (again see Footnote 8, p 19 for previous 
classifications). The series breaks are immediately apparent from this chart. 
This simple eye-balling of the data reveals no obvious visible impact of the 
introduction of the first student loans in 1990. The series between 1978 and 2001 
does seem to show a decrease in the proportion of students coming from 
professional and managerial backgrounds, though, in favour of those coming from 
skilled non-manual backgrounds. There is little change in the proportion of 
students from part-skilled or unskilled backgrounds. 
Looking at the most recent years, after the re-classification in 2002, the 
distribution seems more stable. Students from professional, managerial and 
technical parental backgrounds dominate acceptances while those from routine 
and unskilled parental backgrounds make up around 15% of acceptances. Again 
based on this raw data, the introduction of top-up fees in 2006 seems to have had 
little impact on the distribution of students, although interestingly the proportion 
of unclassified students (i.e. those whose parental backgrounds are unknown) has 
risen to 22% from only 7% in 1993 so there may well be a hidden impact in these 
figures. 
9  
It is worth noting that the proportion of students whose socio-economic status is unknown has 
also risen (for reasons which are not apparent), now standing at 22%, making comparison with 
previous years even more difficult. 
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Figure 1.2 — Socio-economic status of UK domiciled HE students accepted at UK institutions, 
1970-2006, (UCAS) 
Research similar in nature to the above was carried out by Glennerster (2001), 
who reports Social Trends data on higher education participation and parental 
social class for the UK in the 1990s, showing a sharp increase in participation by 
those from higher social classes between 1991/2 and 1998/9, though he also finds 
an increase in participation of those from lower classes over the same time. 
While this and the above research is informative of overall trends in participation, 
it can be misleading, given the multiple re-classification of social classes over the 
time period in question. 
To overcome the problems associated with such official statistics, Blanden and 
Machin (2004) instead examine university participation rates by parental income, 
pointing out that "this makes the metric much clearer, particularly as over 
decades the composition of social class groupings has significantly changed with 
coincident shifts in occupational structure." 
They use survey data from the NCDS, BCS and BHPS to obtain data on youth's 
parental income and university participation. Looking at a simple measure of the 
difference in participation between the top and bottom income quartiles, they 
uncover a sharp increase in HE inequality throughout the 80s and 90s — with a 
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14% gap in 1981, through to 30% by 1993 and even further rises to the end of the 
90s. They conclude that the rapid expansion of HE in the 80s and 90s was not 
equally distributed across people from richer and poorer backgrounds but instead 
those from richer families benefitted more than the poor. 
However, this descriptive analysis does not provide evidence of the causal impact 
of the reforms on participation, rather it simply shows that at the same time as the 
reforms were taking place, inequality in participation between rich and poor 
youths was increasing. But the increases in participation among rich students 
documented by Blanden and Machin may have been caused by factors other than 
the HE reforms. For example, it is widely established that youths from rich 
backgrounds tend to achieve better scores at GCSE level or equivalent (see for 
example Chowdry et al, 2009) and it may be that this factor has driven faster 
increases in their university participation relative to youths from poorer 
backgrounds, rather than any changes in HE finance legislation. Similarly, it is 
well-known that youth's early years experiences are a key driver in their future 
educational attainment, including HE (Heckman and Carneiro, 2003; Gorard, 
2006), so it may be the case that improvements in early child development, rather 
than changes in HE finance, are responsible for increases in university 
participation. 
Blanden and Machin acknowledge this, pointing out that it is necessary to subject 
the analysis to more rigorous probing. They therefore go on to model the 
probability of having a degree with parental income as the explanatory variable of 
interest, controlling for a number of factors including youths' prior educational 
attainment, parental age and family composition. Their results show degree 
attainment becoming more closely linked to family income as participation in 
higher education has expanded between the 80s and late 90s. 
Similar evidence from this nature comes from Galindo-Rueda et al (2004), who 
also look at changes in university participation by parental income. Their results 
are similar to those of Blanden and Machin, emphasizing the large gap in 
participation by income background during the past decades, and these studies 
remain the few to have explored this issue in the UK. 
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However, the studies carried out by Glennerster, Blanden and Machin and 
Galindo-Rueda et al, as well as the descriptive analysis above, are limited for a 
number of reasons. 
1) Descriptive statistics and trends, while informative about absolute 
increases in participation, as well as the gap in educational attainment 
between rich and poor, do not provide information about the causes of the 
increases or this gap. Even if youths from rich backgrounds became more 
likely to attend university around the time up-front fees were introduced 
this cannot be taken as evidence that fees did not impact their likeliness to 
attend. Similarly, even if youths from poor backgrounds were less likely to 
go to university around the same time as grants were abolished, this 
cannot be taken as evidence that abolishing grants drove this shift. Other 
things may be changing at the same time as HE finance legislation, and 
driving the trends observed in the data. While the modeling techniques 
used in the literature discussed above go some way to uncovering the 
causal relationship between parental income and participation while 
controlling for such factors as parental education, there may be other 
characteristics which are more difficult to control for, such as youths 
inherent ability, early childhood development or changing tastes, which 
may be the main factors in participation changes. Furthermore, parental 
income is also directly related to the amount of grants received and fees 
payable, so interpreting coefficients in a causal way can be difficult. 
2) Even if such factors could be controlled for in the models above, this does 
not help to isolate the separate impact of grants and fees on participation. 
As described, the majority of the UK reforms involved simultaneous 
changes in grants and fees, alongside increases in maintenance loans. So 
even if participation was found to have increased among certain income 
groups, controlling for all other possible factors, it is not possible to 
ascertain whether this increase was driven by changes in fees, grants or 
loans, or some combination. In 2007, estimated spend was £918m on 
maintenance grants, £349m on student fee loans and £564 on maintenance 
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loans, as well as a further £509m managing fee and maintenance loans.i°  
Given the huge costs to the taxpayer associated with these elements of HE 
finance, it would seem vital to understand fully their individual effects. 
3) Following on from the above, it would be extremely useful to understand 
the impact of HE finance in monetary terms. In other words, what is the 
impact of an increase of, say, £1000 (again, in 2006 prices) in grants on 
participation? Increases of this nature have been common in UK funding 
policy, and as yet no evidence of their impact exists for the UK. This type 
of evidence could only be ascertained by using econometric techniques to 
model the probability of participation given values of grants fees. 
A further major reason for a better understanding of the impact of HE finance is 
because current system is still in a state of evolution. The deferred £3000 fee for 
English students has only been in place since 2006, but a review in 2009 will 
most likely result in their increase — and there is little solid evidence as to what 
the impact of such an increase will be. Given the costs associated with an increase 
in tuition fees — assuming that these fees would be backed by loans, as well as the 
desire to increase absolute numbers of students while addressing the gap between 
rich and poor in terms of university attendance, it would seem essential for the 
Government to understand the implications of any changes to the levels of aid 
eligibility and fee obligations. 
While, as discussed, no quantitative research of this nature has been carried out in 
the UK, a number of US studies have been carried out over the past few decades, 
which explore the causal relationship between grants and fees and participation. 
Studies such as Kane (1994) and Dynarksi (2004) have modeled probability of 
participation while controlling for observed and unobservable factors, and 
uncovered positive impacts of aid and negative impacts of tuition fees. While 
these results are specific to the US and their aid and fee policies, the results imply 
that the levels of grants and fees set by the Government play important roles in 
encouraging participation. 
l° All in 2007 prices.This does not represent the amount of money lent to students, but the future 
cost of subsidizing and writing off student loans issued in that year as well as management of the 
student loans stock (DfES departmental report 2007) 
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In summary then, it is vital to gain a detailed understanding of the impact of 
maintenance grant eligibility and tuition fee obligation on participation, and this is 
the main aim of the first strand of the thesis. In particular the thesis aims to 
answer the following questions: 
1) What is the impact of the Higher Education reforms of the past two 
decades since the 1990s on absolute levels of university participation, after 
controlling for observed background factors and unobservable factors? 
2) What do the HE reforms mean for relative participation by socio-
economic status? In particular, did the abolition of grants and introduction 
of up-front fees in 1998/99 have a negative impact on participation of 
youths from low income backgrounds relative to those from high income 
backgrounds? And if so, can student aid in the form of grants be used as a 
tool to encourage poorer youths into university? 
3) Did the abolition of tuition fees and re-instatement of grants in Scotland 
contribute to increased participation levels compared with England? 
4) What is the impact of a £1000 increase in grants and fees on participation? 
This work has claims to originality and importance. A causal, quantitative 
analysis which attempts to untangle the separate impacts of grants and fees rather 
than the joint impact of the reforms has never been carried out for the UK, nor 
have any studies aimed to compare participation in Scotland and England given 
their differing HE finance strategies. 
But this analysis is necessary in order to truly understand the impact of the 
ongoing changes to Higher Education finance policy. Due to the complex nature 
of university participation decision-making, which depends on many factors such 
as parental education and motivation, as well as youth's ability and attitude, a 
thorough estimation-based approach to modeling participation is required, in 
which background characteristics can be controlled for. In this way the impact of 
student maintenance grants and tuition fees on participation can be fully 
understood. In the first strand of the thesis the key aim is to estimate a model of 
this nature. 
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1.5 The impact of the reforms on university funding levels 
As discussed in Section 1.2, one of the main aims of the Government's move 
towards cost-sharing in HE was to increase levels of funding per university 
student. Changes in the levels of tuition fee can have a dramatic impact on 
university funding levels. 
As seen in Section 1.1, the Government failed to keep student funding levels up 
during the large rise in student volumes in the 1980s and 1990s. This can be seen 
in Figure 1.3 — a symmetry is apparent between the volume of students and 
funding per head, with per head funding levels over the 1990s falling as quickly 
as volumes of students increased. 
Figure 1.3: University Spending — public funding for domestic students; Full-time 
equivalents UK only, 1985-2002 (figures compiled by Carpentier, V; Institute of Education) 
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The decision in 1998 to introduce up-front fees for full-time degree students 
provided a sudden increase in income for cash-strapped universities across the 
UK. The subsequent increase in fees in 2006 resulted in as much as a 35% 
increase in funding per head in England and Northern Ireland (Dearden, 
Goodman and Wyness, 2009). By this time, the Scottish Parliament had abolished 
tuition fees, thus cutting off this source of funds from their national universities. 
The second strand of this thesis presents an analysis of the resultant comparative 
funding levels in Scotland versus the rest of the UK, thus shedding light on the 
impact of higher education funding from the perspective of university funding 
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levels, and hence the competitiveness of Scotland's universities world-wide. The 
rationale for this is straightforward. 
University funding plays an important role in maintaining quality of teaching and 
research — see for example Beath et al (2005), and ultimately to the 
competitiveness of countries in terms of their HE provision. Scottish universities 
have long been seen as some of the best in the world and have traditionally 
received more funding than those in England. 
There is wide concern in the Scottish press, that the injection of additional money 
into the English system would result in English universities being able to provide 
better facilities, better pay and better resources, resulting in a potential "brain 
drain" of quality teaching in Scotland as lecturers and researches are attracted 
South of the border. Research tends to be dominated by English language 
institutions, and is an extremely lucrative field, attracting large amounts of money 
into UK universities. For example, in 2007/08 UK universities received £3722m 
through research grants" — or 15.9% of their total income, with Scottish 
universities themselves tending to attract a similar proportion of their overall 
funding from research grants. It is important for Scottish universities to remain 
competitive with English, to keep attracting research grants and income, and the 
increased levels of funding going to English universities poses a threat to this. 
Furthermore, students who are attracted by the high quality facilities, research and 
teaching of Scottish universities may themselves be attracted to study in England 
instead, given increases in their relative funding. Cross-border education has 
become a commercial business in the UK, bringing in large amounts of money 
from (unregulated) high tuition fees from non-EU students. Scotland draws 
around 12% of its university funding from non-EU students12 who are presumably 
attracted by the reputation and quality of its universities, and again a threat to its 
competitive position from England could have serious financial repercussions. 
Further increases in tuition fees are expected in England in 2009, which will have 
even greater ramifications. Thus, it is essential for the Scottish Government to 
1 1 Total income and expenditure through research grants and contracts (HESA) 
12 Based on figures for 2007/08 (HESA) 
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understand the implications of the increases in tuition fees in England in terms of 
resources available per student in England compared to Scotland. It is equally 
important to understand the impact of the tuition fee policies in England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland have been successful in their aim to increase funding per 
head. Scotland provides a useful comparison group to shed light on this. 
This is the main aim of the second part of this thesis. 
Again, analysis of this nature — specifically comparing Scottish and English 
funding levels before and after the HE finance reforms, has never before been 
carried out. 
This investigation therefore provides new insights into the potential impact of 
changes in the levels of tuition fees on university funding and hence, 
competitiveness nationwide and abroad. 
1.6 Thesis outline 
Having presented the rationale for investigating the impact of higher education 
funding reforms, Chapter 2 presents a detailed examination of the economic 
rationale behind government intervention in HE, plus a detailed overview of HE 
policy changes in the UK from the 1960s to the present date. As described in 
Section 1.4., there is little robust evidence on the causal impact of different 
aspects of HE finance on university participation, and many researchers have 
argued that factors such as early childhood development have a far greater 
influence in individuals' participation decisions than HE finance (Gorard, 2006; 
Heckman and Carneiro, 2003). The counter-argument is that HE finance does 
matter, and there is a small body of evidence from the US in which a significant 
causal relationship is found even after controlling for background and other 
characteristics (Card, 2005; Dynarski, 1999). Chapters 3 and 4 present this debate. 
Chapter 3 addresses the fundamental question of whether HE finance matters, 
concentrating on the role of early child development and transitions to higher 
education and asking what are the main drivers of higher educational enrolment, 
and what kind of part does HE finance play? Chapter 4 then presents the counter-
argument and sets up the main body of analysis in the thesis by presenting the 
small body of evidence that tuition fees and grants do have some impact on 
individuals' participation decisions over and above the role of early development 
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and early years education. Particular attention is given to the methodologies used 
to uncover the causal relationship between HE finance and participation, which is 
of great relevance to this thesis. Having examined the theoretical issues 
surrounding the impact of HE finance on university participation decisions, 
Chapters 5-7 present the datasets and methods of analysis used for the first strand 
of the thesis. Given the complexity of methodology and the need for data that 
meets many criteria, an exploration of potential data sources is presented in 
Chapter 5, with choice of data source for this analysis and reasons behind this 
choice. Chapter's 6 and 7 present the results of the impact of the HE reforms on 
university participation using a number of strategies and approaches, including 
use of both individual-level data and pseudo-panel data. Chapter 7's key aim is to 
explicitly measure the impact of a real (2006 price) £1000 increase in grants and 
up-front tuition fees on university participation. This information is highly 
relevant to policy-makers in highlighting the delicate balance that policy-makers 
must achieve in setting levels of HE finance in their on-going efforts to design an 
equitable and cost-effective funding strategy. Chapter 8 presents the main 
conclusions of this strand of the thesis. Chapter 9 finishes the thesis with a stand-
alone quantitative analysis of the impact of the abolition of tuition fees in 
Scotland on university funding levels and the resulting implications and 
conclusions regarding the impact of tuition fee legislation on competitiveness of 
universities in terms of funding per head. 
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First Strand 
The impact of higher education 
finance on university participation in 
the UK 
30 
Chapter 2 Higher education finance 
policy — equity, efficiency and 
government intervention 
2.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 1, the UK Higher Education system has undergone 
several government interventions in the last few decades. These interventions had 
at their root the aim to increase funding per university student, but were also 
designed to address the issues of economic efficiency and equity (Goodman and 
Kaplan, 2003). 
As a result of these policy interventions, the UK has moved from a system where 
the taxpayer footed the entire bill for HE to a system of cost-sharing, where HE 
participants contribute to their higher education through tuition fees and income 
contingent loans. 
Many economists (Barr and Crawford, 1998, 2005; Goodman and Kaplan, 2003; 
Barr 2002; 2004; Wossman and Schultz, 2006) argue that government 
intervention of this nature is essential in delivering an efficient and equitable HE 
system and if designed and implemented correctly, can encourage a greater 
volume and more diverse range of applications. 
It is important to understand the economic principles of the governments reforms 
and the rationale and intentions behind them, before going on to analyze their 
impact in terms of participation. 
This chapter therefore looks at the economic principles behind government 
intervention in the HE market, focusing in particular on the cost-sharing model 
implemented in the UK in recent decades. The second part of the chapter 
accompanies these arguments with a detailed documentation of the policy 
changes that have taken place in the UK from 1963 to the present day. This 
provides context to the economic arguments by describing the nature of the UK's 
move towards cost-sharing as well as providing context to the entire thesis by 
explaining the policies that will be analyzed in Chapters 6-8 and the 
Government's intentions behind them. 
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The arguments in favour of moving towards a cost-sharing system largely centre 
on the two main areas of equity and efficiency. In both cases equitable and 
efficient systems reflect the principle that those who benefit from higher 
education should pay for it — since education is an investment good, which has a 
private return to the individual, he/she should contribute to the cost of it. Before 
examining the Government's rationale behind its move towards cost-sharing it is 
therefore desirable to know who the benefits of HE accrue to. The question of 
who benefits from HE, and to what extent, is therefore briefly explored, before 
the issues of equity and efficiency in HE are discussed in full. 
2.2 Who benefits from Higher Education? 
It is widely understood that graduate salaries are some way above those of non-
graduates on average, suggesting that a large private benefit is obtained from 
investing in a university education. 
However, while this may be true of the average graduate, estimates of the returns 
to HE vary considerably, and the relationship between higher education and 
earnings is not clear cut. Even if average graduate salaries are significantly higher 
than those of non-graduates, this may not be directly due to higher education. It 
may be that other factors, aside from education, have caused an individual to earn 
more — for example it may be that those people undertaking degrees are more 
intelligent or possess more skills than average, and as a result these people are 
also more likely to go into higher education. If this is the case, returns to 
education, including HE will be over-stated. 
Early theories on returns to education came from Mincer (1974) who developed 
the famous Mincer equation to estimate the rate of return to education: 
InY =a +pS + I30x + Pix2 + r 	 2.1 
Where Y=real wage earnings, S=years of schooling, x=work experience 
As is clear, the Mincerian estimation method as well as much of the early human 
capital based literature ignores the possibility that other factors may have 
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contributed to an individual's wages, most obviously that those entering higher 
education may have higher ability than those without a degree and this may be the 
factor behind their higher earnings — so called "ability bias." 
Such ability bias was first discussed extensively by Griliches (1977), and this is a 
very developed area of research with a long history of investigation. In order to 
overcome the problems associated with ability bias and uncertainty, a number of 
methodological approaches have been used to estimate a causal relationship 
between education and earnings — i.e. one in which the impact of ability is 
somehow controlled for (see for example Angrist and Krueger (1991), Saiger and 
Stock (1997), Kane and Rouse (1993), Blundell, Dearden, Meghir and Sianesi 
(1999), Blundell et al (2000)). Such methodologies include adding controls for 
family background, estimating the model using an instrumental variables (IV) 
approach, using an instrument such as an institutional feature of the education 
system, using twin studies to control for bias, matching graduates with otherwise 
identical non-graduates using propensity score matching, or indeed controlling for 
ability using test scores. 
Card (1994; 1998) pulls together the main methodological issues around 
estimating rates of return to HE, including many of those mentioned above, and 
estimates that OLS regressions of earnings on education may be upward biased to 
the tune of around 10%. 
Further developments came from Heckman (2005; 2008) who argues that ability 
bias will almost certainly result in over-estimation of the returns to education, and 
adds to the literature, the theory of sequential revelation of uncertainty. In other 
words, as an individual goes through life, information on their potential future 
earnings from different sources of education are updated. For example, if an 
individual learns that they will incur a good wage early on, they may be more 
inclined to leave school and enter the labour market, whereas those staying on at 
school may have done so because there were no suitable or good paying jobs 
available to them. But those that stay on will have new information revealed to 
them — for example at the end of high school, the possibility of attending college 
is opened up, which the rational individual will go on and do if tuition costs and 
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opportunity costs (of sacrificing earnings) are low. Heckman therefore argues that 
education decisions are made sequentially and so models of returns to education 
must be dynamic, and factor this uncertainty in, rather than seeing education 
decision making as something made once in a lifetime. 
More recently, Walker and Zhu (2005) find the effect of (typically a three-year) 
college education on wages is large — the college premium averages around 22% 
for men and 35% for women. They go on (in their 2008 paper) to show that even 
after the large increases in university participation over the 1980s and 1990s, 
returns to degrees are still positive in the UK, and for women actually rose, 
despite the large increase in the supply of female graduates. 
The studies above suggest that returns to higher education, while often over-
estimated, are generally positive, indicating Higher Education, does indeed 
represent an investment good with a significant personal return. However, even 
though high wage returns may be positive for the average graduate, this may not 
be true for all graduates. Walker and Zhu (2005) show that the cohorts of 
graduates entering the labour market after the mass expansion of HE appear to 
have lower wage premiums than those entering before the expansion. They also 
show that the rises in returns to degrees were not evenly distributed — they find 
substantial rises in returns for those in the top income quartile, while they find a 
fall in wage premiums for men in the bottom income quartile. 
Work by Dearden et al (2005) also supports this theory, finding that different 
types of individual will have different lifetime earning profiles as a result of 
undertaking HE, and therefore focussing on average earnings profiles, and 
ignoring spells of non employment (especially females experience through 
motherhood) or graduates changing position in the earnings distribution (through 
moving jobs), ignores the diversity of graduate trajectories. By accounting for 
these factors, Dearden et al find that benefit an individual reaps from a degree is 
highly dependent on their place in the overall earnings distribution — while the 
average graduate earns more than a non-graduate, the financial advantage for 
many graduates is much smaller, and some graduates will end up earning less 
than non-graduates. For example, while male non-graduates in the bottom 10% 
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earning percentile earn nearly £800,00013 less than male graduates, male non-
graduates in the top 10% of earners earn £369,000 more than graduates — i.e. a 
substantial proportion of graduates can end up earning less than those without a 
degree. This analysis is not causal, but highlights there is huge variability in 
graduate and non-graduate earning profiles over the lifecycle and undertaking HE 
does not mean that all HE graduates will derive positive returns. 
Card, in his 1998 review, also points out that the marginal returns to schooling 
vary by certain subgroups, with some apparently benefitting more than others. He 
concludes that there may be no unique causal effect of schooling, or at best 
individuals may all have different returns to education as a result of their inherent 
ability and varying marginal rates of substitution between earnings and future 
earnings, as a result of their different levels of wealth or different tastes. 
So, while graduates on average will almost certainly earn more than those without 
a higher education, returns are not certain for all graduates. 
However, this discussion has focused only on monetary benefits to graduates, 
whilst there may be a number of non-monetary benefits that participants derive 
from HE. For example university may be an enjoyable experience which also 
improves individuals' access to more interesting types of job or better working 
conditions. 
Furthermore, there may be benefits to society as a whole resulting from HE. Such 
benefits could include increases in economic growth through technical 
innovation, health benefits or the contribution of education to parenting skills. 
Unfortunately, such social returns to higher education are notoriously hard to 
quantify and are by no means certain (see for example the discussion in Dolton, 
Greenaway and Vignoles, 1997). 
Nevertheless, despite the wealth of studies of the returns to HE, a positive return 
to higher education is still found in the UK (Walker and Zhu, 2008), suggesting 
higher education represents an investment good with a significant personal return. 
13 All figures in this chapter are reported in 2006/07 prices unless otherwise stated 
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With this in mind, the following sections consider the equity and efficiency 
arguments behind cost-sharing in education. 
2.3 Efficiency and Equity in Higher Education Finance 
Efficiency interventions concern the costs and benefits of HE — in other words, 
how much benefit is obtained from the HE sector compared to the costs of 
running it (Wossman and Schultz, 2006). Equity in higher education can 
meanwhile be viewed in two lights — firstly, in terms of the issue of unequal 
access to higher education, and secondly in terms of inequalities in the costs 
incurred and benefits received. 
The Government may wish to intervene in an HE system to increase university 
funding, and to reduce costs to the taxpayer (Goodman and Kaplan, 2003), but 
must balance this by maintaining efficient rates participation and equity of access. 
Barr and Crawford (1998; 2005) argue that while it is possible for the taxpayer to 
fund an elite system such as that of the UK in the 1960's, which due to the small 
numbers of participants was relatively low cost, it is not possible for the taxpayer 
to fund a mass system — the education sector will always lose out to other 
priorities such as health and housing. As discussed in Section 1.5, the experience 
of the UK seems to support this — by the late 1990's real funding per higher 
education FTE (full-time equivalent student) had fallen from a high of £12,14714 
in 1973, to £4,850 in 1997. 
As seen in Section 2.1, there are likely to be high private benefits associated with 
HE, so it would seem fair that those benefitting from HE should therefore 
contribute to the costs of their education. However, those contributing to the cost 
of HE do not always reap these benefits. 
As discussed in Section 1.4, equity of access is not achieved in the UK HE system 
(Wossman and Schultz, 2006); a person's likeliness to participate in HE is highly 
correlated with their family circumstances — the proportion of youths from 
professional, managerial and socio-economic groups attending HE is far greater 
than the proportion from routine and semi-routine occupations. 
14 Again, in 2006 prices 
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So, while the overwhelming majority of participants in higher education are from 
professional and managerial backgrounds, taxpayers are spread across all socio-
economic groupings. Low-income households are therefore paying taxes for a 
higher education system that those from high income backgrounds derive the 
most benefit from — in terms of both the experience of attending university, and 
the high wages they will likely go on to earn as graduates. 
This issue has been widely debated in the UK (Barr and Crawford, 1998; 2005) 
and in the US (D. Bruce Johnson, 1972; 1991; 2003). Barr and Crawford's work 
looking at the UK system seeks to highlight the regressive nature of a purely 
taxpayer funded HE system. They argue that the provision of free tuition fees and 
grants to students (the system that was in place in the UK up to 1990) is 
inequitable, and highly regressive in economic terms, since the costs of HE must 
be paid for by all taxpayers regardless of whether or not they actually participate, 
while the benefits, as discussed in Section 2.2., are largely private. 
Greenaway and Haynes (2003) and Goodman and Kaplan (2003) concur with this 
theory, with the former arguing that 'public funding redistributes resources from 
low income taxpayers to (future) high income taxpayers and is therefore 
regressive.' 
This is seen as clear evidence for government intervention in the form of 
introducing tuition fees and loans (Barr and Crawford, 1998; 2005) — graduates 
derive a high private return from going to university, so they should contribute to 
at least some of the cost of their tuition and maintenance, rather than enjoy large 
subsidies from low-income taxpayers who are unlikely to go to university and 
therefore reap the benefits enjoyed by graduates. 
Even given the uncertainty of the financial benefits of HE described in Section 
2.2., it seems therefore that on equity grounds, individuals should contribute to 
the cost of their education in some manner. 
There may be other reasons why individuals should contribute to their education 
on equity grounds, thus justifying cost-sharing systems. For example, even if 
there was little wage gain directly associated with participation, graduates may 
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enjoy a number of non-monetary benefits to HE, and may therefore consider it a 
worthwhile investment, meaning that some sort of private contribution may be 
justified. 
One possible exception would be if there were large social returns to HE, as 
discussed in Section 2.2, which justified the taxpayer covering the bill for higher 
education. As stated, however, such returns are by no means certain and so it is 
difficult to justify use of taxpayers' money on these grounds. 
So, given that there is likely a high private return to HE, on equity grounds it 
would seem justifiable that HE participants make some contribution to their 
education. 
One possible strategy would be for the government to surrender to the free market 
and allow students to bear the full cost of their higher education, since as 
discussed above, they are likely to benefit from it in the form of increased wages. 
However, most youths of school leaving age do not possess adequate financial 
resources and would instead be reliant on their parents to loan or give them the 
money, or must be prepared to borrow from capital markets. While banks may be 
willing to loan students the money to pay for their education, they may not do so 
efficiently, and there are many reasons why capital markets fail — banks do not 
have full information on individuals future earnings (the problem of asymmetric 
information) and therefore may not want to loan them money or may only do so at 
a cost that is prohibitive to most students. Adverse selection may occur if the 
banks are only willing to loan to the least risky customers, since these customers 
are likely to need the loans in the first place, while those who would most benefit 
may be refused credit. A further problem may arise if people realize they can 
avoid paying back their loans if banks do not have sufficient information on their 
earnings or whereabouts. Such a problem is called moral hazard and again could 
result in banks refusing to issue loans to potential students. 
Therefore the government may wish to intervene in the credit markets to help 
those who cannot afford to pay for their education (particularly those from low-
income backgrounds) by offering loans at the market rate or even at lower cost. 
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Another way of dealing with this problem would be if the Government was to 
lower the up-front cost faced by students. They may ask students to make a 
smaller contribution to their education than the full market amount, for example, 
in the form of up-front tuition fees of the kind introduced in the UK in 1998/99, 
which were approximately 25% of the value of HE (See Section 2.5). 
Johnstone (1972; 1991; 2003) argues that such tuition fees are a highly efficient 
means of creating a funding source for universities, since in most cases, because 
of the lack of wealth of youths described above, they are typically paid for by 
parents. Many wealthy parents would be happy to make a contribution, and some 
would likely pay well above the maximum fee to guarantee their child's place at a 
more prestigious university — so the university (and the taxpayer) reaps a rich 
resource. 
However, up-front fees may not be an efficient or equitable means of increasing 
HE funding, since, certain groups of youths may be deterred from university as a 
result of the up-front cost. Such youths could be described as credit constrained 
(Carneiro and Heckman, 2003) — i.e. a lack of financial resources to pay for fees, 
living costs or both prevents them from attending university, rather than this being 
an informed choice. 
To tackle this issue, the government may wish to intervene by lowering the costs 
to certain groups of students e.g. by means testing so that lower income groups, 
for example pay less or no fees. The government may also wish to lower the cost 
of living of certain students by offering grants or loans to cover both fees and 
maintenance, meaning that students would not have to pay any up-front costs. 
Again, of course, certain groups of students may not wish to take out loans and 
enter HE if they are debt-averse, or if they have a high future discount rate — e.g. 
certain youths may be unprepared to forgo the chance to earn a wage straight 
away in order to study and may not believe their earnings upon graduation will be 
enough to justify taking out loan. In both cases such youths are more likely to be 
from low income backgrounds (Callender and Jackson, 1998; Goodman and 
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Kaplan, 2003). Such students may also be less informed about the income 
benefits of HE - research has shown that students from poorer backgrounds may 
underestimate the benefits of going to university and overestimate the costs 
(Callender and Jackson, 2005). 
Thus, an inequitable, and inefficiently low number of such students may 
participate in HE without further government intervention. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the UK Government has expressed a desire to increasing participation 
rates across the board, and to increase participation of low-income students, and 
therefore intervention may be needed to ensure that youths are not put off by the 
loan requirement. 
In order to allay these fears, the government may wish to design a loan system 
that protects against future earnings, which as seen in Section 2.2, are uncertain. 
This could be achieved by making the loans income contingent — i.e. students 
would only have to repay their loans upon graduation and employment, and if and 
only if their income goes above a certain threshold. 
Barr (2002; 2004) and Greenaway and Hayes (2000; 2003) argue strongly in 
favour of income-contingent loans (ICLs) for both fees and maintenance on 
efficiency and equity grounds. They argue that income-contingent loans 
encourage participation from low-income students, as many of these students 
cannot afford the up-front costs of going to university, and allowing costs to be 
deferred until later in life would be more efficient since repayments would be 
smaller in the earlier years of graduation and larger in the later years, when 
graduates earnings increase. 
ICLs often include interest subsidies — i.e. where interest rates on the loans are 
frozen so that graduates only pay back what they have borrowed, adjusted for 
inflation. Again this may be justified in that this provides an extra insurance 
policy for debt-averse students, who may be concerned that their debt may spiral 
out of control. 
However, such interest subsidies are very expensive and again must be funded by 
the taxpayer, meaning the government must weigh up the cost of providing 
interest free loans to encourage participation. Greenaway and Hayes (2003) are 
against these subsidies on efficiency grounds, arguing that the private sector 
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would be more attracted to the debt — thus relieving the burden from the taxpayer 
— if a real interest rate was involved. However, charging real interest rates, while 
less expensive to the taxpayer, could be problematic since again as previously 
discussed, higher interest rates may result in a market for loans which again 
suffers from moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
Barr (2002) meanwhile argues against subsidies on equity grounds. He maintains 
that interest subsidies are regressive since they cost the taxpayer huge amounts of 
money and instead governments should provide loans at a real interest rate. 
Indeed Dearden et al (2004) estimate that a typical male graduate earning median 
graduate income up to age 55, who borrowed £3000 for 3 years in fee loans, and 
around £4000 in maintenance loans, would receive a government subsidy on these 
loans of £6103. This figure would obviously vary according to an individual's 
repayment status — someone taking longer to pay off a loan would have their loan 
interest subsidized for longer, and would therefore enjoy a larger subsidy. As the 
government is effectively paying the interest for this graduate, this money comes 
directly from taxpayer funds, and is therefore — as regressive as an education 
system with no student or graduate contribution (Barr, 2002). 
An ICL system with a zero real interest rate was implemented for maintenance 
loans in the UK in 1998 (borrowers previously had to pay a flat rate per month 
unrelated to their earnings) and also replaced upfront fees in 2006. 
A similar solution to the income-contingent loans system would be to implement 
a graduate tax system. This is a deferred payment strategy where some sort of tax 
levy is taken from graduates during their entire working lifetime. This model is 
often favoured on efficiency grounds (Barr, 2004), given its ease of revenue 
collection and that only the direct beneficiaries of HE (rather than all taxpayers) 
would be responsible for paying. Greenaway and Haynes, however, point out that 
graduated taxes can actually be rather inefficient, since revenues would be 
extremely slow to reach Government coffers — for example in the case of a 
graduate tax, they calculate that, assuming a 1% tax and a 40% participation rate, 
it would take 43 years from implementation for a graduate tax to reach a steady 
state of income. A further issue may arise when attempting to collect tax from EU 
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citizens who study in the UK, paying subsidized fees, then return to their home 
countries. 
Governments may also wish to operate the HE market in a way that reflects the 
true costs of higher education. This could be achieved by implementing a variable 
fee system — i.e. one that allows universities to set their own levels of tuition fees. 
Such a market would be more efficient since it could take into account supply and 
demand, and also students themselves may make more rational decisions if they 
were aware of the true costs of their education. 
Variable prices may also be justified on efficiency grounds (Barr, 2004). As well 
as allowing Oxbridge and other universities in high demand to increase their 
quality and competitive edge through access to a lucrative source of funds from 
students (and their parents) who are willing and able to pay, this might also 
improve equity by enabling students, through choice or necessity, to spend less on 
their course and go to a smaller institution. Greenaway and Hayes (2000) and 
Dolton, Greenaway and Vignoles (2004) support this, arguing that "a free market 
depends on prices determined only by competitive pressures, which of necessity 
will be related to true costs." 
Johnstone (1972; 1991; 2003) extends this argument to the US. The US has an 
enormous array of colleges and universities with varying fees. There are many 
institutions charging relatively low tuition fees in comparison with the high rates 
charged by Ivy League schools, but which nonetheless produce good quality 
research and teaching. Individuals can decide, based on their personal 
circumstances which type of institution to invest in. 
A further step would be to allow universities to vary their prices by subject. For 
example universities could charge more for subjects that are more expensive to 
teach, such as medicine, making incomes more relevant (Barr, 2004). For 
example, despite the high demand for engineering and math's degrees, in the UK 
students must pay the same £3000 fee for both despite the fact that engineering 
subjects are far more costly to teach. The system could be made more efficient by 
making engineering students pay more. The Australian Higher Education 
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Contribution Scheme (HECs), for example, has different charges for different 
bands of subjects15. 
A further argument for variable fees is that fixed fees harm access to UK students 
as universities are unable to raise their fees to boost their funds (Barr, 2004). Fees 
for overseas students are unregulated however, so cash-strapped UK institutions 
could simply increase the number of overseas students they accept in order to 
raise more money. This could result in a reduction in places for home students. 
Thus, in order to create a market which reflects the true costs of education it 
would seem that variable fees would be more appropriate than fixed fees. If the 
desire is to reflect this true costs, income contingent loans may also be preferable 
to a tax system, since ICLs are clearly linked to the cost of the graduate's 
education — where as tax systems are open ended, meaning certain graduates, 
depending on their earnings, may pay much more than the cost of their education 
in taxes; the tax itself would bear no relation to the true cost of HE (Dolton, 
Greenaway and Vignoles, 2004) 
By relating the price of university to its true costs, individuals can arguably make 
more rational decisions as to whether to invest in HE and what type of HE 
institution and course they may wish to invest in. 
However, market failure could again occur in this situation (Barr, 2004). Such a 
system would only be equitable if individuals have full information — that is, 
every potential student has full knowledge of varying prices of institutions and 
courses as well as funding legislation, and is aware of the benefits they will gain 
from HE at the expense of their debt. Imposing free market conditions on a HE 
system can only be fair if youths understand all the costs and benefits associated 
with their education. But it is widely known that certain groups of individuals, in 
particular those from low-income backgrounds, have poor access to information 
(Brooks, 2004; Callender and Jackson, 2005). They are less likely to have friends 
or family who have been to university, and may be less likely to be able to access 
15 See "The International Comparative Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project 
(ICHEFAP)" which has details of the HE funding systems of all major countries 
(http://gse.buffalo.edu/org/IntHigherEdFinance/)  
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information about the costs of participation, as well as their potential future 
earnings. Adding such complexities as variable fees may further exacerbate these 
problems. 
Thus, further government intervention in the form of widening access to low-
income youths, e.g. increasing information about the benefits of university, is 
needed to improve information available to those from low-income households 
and this is essential for a system to be efficient (Barr, 1993; 2004). 
So in summary, there are many potential ways for governments to intervene in the 
HE market, and many of the most powerful reasons for doing so concern the 
current inequity of access in the UK system. Fee remissions, grants and income 
contingent loans, of the type discussed, are designed specifically to encourage 
low-income youths to attend university by tackling problems such debt aversion, 
lack of understanding of the future benefits of HE and credit constraints. 
However, there is much evidence that issues such as credit constraints and debt 
aversion are minor (Gorard, 1997; 2006, Carneiro and Heckman, 2002) and that 
the reason for low university participation rates of youths from poorer 
backgrounds is that these youths are far less likely to have the necessary 
qualifications to enter university. If this is the case, then fee remissions and low 
cost loans of the type discussed above will be ineffective as tools to encourage 
participation. 
This will be fully discussed in Chapter 3, which considers in detail the 
determinants of university participation and therefore the effectiveness of HE 
finance policy as a tool for encouraging it. 
Before this though, having put forward the reasons why governments may wish to 
intervene in the HE sector, and the nature of such interventions, Section 2.4 now 
presents a detailed historical analysis of the evolution of the UK's HE funding 
system from the 1960s, when education was free to all, to the current system — a 
mixture of individual and taxpayer responsibility. This section concludes by 
considering the governments most major interventions and to what extent they 
reflect the equity and efficiency considerations discussed. 
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2.4 Policy changes in UK Higher Education funding, 1963-2009 
Unlike many OECD countries, the UK Higher Education sector is almost entirely 
publicly-owned. The exception is Buckingham University, a privately run 
university which offers two-year degree courses, charging students around £8,000 
per year in current (2009) prices. Even Cambridge and Oxford are publicly 
funded, though they may argue that they are privately owned. 
Over the past few decades, the HE sector has moved from this largely state-
funded system to one where part of the cost (in particular, the undergraduate 
teaching component) is borne by undergraduates. This section documents these 
changes, starting from the 1960's and going up to the present day. 
Pre-1963 
Participation Rate: 5%16 
Funding per FTE: £6,11517 
In the 1960's in the UK, the Government (and therefore, the taxpayer) footed the 
bill for the entire cost of higher education. This included teaching, tuition fees and 
generous maintenance grants, as well as the cost of maintaining buildings and the 
other numerous expenses associated with the HE sector. At this time, higher 
education was a privilege of only a small proportion of the adult population — the 
sector consisted of a small number of elite universities, mainly the 7 "ancients" 
(see Appendix 1). Funding per head was high, with a relatively small cost to the 
taxpayer given the low volume of students (Mayhew et al, 2004). 
1963 — The Robbins Report 
Participation Rate: 6% 
Funding per FTE: £8,818 
In the early 1960's the Government became concerned that the UK higher 
education sector was relatively small compared to the rest of the developed world 
16 Represented as the IER (Initial Entry Rate) which measures the percentages of students entering 
higher education for the first time at each age between 18 and 30, expressed as a proportion of the 
total population for each of those ages. 
17 All figures represent funding from public sources excl fees, real 2006 prices (GDP deflator), 
source: 10E, IFS, DIES (note, upfront fees which began in 1998 and top-up fees which were 
implemented in 2006 are not included in this series since a series including these fees is not 
available for the UK as a whole — fees charged are dependent on country of domicile). 
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— the UK's HE participation rate, at around 6%, was one of the lowest in the 
OECD (Barr and Crawford, 2005). The Government were particularly concerned 
that the lack of higher education in the workforce would stunt economic growth. 
As a response, the Committee on Higher Education was commissioned, and 
chaired by Lord Robbins from 1961 to 196418. After the Robbins Report 
publication, its conclusions were accepted by the government on October 24, 
1963. 
The report recommended immediate expansion of universities, by two means. 
Firstly, all Colleges of Advanced Technology were to be given the status of 
universities, which would result in many students being reclassified as higher 
education students. Secondly, the report recommended expanding the sector by 
building more universities. This led to the establishment of 17 "plate glass" 
universities — so called because of their modern, glass fronted design. 
1989 — The Government's white paper on student loans 
Participation Rate: 15% 
Funding per FTE: £9,530 
By the time of the late 1980's, the Government felt the need to intervene in the 
sector once more, for several reasons. The rapid expansion brought about by the 
Robbins reforms had somewhat stalled, with participation at around 15% - still 
one of the lowest in any advanced industrial country. Furthermore, participation 
rates among the working class were extremely low (Greenaway and Haynes, 
2003). The Government recognised the need to grow the higher education sector 
from an elite system to a mass system, partly in response to rapid technological 
change, which necessitated a highly skilled workforce, as well as recognising the 
equity problems associated with the sector. 
However, expanding the sector even further was problematic. The real value of 
maintenance grants had fallen by nearly 20% between 1963 and 1982 as student 
numbers increased, while real wages for school leavers had risen substantially —
tempting many to go straight from compulsory education into the workforce. In 
addition, the sector was still entirely state funded and costly — particularly as the 
Government paid maintenance grants for every student. The Government simply 
18 See also http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uldstory.asp?storyCode=92887&sectioncode=26 
for an analysis of the evidence presented to Robbins 
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couldn't afford to increase the number of places available without cutting funding 
elsewhere, which it was unwilling to do (Barr, 1997). 
In response, the Government began to examine student loan systems to cover part 
of the grants and thus enable further expansion of the sector. 
1990 — The First Student Loan Scheme 
Participation Rate: 17% 
Funding per FTE: £8,928 
In 1990, the first UK student loan scheme was implemented. Student maintenance 
was initially made up of 50% grant and 50% loan. The loan was means-tested 
against parental income, so for better-off students a parental contribution was still 
expected (though not enforced). Repayments were to be made once the student 
was in the workforce and earning over 85% of average earnings, and were 
`mortgage style' — students repaid a flat rate every month, regardless of income 
(Barr and Crawford, 1998). To enable the giant task of administration and 
collection of repayments, the Student Loans Company (SLC) was founded —
initially this was to be co-owned by the high street banks but the agreement 
quickly collapsed when the banks balked at the idea of their prospective best 
customers suddenly becoming indebted to them through an unpopular loans 
scheme. Instead, the Treasury itself took over the running of the SLC. This 
brought with it a major funding problem. Government accounting rules stipulate 
that when the treasury issues a loan, it must be accounted for as expenditure (Barr 
and Crawford, 1998). This meant that in the short term, the savings made on 
maintenance grants would all be taken up by the expenditure on loans. Money 
would only start coming in when the first students graduated and started to repay 
their loans in three years time. Furthermore, the loans were indexed to the rate of 
inflation, but otherwise interest free. This meant the Government had to cover the 
students' cost of borrowing — a substantial subsidy (Barr, 2004). 
1992 — Further Education and Higher Education Act 
Participation Rate: 23% 
Funding per FTE: £6,245 
The 1992 Further and Higher Education Act granted university status to 48 
polytechnics, including 44 in England, 4 in Scotland and 1 in Wales (see 
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Appendix 1). While this act did not increase actual numbers of students, the re-
classification brought about a sharp increase in students counted as being in 
Higher Education (Greenaway and Haynes, 2003). In addition the Act created 
bodies to fund higher education in England — the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE) — and the Further Education Funding Council 
(FEFC). Similarly, the act led to the creation of the Scottish Funding Council and 
the Welsh Funding Council (HEFCW). 
1997 – Dearing report 
Participation Rate: 33% 
Funding per FTE: £4,850 
Dampened by growing participation rates, funding per head had fallen to a 
historical low in 1997. Furthermore, it was widely accepted that the combination 
of loans and grants available to students was not enough, and many of them were 
living below the poverty line (Barr and Crawford, 1998). In response to the major 
funding crisis, the UK Government commissioned the Dearing report, formally 
known as the "National Enquiry of Inquiry into Higher Education", actually a 
series of reports, the principal author of which was Sir Ronald Dearing. 
1998 – First Tuition Fees 
Participation Rate: 33% 
Funding per FTE: £4,787 
Dearing's report made 93 recommendations; one of the main recommendations 
being that students start contributing to the cost of their education. To that end an 
up-front fee of £1,000 in 1998 prices, or £1200 in 2006 prices (25% of average 
tuition costs)I9 was introduced to be paid by all home and EU students at UK 
universities starting their courses in 1998 (Greenaway and Haynes, 2003). 
Dearing's main aim was to bring more money into the sector, and was aware that 
issuing more loans would not achieve this since the Treasury classified student 
debt in the national accounts. To get round this it was decided that there would be 
no loans for fees. The richest students (or their parents) would have to pay their 
19 R79 of the report recommended that' 	
 graduates in work make a flat rate contribution of 
around 25 per cent of the average cost of higher education, through an income contingent 
mechanism 	 '; 
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fees themselves, while the poorer students would be exempt. Against Dearing's 
recommendations, grants were also cut, before being abolished the following 
year, and maintenance loans were extended to all students. However, the main 
difference was that these loans were to be income contingent as opposed to 
mortgage style — students would only begin repaying after they earned £10,000 
(nominal prices) a year — and their repayments would be automatically collected 
from their monthly wages in a similar way to National Insurance Repayments. 
Maintenance loans continued to be subsidised at a zero real rate (Barr and 
Crawford, 1998; Dearden et al, 2008). 
1999 — Scottish devolution 
Participation Rate: 39% 
Funding per FTE: £4,994 
As a result of the 1997 referendum, Scotland was granted powers to make 
primary legislation in certain 'devolved' areas of policy — notably education. The 
Scottish parliament first opened in 1999 and decided that the up-front tuition fee 
would be abolished for Scottish and EU students with the Scottish Executive to 
pay it on their behalf (Cubie et al, 1999). Maintenance loans were kept, but grants 
were re-introduced for the poorest students and renamed as the Young Students 
Bursary. The Graduate Endowment was also introduced. This was a deferred, 
one-off fee of £2289 to be paid in the final year of study, which would go towards 
the funding of future Scottish students. Students could take out an income-
contingent loan to cover the Endowment, with the money to be ring-fenced to 
allow payment of tuition fees and the Young Student's Bursary as well as other 
grants and bursaries. 
2001 — Divergence of policy between UK constituent countries 
Participation Rate: 40%20 
Funding per FTE: £5,485 
The new legislation on tuition fees and graduate endowment in Scotland was 
agreed and by 2001 they had a completely different system from that of the rest of 
20 Note series break from 2001 due to discontinuation of IER, which was replaced by the Higher 
Education Initial Participation Rate (HEIPR). This measures the percentages of students between 
18 and 30 who have started a higher education course for the first time and are still there after six 
months , expressed as a proportion of the total population for each of those ages. 
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the UK, with tuition fees abolished in 2000, and grants re-implemented and the 
graduate endowment put in place in 2001. 
2004 — Higher Education Act 
Participation Rate: 40% 
Funding per FTE: £5,489 
By 2004 participation had risen to around 40%. Even though overall participation 
had increased significantly, the Government became again concerned that 
participation from the working class had not risen. It was also widely agreed that 
the student support package was still too small (Barr, 2004). A further concern 
was that UK universities were still under funded compared with the rest of the 
OECD, and hence lacking in quality (Greenaway and Haynes, 2003). The 
Government looked at ways to improve on the post-Dearing reforms. 
As a result of the 2004 Higher Education Act, upfront fees were abolished and 
replaced with a deferred fee, to be implemented in the 2006/07 academic year. In 
contrast with the set £1,200 fee, the new fee was to be variable up to £3,000 with 
the universities themselves to decide how much to charge each student (Dearden 
et al, 2004; 2008). There was no exemption from this new fee (as opposed to the 
upfront fee where low income students were exempt). Repayment was to be made 
in the same way as the maintenance loans, but in both cases repayment was 
deferred until earnings were above £15,000 (nominal prices). Grants were also re-
introduced for the poorest students, with immediate (2004) effect. 
The 2004 Act also granted decision making on tuition fee policy to the Welsh 
Assembly. 
2005 — The Rees Review 
Participation Rate: 42% 
Funding per FTE: £5,66121 
In 2005 the Welsh Assembly commissioned the Rees Review22 to examine the 
implications for Wales. Rees was concerned that abolishing top-up fees in Wales 
would result in a large influx of students from England to escape the fees. It was 
21 Funding per FTE figures that follow are based on DfES estimates, again excluding fees 
22 Officially known as: "Fair and flexible funding: A Welsh model to promote quality and access 
in Higher Education. Final report of an independent study into the devolution of the student 
support system and tuition fee regime in Wales (The Rees Review)" 
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therefore concluded that tuition fees would remain at £1,200 in 2006/07 and that 
the £3,000 deferred fee would be adopted from 2007/08 — but that all Welsh 
domiciled students would be exempt from top-up fees, instead receiving a grant to 
cover the additional £1,800. 
2006 — First implementation of top-up fees in England and Northern Ireland 
Funding per FTE: £5,921 
Participation Rate: 40% 
In 2006/07 the £3,000 top-up fees of the 2004 Act were first implemented in 
England and Northern Ireland. Despite being a variable fee, almost all UK 
institutions chose to charge the full £3,000 fee. Scotland also raised their tuition 
fees to £2,700 for medical students, and £1,700 for all other students, again paid 
for by the Scottish Executive23. Tuition fees in Wales remained upfront, and at 
£1,200. 
2007 — First top up fees introduced in Wales; Graduate Endowment 
abolished in Scotland; Amendments to English system. 
Participation Rate: not available at time of print 
Funding per FTE: not available at time of print 
In 2007, the £3,000 deferred top-up fee for non-Welsh students was introduced in 
Wales, with Welsh domiciled students also moving to the deferred fee loan 
system, but still only liable for £1,200 per year with the remainder covered by a 
grant. The Scottish National Party (SNP) was elected was elected in Scotland, and 
one of their first acts was to abolish the Graduate Endowment for all Scottish 
domiciled students studying in Scotland24. 
2008 — Changes to grant system in England and Northern Ireland 
Participation Rate: not available at time of print 
Funding per FTE: not available at time of print 
In England and Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State for Innovation, 
Universities and Skills, John Denham, announced a number of minor changes to 
the English and Northern Irish systems. These included increasing grants for 
23 See http://www.guardian.co.uldeducation/2005/jul/20/tuitionfees.students for more details 
24 This was covered by the Graduate Endowment Abolition (Scotland) Act, 2008 
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those with parental incomes between £25,000 and £60,000 (at 2008 prices), 
decreasing loan entitlements for students of with parental incomes between 
£27,000 and £50,000, again in current 2008 prices (with the result that no students 
were worse off due to the increase in grants), and offering a repayment holiday of 
up to five years for those graduates repaying their loans (Dearden et al, 2008). 
This repayment holiday was cut to two years in 200925. 
The next major changes to the UK system are expected late in 2009. 
2.5 Conclusions and analysis of the UK system 
This chapter set out to explain the economic principles behind the UK's move to a 
cost-sharing system, in particular the introduction of tuition fees and student 
loans, with detailed documentation of the evolution of that system from the fully 
taxpayer funded one of the 1960s. 
The government interventions were designed to improve efficiency and equity in 
the UK HE market, bringing in more money to the system but also maintaining 
participation volumes, as well as aiming to widen the participation of low socio-
economic groups. 
The first major intervention in the UK HE market was to ask students to 
contribute to their education through student loans. These were at first mortgage 
style, meaning that students were forced to pay off a set amount each month 
rather than repayments based on income. Nevertheless loan repayments were only 
to be made once earnings were above a certain amount, and were soon moved to 
be fully income contingent, in line with the efficiency and equity arguments of 
Barr and Crawford (1889; 2005), Greenaway and Hayes (2000; 2003), and 
Goodman and Kaplan (2003). 
Perhaps the most controversial intervention was the implementation of up-front 
tuition fees in 1998. While low income students were exempt from the fees, as 
described, up-front fees are thought by many (Barr, Greenaway and Hayes, 2000) 
to be an inequitable and inefficient means of increasing funding to universities, 
25 See "Education (Student Support) Regulations, House of Commons, 29 October 2008 
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since students are reliant on their parents or credit markets to cover the fees, 
potentially dissuading certain groups of people from participating in HE. 
However, as described in Chapter 1, the impact of these up-front fees on 
participation volumes, and on types of participants (by socio-economic group) has 
not been fully understood. This will be fully investigated in Chapters 6-8, along 
with an analysis of the impact of removing grants. 
These controversial fees were replaced in 2006 by a deferred fee, fully covered by 
an income contingent loan, somewhat more in line with the economic principles 
described above. These fees are allowed to vary by institution, with the maximum 
set at £3,000. However, in practice almost every institution has set their fee at the 
maximum making the fee appear to be more fixed than variable — thus meaning 
market rules of supply and demand cannot be fully realised. 
This may be because the £3,000 cap is too low — it remains to be seen whether a 
lifting of the cap — which will probably occur in 2009 — will encourage some 
universities to set their prices below the maximum to be more competitive. 
Again, however, the impact of implementing this higher, but deferred fee, has yet 
to be directly investigated in the UK. Chapters 6-7 will briefly consider the 
impact of this policy (although as will be discussed, at the time of writing, 
insufficient data are available to properly analyse the impact of this fee). 
Related to this, despite the important economic arguments for considering the 
type of HE system, and the financial impact of government interventions in terms 
of university per head, many researchers argue that HE finance has little or no 
causal impact on university participation. Rather, HE participation may be 
influenced far more by factors such as early child development and early 
educational attainment. 
The counter-argument is that HE finance does matter, and there is a small body of 
evidence from the US in which a significant causal relationship of different HE 
systems is found even after controlling for background and other characteristics. 
Chapters 3 and 4 present this debate. Chapter 3 begins by addressing the 
fundamental question of whether, and to what extent, HE finance matters as a tool 
to increase volumes and types of HE participants. 
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Chapter 3 Does higher education 
finance matter for participation? 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 described the economic importance of higher education finance 
systems and the rationale behind the government intervention of recent years. 
Aside from increasing university funding per student, a key aim of the UK 
Government is to increase participation rates across the board, and to achieve a 
50% participation rate by 2010. A key factor in achieving this goal is clearly to 
understand how to increase participation, and in particular to encourage 
attendance among low income groups, who make up a large proportion of society. 
As described in the previous chapter, the UK HE system has been in a state of 
evolution since 1990, and interventions have included tuition fees, student grants 
and income contingent loans. 
In particular, the Government has attempted to maintain or boost attendance by 
countering increasing tuition fees with income contingent student loans, and by 
offering grants to poorer students (since 2004). However, it remains unclear as to 
the effectiveness of these policies on absolute volumes of participants or relative 
participation by socio-economic group. One reason for the lack of evidence of the 
effectiveness is lack of available data suitable to explore the question fully (this 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5). Another reason, however, is that many 
researchers believe that HE finance has a minimal if not non-existent role in 
individuals' enrolment decision making. (Blossfield and Shavit, 1993; Carneiro 
and Heckman, 2002; Gorard, 2006). 
There are two main ways in which HE finance could impact university enrolment 
decisions. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 2, there may be a proportion of society 
who are "credit constrained" — i.e. that are prevented from participating in HE 
because they cannot afford the fee and/or maintenance costs involved, rather than 
because they have made an informed choice not to participate. Such individuals 
are clearly most likely to be from lower income households. For these people, HE 
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finance may be an important tool to encourage them into HE, for example as 
discussed in Chapter 2, if grants and loans were available to remove their credit 
constraint. 
Secondly, some individuals may be sensitive to the price of HE and/or the nature 
of the HE funding system in place. For example those who discount the future 
returns to education heavily will be more sensitive to upfront costs, or those who 
are debt averse may be more sensitive to loan repayment options. 
So, HE finance could impact the university enrolment decisions of these youths 
by lowering the price of HE, or by altering the way it is paid for (e.g. up-front 
versus deferred fees), and thus encouraging them to attend HE. 
However, many economists such as those mentioned above argue that the 
proportion of youths who are credit constrained is minimal, so HE finance will 
have little impact here, and also that very few individuals are sensitive to the price 
or nature of the HE finance system, again implying a limited role for HE funding. 
Instead, they argue that participation decision making takes place at a very early 
age — and is based primarily on a child's circumstances in their early years — on 
factors such as their social class, parents education and parents income — as well 
as the child's own innate ability and qualifications obtained during school years. 
If this is true, then HE finance policy, delivered when a potential student is 16-18, 
will have a limited impact on his or her decision to go to university and any 
analysis of the impact of HE finance will uncover very little. This is a compelling 
set of evidence. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter 1, a number of studies from the US in 
particular, have found an impact of grants and fees over and above that of the 
influence of early child development and prior attainment, suggesting that a small 
number of youths do make their college entry decisions based on the levels of fee 
obligation and grants eligibility at the time of entry. The question of whether HE 
finance matters has concerned many researchers, academics and politicians 
throughout the past decades. 
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The following two chapters thus explore the HE finance debate, firstly in this 
chapter, by presenting some of the major studies which examine the role of early 
child development, ability and attainment and their roles in HE, and argue that 
these are the most influential factors in individual university enrolment decision-
making. Chapter 4 goes on to explore the counter-argument, by presenting a 
number of studies which find grants and fees to be significant factors in youths' 
participation decision-making, with a detailed analysis of the methodologies used 
and results obtained. This chapter provides evidence that HE finance does have an 
impact on participation, but that modeling this relationship can be problematic 
unless robust econometric techniques are used. Thus, Chapters 3 and 4 fully 
explore the debate surrounding the determinants of HE participation. 
Thus, these chapters set up the remainder of the thesis by presenting background 
and methodology for the analysis that will be carried out in Chapters 6-8. 
3.2 Liquidity constraints 
As discussed above, the type of HE finance system in place may be a powerful 
tool to alter the behaviour of participants who are liquidity constrained — i.e. those 
whose low levels of participation are due to financial constraints rather than 
informed choice. 
The evidence for the existence of such credit constraints is minor, and somewhat 
mixed. 
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) examine the relationship between family income 
and college enrolment, investigating the role of short-run credit constraints 
alongside factors such as individual ability, early child development and family 
background factors, which they define long-term factors'. 
In their analysis, they find that controlling for these long-term factors removes the 
effect of short-run credit constraints. The authors argue that the resources enjoyed 
by high-income parents shape their children's cognitive ability at an early age. 
These individuals are more likely to attend college because their parents are better 
educated, and thus better able to develop scholastic aptitude in their children, and 
have better access to primary and secondary schools. The authors find these long-
term factors to be far more important in predicting a youth's likeliness to go to 
college than short-term liquidity constraints. So, if a youth comes from a 
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background with a lack of long-term factors of this nature, no amount of 
government policy that adjusts for tuition fees or financial aid will be of use, as 
the child will not be qualified for college. 
Nevertheless, the authors concede that short-run effects do play a role, albeit a 
very minor one — they estimate at most 8% of the population faces some sort of 
credit constraint with regards to college attendance. 
Similar work of this nature comes from Dearden et al (2004). In examining the 
importance of credit constraints in terms of HE attainment decisions, they find 
evidence of minor credit constraints affecting 2-3% of males born in 1970 (so 
reaching college age in 1986), and 3-6% of females of the same age. 
However, other research by Dearden et al (2008), when examining UK youth's 
responses to a cash transfer paid to youths age 16-18 in full-time education, finds 
the evidence for a credit constraint to be mixed; the authors test the response to 
the cash transfer of youths from owner-occupied homes (hypothesized to have no 
credit constraints since their parents have good access to cash not least through 
releasing equity from their homes), versus the response from youths from rented 
homes (who are more likely to be credit constrained since their parents 
presumably have limited access to funds to support them in education). The 
results showed the youths from rented accommodation to be more responsive to 
the cash transfer, but the difference in up-take was only significant at the 12 
percent level. This suggests the positive impact of the cash transfer may have 
been a result of simply changing the price of staying on at school. An alternative 
suggestion put forward by the authors is that those youths from rented 
accommodation may also be those most likely to discount the future returns from 
education, and may therefore place too much weight on the up-front costs of 
staying on at school. 
Thus, evidence of a credit constraint is somewhat mixed. As stated though, there 
may be other ways in which HE finance matters, such as by lowering the price of 
college or changing the nature of the costs involved. 
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However, there is a compelling set of evidence that university participation 
decision making takes place at a very early age, as Heckman and Carneiro attest, 
based on early childhood development and prior attainment. If this is true, 
lowering the price of college will have little impact on participation. 
The remainder of this chapter examines this evidence. 
3.3 Early child development 
Much evidence that skill formation later in life is determined by ability developed 
early in life, is put forward by Heckman (1995) in his work on Human Capital 
Theory. Heckman examines the socio-economic gap in educational attainment, 
which as seen in Chapter 1 is highly significant in the UK. 
Heckman argues that differences in the uptake of different levels of education —
including higher education — are primarily driven by cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills, and that these skills emerge very early on in life. By examining cognitive 
test scores of children from different income groups, Heckman finds that gaps in 
test scores between income groups emerge as early as age 6 and remain stable —
so any attempts to improve educational outcomes such as whether a youth goes to 
university, will have to be administered in his or her early years. 
Heckman argues that the majority — though not all — of the gaps in both cognitive 
and non-cognitive ability, and therefore a youth's likeliness to attend HE, can be 
eliminated by equalizing family background characteristics such as mother's 
education, mother's ability, and family structure, and it is heterogeneity in these 
endowments among young people that produce the wide range of skills and 
motivations that we observe in society — thus policy interventions designed to 
improve educational outcomes later in life should be directed towards these 
elements of family background, early on in a child's life. 
Further evidence, however, that ability is the driving factor in educational 
attainment is given by Cameron and Heckman (1998; 1999; 2001) — again 
examining the reasons for disparity in college attendance by certain, less well-off 
groups such as ethnic minorities (they point out that family incomes are highest 
for whites and lowest for blacks — while parental education is highest for whites 
58 
and lowest for Hispanics). In modeling the drivers of educational outcomes 
including college attendance among these minority groups they find family 
income and education to be highly significant, accounting for almost all the 
disparity in college attendance. However, once their measure of ability (here they 
use AFQT26) is added to the model, the influence of family background factors 
are substantially weakened, implying that ability is the main driver of college 
attendance, not family income. 
Nevertheless, they do find some evidence that a credit constraint may impact on 
HE enrolment. Even after AQFT is controlled for there are minor, but still 
significant effects, mostly for enrolment at two-year and community colleges. The 
authors argue, therefore, that policies should be carefully targeted towards the 
constrained, rather than at a broad range (such as the US Clinton Hope 
scholarships which were targeted primarily at the middle classes). 
It is important to note that Cameron and Heckman take account of the sequential 
nature of educational attainment — i.e. that the grades individuals attain at each 
level of school assessment to some extent dictate their future achievements, since 
attainment determines their schooling choices — the probability that a person 
attends college depends on whether they achieve the necessary grades in high 
school. 
Further evidence from Human Capital Theory comes from Murnane et al (1995) 
who examine the link between cognitive skills — as measured by mathematics 
scores of youths in their last year of high school — and wages. Murnane et al find 
a strong link between this early mathematics score and the individuals' likeliness 
to graduate college. They also find strong evidence that mathematics score 
explains a high degree of wage returns for females — even more so than college 
attendance. 
Support for this theory comes from Feinstein (2003) in his investigation of the 
differences in educational achievement between children from different social 
backgrounds. Feinstein attests that a children's attainment at 22 months influences 
26 Armed Forces Qualification Test 
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their attainment at age 26 — those who demonstrate a low level of cognitive skills 
in early age are less likely to gain qualifications later in life. 
Like Heckman et al, Feinstein explores the link between SES and educational 
attainment, and supports the view that family background is the major influence 
on educational attainment. He finds a strong relationship between socio-economic 
group and attainment, even in the youngest of children. Furthermore, he supports 
Heckman's evidence that the attainment gaps between SES groups are stable or 
even increasing over time. Children of low SES who performed poorly in tests at 
age 22 and 24 months were highly likely to perform poorly at age 10, while 
children of high SES who performed poorly in the early age tests were more 
likely to show a high attainment at age 10 — suggesting their socio-economic 
status somehow propped them up and propelled them forward. The results are 
also true when the children are segmented by parental education. 
Feinstein et al (2004) conclude that parental education and income are the most 
important family influences on attainment. Parental education is found to strongly 
influence most of the main factors in child development — e.g. more educated 
parents are found to be less likely to use spanking as a form of discipline (Day et 
al., 1998), have a warmer parenting style (Klebanov et al. (1994), and to be more 
likely to read to their child (see also Laosa, 1983). As well as influencing 
behaviours, parental education has been widely found to influence family 
circumstances — more educated parents are more likely to choose private schools 
(Melhuish et al., 1999). Further, parental education is found to heavily influence 
contextual factors. More educated parents have higher expectations of their 
children (Davis-Kean & Schnabel, 2001), while parental education is strongly 
negatively correlated with family size (Ferri & Smith, 2003) and likelihood of 
becoming a teenage parent (Rowlingson & McKay, 1998). 
Parental education, unsurprisingly, also has a significant positive impact on 
parental income (Dearden et al., 2003). Feinstein et al conclude that parental 
income has a large impact on child's attainment by enabling parents to provide 
good learning environments such as housing and educational materials such as 
books and games as well as more obvious basic needs such as housing and 
clothing, essential to any child's outcomes. Again this is strong evidence that HE 
finance is a minor influence once parental income is controlled for. 
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A major contributor to the literature surrounding early child development is 
Gorard (1997, 2005, 2006), who in fact was commissioned by HEFCE in 2006 to 
document and summarize a number of available studies on the subject of barriers 
to widening participation27. From Gorard himself comes the theory of learning 
trajectories — that an individual follows a trajectory, pre-determined from a very 
early age, that largely determines their educational outcomes later in life. For 
example, an individual of a certain social background will set out on a trajectory 
which is constrained by his attitude to learning, lack of qualifications, previous 
experience — all of which are determined by the educational culture of his class. 
Thus, individual choice has little impact on an individuals' education — their 
trajectory is set, and unlikely to be effected by barriers such as cost constraints. 
Furthermore, which 'trajectory', from non-university-participation to lifelong 
learning, an individual takes can be accurately predicted on the basis of 
characteristics which are known by the time an individual reaches school-leaving 
age. Gorard concludes that an individual's trajectory can be predicted with 
extreme accuracy, of up to 90%, using just six independent variables —area of 
residence, gender, type of school, attempting qualifications, qualification at age 
16, and occupational class of father. Arguably, however, area of residence and 
type of school attended are choice variables — parents may choose areas with 
better schooling and types of school which improve their child's chances of 
attending HE, or those from poorer areas may also be suffering from short-term 
credit constraints. 
Gorard argues that policy in education occurring later in life — such as the 
Governments' Widening Participation Policy and Lifelong Learning initiatives 
are not effective, and that that the solution to inequalities is not, in fact, an 
educational one but a lifelong one. The lifelong approach argues that rather than 
lowering simple barriers such as the cost of education, policy must tackle lifelong 
entrenched and learned behaviours that lead to non-participation in HE. 
3.4 Prior attainment and its role in university participation 
Similarly to Heckman, Gorard emphasizes the role of prior attainment in 
university participation — an individual's early ability will determine their success 
27 This summary is available online at http://www.hefce.ac.uldpubs/RDreports/2006/rd13_06/ 
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in school examinations, which will then determine whether or not they qualify for 
university entry. Thus, it is imperative that any analysis of the impact of HE 
finance takes this into account. 
The importance of prior attainment is very clearly emphasized in work by 
Chowdry et al (2009). The authors use longitudinal administrative data to track 
youths' educational attainment at key stage 2 (age 7) all the way through to 
potential age 18 or 19 Higher Education participation. The results showed that 
students from poorer backgrounds are much less likely to participate in university 
at ages 18-19 relative to those from better off backgrounds — however the main 
reason for their low participation rate is that poorer pupils do not achieve the 
necessary qualifications in secondary school to qualify for university. In other 
words, the gap in university enrolment comes about much earlier than at point of 
entry to university, emerging as pupils secondary school attainment record is set. 
Once the authors control for this prior attainment, the socio-economic gap 
(defined here using Free School Meals as an indicator of deprivation) that remains 
on entry to HE is just 1.0 percentage points for males, and 2.1 percentage points 
for females. This implies that HE finance may have a limited role in reducing 
socio-economic participation gap (though it may still impact absolute volumes of 
participants). 
Further evidence on the role of early or prior attainment comes from Moor et al 
(2004) who find the biggest single factor determining whether a respondent 
continued their education beyond the compulsory age is their performance at 
GCSE/GNVQ level. Their work shows a pattern of social and economic under-
representation in HE which is already apparent by the time a student has had his 
Level 2 qualifications — which then go on to be the main influence on his decision 
to go on to obtain Level 3 qualifications. 
Forsyth and Furlong (1999, 2001) in their work on educational disadvantage in 
Scotland, however, argue that prior attainment this is not the whole story in HE 
participation — they report that while three quarters of all young people with 2 or 
more A-Levels in socio-economic (SE) groupings I and II make it into higher 
education, only half of similarly qualified students from SE groupings IV and V 
do so. However, it should be noted that Forsyth and Furlong's research is largely 
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qualitative and focused on interviewing small numbers of 6th form pupils in 
Scotland, so their findings are not representative of the entire population (see 
Chapter 4 for more details of their methodology). 
Forsyth and Furlong also argue that while socio-economic status may not 
significantly impact the overall volume of participants from different classes, it 
may have a more subtle impact in terms of type of enrolments. For example, 
poorer children tend to choose different course types, subject types and institution 
types. So while focusing research on those who do not enter HE is important, it is 
also important to look at those who did enter, in terms of their choice of course 
and institution. 
Work by Brooks (2003) meanwhile argues that young people are not a 
homogenous group and it is untrue to say that all children of wealthy and 
educated backgrounds will go on to HE — there is heterogeneity within socio-
economic group in terms of the types of subjects and institutions the young people 
apply to and crucially the information they have access to. 
Finally, many authors, such as Galindo-Rueda et al (2004) acknowledge that 
while A' level attainment may appear to be the main driver of participation, this 
may be an endogenous variable — students may make less effort in school as they 
anticipate barriers to entry in HE in the future. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This Chapter has presented a review of the drivers of and barriers to Higher 
Education participation, in particular exploring the argument that participation is 
decided early in life, and is therefore not affected by HE finance. While it is 
generally agreed that parental income, education and family background 
characteristics have a large part to play in a young person's educational 
attainment throughout their life, and eventually in their decision to attend 
university, there is minor evidence to suggest that credit constraints also have a 
small part to play, suggesting HE finance may have a role to play in university 
decision making. Work by authors such as Dearden et al also put forward the 
possibility that certain youths discount the future benefits of education and that 
altering the costs of education may improve their likeliness to participate. HE 
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finance may be important for other reasons such as in countering debt-aversion by 
offering participants more agreeable loan repayment options. 
Indeed, there is a small body of work that has uncovered evidence for some 
impact of tuition fees and loans on participation, suggesting youths do respond to 
the HE finance system for reasons such as these. This body of work will be 
explored in Chapter 4 with the implications essential for this thesis and in 
particular the methodological approaches used in Chapters 6-7. 
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Chapter 4 Methodological approaches 
to estimating the impact of higher 
education systems on university 
participation 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 presented evidence that HE finance may have little or no effect on 
participation, which instead may be decided far earlier in life. Yet, a great number 
of quite dramatic policy changes have taken place in the UK that significantly 
altered the financial position of students. The main aim of the first strand of this 
thesis is to explore whether these changes did affect school-leaving youths' 
propensity to participate in HE. To this end, this chapter presents a review of 
studies which have attempted to measure the relationship between HE finance and 
university participation. 
This chapter explores both the outcomes of this work and, crucially for this thesis, 
the methodological approaches used. 
While this subject has been widely debated in academic and political arenas over 
the last decade in the UK, there remains little empirical research on the subject —
especially quantitative — perhaps due to a lack of available and robust data (a 
topic to be covered in Chapter 5) as well as the difficulty of untangling the impact 
of finance policies from the impact of accompanying policies and normal growth 
in participation. 
As a result, much of the evidence on the impact of cost-sharing comes from other 
countries where more data is available and reforms have been in place for longer. 
This chapter summarises several of the most significant and relevant papers from 
the UK and abroad, paying particular reference to the methodological approaches 
adopted to identify the impact different aspects of HE finance reform. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the problems faced by researchers in 
estimating the relationship between HE finance and participation, and then moves 
on to examine the body of papers which have used a variety of methodologies to 
overcome these issues. The chapter concludes with some criticism of the 
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methodologies used and a summary of their results. A significant finding of this 
chapter is that the results presented in this summary, although using a wide range 
of methodologies and data, are remarkably consistent. Thus, this chapter contests 
that there is evidence of a link between policy changes of the nature discussed in 
chapter 3, and higher education participation. 
4.2 The estimation problem 
An obvious first step in attempting to identify the impact of student aid (e.g. 
grants, and in some circumstances loans) eligibility and tuition fees would be to 
estimate an equation such as the following: 
Pit = oc0+ yo AlDit + f o FEESit + Eit 	 4.1 
Where Pit is a binary variable with the value of 1 if individual i attends university 
at time t and zero otherwise. AID represents the sum total of individual i 's aid 
eligibility and FEES represents individual i's tuition fee obligation (all in £s). 
In this simplistic model, yo could be interpreted as the impact of a £1 increase in 
aid on an individual's likeliness to participate in HE. 
The main issue with this type of model is that there are likely to be many factors 
that affect both a youth's aid and fee eligibility and his likeliness to participate in 
HE. For example, poorer children receive larger grants since — as was discussed in 
Chapter 2 — the Government may wish to encourage poorer children to go to 
university for both equity and efficiency reasons. But poor children are less likely 
to go to university for many other reasons (such as lack of information about the 
benefits of a university education), so student grants will appear to be negatively 
correlated with participation if this endogeneity problem is not properly 
controlled for. A number of early studies in the US attempted to solve this 
endogeneity problem by adding a number of controls into the equation above. 
The earliest and most well-known of these studies include Manski and Wise 
(1983), Hansen (1983) and Leslie and Brinkman (1998). In these studies, an 
equation such as the following is typically estimated (in the case of Leslie and 
Brinkman, a meta-analysis, several such equations are reviewed): 
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Pit = a1  + YiAlDit fiFEESit + 81Xit + Tht 	 4.2 
Where Xit is a set of controls which includes variables such as family income, 
parental education and prior attainment. 
Leslie and Brinkman examine nine econometric studies of this nature. The 
conclusion is that the enrolment of low income students would be reduced by 20-
40% without student aid; this substantial figure varies by income (is lower for 
medium and high income students) and by sex, ethnicity etc. Manski and Wise 
also find a significant impact from aid, but find that only 25% of aid (in 1979-
1980) went to the students who would not otherwise have enrolled. 
However, studies of this nature pose a further significant problem. While it is 
possible to control for many aspects of a youth's background, there may be a 
number unobservable characteristics that are correlated with aid, fees and 
attendance. These unobserved characteristics will be omitted from the model and 
will again result in biased estimates. An example of such a characteristic is 
parents' propensity towards investment — certain types of parent may be disposed 
towards investing in the future (e.g. in terms of savings, stocks and shares but also 
in terms of education). Such parents will be more likely to have high incomes —
meaning the youth in question will higher fees — but are more likely to encourage 
their children to go to university. This could result in an over-estimation of the 
coefficient on fees. A problem of a similar nature might be measurement error —
income data, which is often used to calculate the amount of fees and aid a student 
receives, as well as to control for parental income in the model, can be subject to 
measurement error, which again will result in downward biased estimates. 
To illustrate this, the error term in 4.2 can be decomposed: 
Pit = a + fliAlDit+ 1I2FEESit+Y1Xit+fi + vu 	 4.3 
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Where f represents the individual-level unobserved heterogeneity and v, 
represents the random component of the error term. Given this, in order to obtain 
an unbiased estimate of aid, for example, the following is required: 
cov(AID, f)=0 	 4.4 
cov(AID, vid=0 	 4.5 
But as discussed above, this is unlikely, and rather, it is more likely that there are 
some unobserved individual characteristics correlated with both the explanatory 
variables and the error term. Chapter 6 discusses this issue in more detail, in an 
attempt to estimate an equation similar to 4.3. 
A number of later studies have attempted to overcome the problems of associated 
with unobserved characteristics, using a range of methodologies. For example, 
Dynarski (1999), with an extensive Government run survey of 3,545 American 
high school seniors uses a difference-in-difference approach to analyse her data. 
Kane (1994; 1995) meanwhile employs panel data and fixed effects methods to 
estimate his models on US State-level data. Galindo-Rueda et al (2004) employ 
postcode matching techniques to augment their set of controls before using OLS 
and probit analysis. In the following sections, these methodologies and others are 
reviewed. 
4.2.1 Difference-in-difference models 
Difference-in-difference is a well established method of estimating the impact of 
a potentially endogenous variable, but relies upon the occurrence of a "natural 
experiment" involving the variable of interest. An often quoted example of such 
an experiment is that studied by Card and Krueger (1994) in which the minimum 
wage in the US state of New Jersey was increased. Employment in fast food 
restaurants over the same time period increased from 20.44 FTE (full-time 
employees) to 21.03. This suggests that the impact of the minimum wage increase 
was to raise employment. However, many other things may have changed over 
the same time period, which would also effect employment in fast food 
restaurants in New Jersey (e.g. increased demand for fast food through advertising 
etc). In order to control for these possible unobserved changes, Card and Krueger 
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used another state (Pennsylvania) as a comparison group — Pennsylvania was a 
state facing similar conditions to New Jersey with one exception — they did not 
increase their minimum wage. In this state, employment actually fell over the 
period in question. Assuming that New Jersey and Pennsylvania faced the same 
conditions in terms of fast food demand, and all other things that may have 
changed employment, by comparing the two groups one can ascertain the pure 
impact of the minimum wage. In this case, given employment rose in New Jersey 
and fell in Pennsylvania, the overall impact of the minimum wage was a net 
increase in employment. 
So, the difference-in-difference technique can be used when there are two time 
periods (or more) of data, with the explanatory variable of interest changing —
usually due to a policy change — during this time period for one group (the 
"treatment" group) and the explanatory variable remaining the same for another 
group (the "control" group). Clearly, the technique relies on the two groups being 
very similar before the policy change (in the example above the policy being the 
increase in the minimum wage) and nothing else changing between the two 
groups over the period of interest. 
In the context of HE funding, suppose there had been an increase in student aid 
for one group of youths (e.g. if the government increased grants for poor students) 
but that for another group of youths, there was no such increase in aid (and also, 
for both sets of youths, fees were zero in all time periods). The treatment group in 
this instance would be those for whom aid had increased, while the control group 
would be the group for whom aid remained unchanged. 
A causal effect of aid could be obtained by comparing participation between the 
two groups. If participation in the treatment group rose relative to the control 
group, one could conclude that aid is positively related to participation. 
The benefit of the difference-in-difference approach is that, by having a control 
group, any other changes occurring at the time of the treatment, which may affect 
participation (e.g. rising unemployment) will be removed — assuming that changes 
that occur to the control group would have occurred to those treated if they had 
not received the treatment. 
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So, assuming there exists a control group, who are very similar to the treatment 
group in composition and economic conditions, a true causal effect of aid can be 
obtained by comparing the difference in treated with difference in control groups. 
In its simplest format this would be obtained by estimating OLS on: 
Pit =oc +80 postit + flitreatmentit + 61post1t * treatmentit + uit 
4.6 
Where post is a binary variable set to 1 if the time period is after the policy 
change and 0 otherwise, and treatment is a binary variable set to 1 for those in the 
group whom the policy change affects and 0 otherwise. 
81 is therefore the incremental difference between the two groups, controlling for 
any changes over time and any differences between the treatment and control 
group, which would then be purely attributable to the increase in grants. Usually, 
a set of control variables such as educational attainment, gender and parental 
income would be included in the equation for extra precision. 
A good example of the use of such a strategy is by Dynarski (1999) who studies 
the impact of student aid. 
She exploits a policy change in 1982, when the US Congress abolished a social 
security benefit which had previously entitled all children with a deceased, 
disabled or retired father to aid of around $5,400 until the age of 18, and crucially, 
until the age of 22, if they attended HE. Except for the introduction of the Pell 
Grant program in the early 1970s, and the various GI Bills, this is the largest and 
sharpest change in grant aid for college students ever to occur in the United 
States. In 1980, two years before the programme was cancelled, 1 in 9 students 
were eligible for this aid. 
The policy change was an exogenous shock to the system, and therefore is not 
correlated with any unobservable variables that may impact college attendance —
the death of a child's father occurs completely at random and therefore their aid 
eligibility is also random. 
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The treatment group is therefore those who were eligible for benefits before the 
elimination (proxied here as those with a deceased parent) and who lost their 
benefits after its withdrawal in 1982. The control group is all other children, i.e. 
those unaffected by the policy change since they were not eligible for aid in the 
first place. The treatment therefore represents the withdrawal of benefits from 
those who would have received them, and the time periods are pre- and post-1982 
(data is pooled so that the before period is 1979-1981 and the after period 1982-
1983). Note here, that the control group is drawn from the same population as the 
treatment group, and therefore should be similar in composition. This is very 
important for the robustness of difference-in-difference. Note also that Dynarski 
does not consider tuition fees or any other type of HE finance in her estimation 
and looks only at grant aid. 
Dynarski uses an OLS regression and a probit to estimate the following equation: 
y it = a+ fl(SSit * Beforeit ) + 8SSit +OBefore tt +vit 	 4.7 
where yit is a binary variable representing college attendance, SS is a dummy 
variable representing benefit eligibility (1=eligible, 0=ineligible) and Before is a 
dummy representing time (1=before treatment, 0=after treatment). 
Data on 5,345 young Americans from the NLSY (National Longitudinal Study of 
Youth) from 1979-1983 is used. 
Those with deceased fathers before the treatment, were found to be slightly more 
likely to attend college than other children (62% vs 59%). However, after the 
treatment, the pattern is reversed, with 32% of those with deceased fathers 
attending v 49% of others. The estimated impact of withdrawing the benefits is 
therefore the difference in these differences — since those unaffected by the 
treatment should exhibit "normal" growth, so subtracting this away from the 
decrease experienced by the treated group should show the pure impact of the 
treatment. This method should also remove any unobserved heterogeneity such as 
that discussed in 4.2., provided it is assumed that the control and treatment groups 
do not differ in any other ways that cannot be controlled for, and that the sample 
is drawn from the same population before and after the policy change. 
71 
In this case, the difference-in-difference is found to be 26 percentage points -
meaning the effect of social security benefit is to increase the probability of 
attending college by 26 percentage points. 
Calculating this using an OLS regression gives a (highly significant) 13 coefficient 
of 25.6 (with a standard error of 10.0). Given that the probability of attending 
college in the sample is 53%, this indicates that withdrawal of the benefits almost 
halves the probability of attending college. 
Dynarski also controls for the possibility that the model is picking up differences 
in the control and treatment groups that vary over time. In order to combat this, 
she includes a set of covariates in the model, such as family size, race, year of 
birth etc. The point estimate drops slightly (but insignificantly) to 23.3 percentage 
points (std error of 8.7). 
Dynarski also controls for time-varying trends — for example, attendance rates of 
blacks fell during the period of Social Security benefit elimination, and Social 
Security beneficiaries are disproportionately black. So it is possible that part of 
the decrease in participation seemingly from the withdrawal of benefits might be 
simply due to trends in college attendance among blacks. This results in the 
estimated impact of aid on attendance dropping to 19.4 percentage points. 
Dynarksi also tests the use of a fixed-effects model — using a dummy for each 
household in the survey (which contains every youth of appropriate age within a 
given household) to measure the proportion of variance in participation that can 
be explained by the fact that families are different from each other. Thus, the 
model is then estimating the differences between children of deceased and non- 
deceased fathers within households rather than over time — i.e. the difference 
between younger and older siblings with and without deceased fathers. The fixed 
effects model indicates that unobserved differences between households are not 
driving the results — the estimates are very similar to those above. 
In summary, Dynarski's analysis shows that student aid increased the US college 
attendance rate by 19.4 to 25.6 percentage points. Given the average social 
security benefit paid in 1980 amounted to $6,300 this implies that each $1,000 of 
aid induced an increase of 3.6 percentage points in university attendance by high- 
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school graduates28. Over the same period, the average costs faced by a student 
(including tuition fees, room and board) was $9,600. Thus, the implied elasticity 
of college attendance with respect to costs is calculated to be about 0.65. 
Dynarski repeats the analysis using years of college attendance as a dependent 
variable, and again finds very positive results associated with student aid — she 
concludes that a $1,000 increase in grant aid increases educational attainment by 
0.16 years. 
Linsenmeier, Rosen and Rouse (2001) also use a difference-in-difference 
methodology; again to estimate the impact of aid on enrolment. In this example, 
again the identification issue is that financial aid packages are not exogenous to 
student characteristics. The authors therefore take advantage of a natural 
experiment occurring in a major North-Eastern US university. Previous to 1998, 
this university offered low-income students an aid package consisting of around 
$12,00029 in grants, $4,000 in loans and $200 in work-aid (i.e. where a student is 
given a paid job on campus). In 1998, this package was altered so that the loan 
element was removed and replaced by additional grant money of the same value. 
The treatment group is therefore low income students who benefited from a 
reduction in amount of loans they needed. The control group is high income 
students whose aid package remained the same. The pre-period is before 1999 and 
the post period is 1999-2001. The authors use administration records on 25,958 
students from the college in question. The model is estimated in the same way as 
Dynarski's equation 4.7. In this case, the difference-in-difference yields an 
increase in participation of 2.3 percentage points for low income groups as a 
whole — but this is not found to be significant, implying that grants and loans were 
viewed in a similar way for this group. However, the authors do find a significant 
effect for minority groups, of 8.9 percentage points, suggesting this group differ 
in their attitude towards loans. 
28 At 1998 prices 
29 At 1999 prices 
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4.2.2 Panel models 
Another type of natural experiment occurs when different groups of individuals 
experience different policies over time. Although there is rarely a clean "before" 
"after" type of scenario, as there is in the difference-in-difference approach, this 
exogenous variation in policy can be exploited to remove the effects of 
unobserved heterogeneity and obtain unbiased estimators. 
For example, the fixed effects approach can be used to remove unobserved 
heterogeneity that is assumed fixed over time. This approach uses variation over 
time, within a specific group (which could be individuals, households, regions or 
any other type of group — so long as there are multiple groups or individuals, each 
of which can themselves be observed over time) to identify the impact of a 
specific variable or variables, removing unobserved heterogeneity. 
In the context of HE finance, for example, suppose this time you wanted to 
examine the impact of fees on participation (assuming here, that aid is zero or 
doesn't change over time and between control and treatment groups). If you were 
to examine two regions at the same period in time, one of which had high levels 
of fees and high university participation rates, and the other also had high fee 
levels and high participation rates, you might be tempted to conclude that fees are 
positively related to participation. But for reasons already discussed, fees are 
positively associated with participation for many other reasons — in this case it 
could be that these regions contain high proportions of parents who are highly 
intelligent, and hence have high incomes, and also high motivation to send their 
children to university. 
A better solution would be to examine the relationship between fees and 
participation within each region over time. If fees increase relative to their 
average over time (for example as the result of a policy change), and this is 
accompanied by a decrease in participation, again relative to its average, this 
implies fees are negatively related to participation. So, the fixed effects method 
removes between-group differences, which are the source of heterogeneity, and 
uses variation in fees and participation with groups over time to identify the 
causal effect of fees. Because the unobserved heterogeneity is fixed over time, it 
will be equal to its average over time, and will therefore be removed. In a similar 
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fashion to difference-in-difference models, a set of controls would normally be 
added to the model. 
The estimating equation will thus be: 
Pi, = a + AiFEES it + ( hYtt + i) it 	 4.8 
Where Pit = Pit — Pi is the time demeaned data on P, etc. This is also known as 
the within transformation, or fixed effects transformation. Note that the 
unobserved fixed effects fi have been removed. 
An example of this type of approach comes from Kane (1994) who studies the 
role of college costs on enrolment of blacks in the US. Black enrolment declined 
14% in the US between 1980-1984 — a period during which tuition costs were 
rising, but then recovered in 1985, despite continued increases in tuition fees. 
Kane points out that simply looking at participation within US states before and 
after the increases in tuition fees will not provide a true picture of the impact of 
fees, since certain states encourage college going in other ways, such as by 
targeting high-schools. Kane therefore exploits between- and within- state 
differences in US college costs to establish their impact on enrolment. Kane's 
methodology relies upon the fact that states across the US not only have different 
income distributions, but different approaches to tuition fees — some states 
subsidise tuition fees heavily whilst others prefer to keep fees high and instead 
provide aid targeted at disadvantaged groups. The result is a wide variation in 
tuition fees across states — e.g. in 1987 tuition fees were as low as $900 in 
California, and as high as $2600 in Virginia — and within states over time, as 
average income levels change along with within-state policy. 
Kane uses Current Population Survey (CPS) data for 56,000 households from 
1970-1988. He finds enrolment to be lower in the high tuition states but also that 
the gap in participation between high and low-income youth are wider in states 
with higher tuition fees. Additionally he finds that within state rises in tuition led 
to falls in enrolment. 
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Kane's analysis implies that a $1,0003° decrease in university tuition increases 
participation in of black 18-19 year olds by 3.7 percentage points. He finds a 
similar effect for all income groups of black students, though only low-income 
white students are sensitive to fees. Kane also looks at the impact of the Pell 
maintenance grant but finds this to have a much lower impact — which he 
speculates may be due to lack of information about grants, particularly for blacks. 
Kane concludes that while fees did account for some of the decline in college 
going by blacks, they were counteracted by improvements in education of black 
parents and increases in wage returns to college. 
A similar study is carried out by Kane (1995), which again relies on variation in 
funding policy within and between states of the US. Some states keep tuition low 
to promote college entry, while some rely on government aid to do the same. 
Kane attempts to reconcile the two policies to establish which is a more effective 
method of encouraging college participation. Again, Kane exploits between and 
within-state variation in fee policy as well as within-state variation arising from 
the establishment of the Pell Grant program in 1973. He uses data from the 
National Longitudinal Study of Youths (NLSY) on 12,000 youths from 1979, 
combined with the CPS (1977-1993) and the High School and Beyond study of 
the senior class of 1980 and 6 years beyond. 
His fixed effects methodology implies that within-state increases in tuition are 
reflected in enrolment declines. He uncovers a significant effect of tuition fees — a 
$1000 increase in public 2 year tuition fees results in a 2.4-3.5 percentage point 
drop in enrolment31. He also finds a small positive effect of grants on enrolment. 
4.2.3 Time-series and cross-sectional models 
A number of researchers have employed a simple time-series or repeated cross-
section approach to the question of the impact of aid and fees on participation. In 
such cases authors tend to model enrolment rates over time, or look at 
participation rates before and after some sort of policy change, and choose to 
either present purely descriptive information, or attempt to augment their set of 
30 1998 prices 
'
1 1991 prices 
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controls — for example by adding parental income proxies — to provide an accurate 
picture of the relationship between student finance and participation. 
A summary of such studies is contained in Leslie and Brinkman (1987) who 
perform a meta-analysis of 23 studies of the impact of student aid (including 
federal and state aid programs) on student choice (including general enrolment 
and institution type). A consensus of the studies they survey estimates the effects 
of a $100032 decline in the net price of college to drive a 4 percentage point 
increase in college attendance. 
More specifically, McPherson and Shapiro (1991) model US enrolment rates over 
time from 1974-1978 — a period of huge fluctuations in loans and grants in the 
US. The authors create a composite "net costs" variable which is defined as fees 
minus aid. The aid variable itself comprises grants plus loans, where loans are 
entered at 50% of face value. Other controls are parental income, gender and year, 
and the fee and aid variables are interacted by income group (low, medium and 
high) dummies. Increases in the net cost of attendance are found to have a 
negative and statistically significant effect on enrolment for white students from 
low-income families (a $100033 increase in net costs leads to a 2.7 percentage 
point decrease in participation of low income students). No consistent effect is 
found for medium income students, and somewhat conversely, net costs are found 
to have a positive impact for high income students. The authors suggest this may 
be as a result of the strong demand among middle- and upper-income students 
causing colleges to raise their prices, but suggests some issues with the estimation 
techniques. 
The Australian experience is often used as a model to examine the impact of 
tuition fees on HE participation. The Australian system of tuition fees (known as 
HECS — the Higher Education Contribution Scheme) was first implemented in 
1989, and is one of the longest running schemes in the OECD. From the outset, 
contributions were collected using the tax system (although graduates stop paying 
once they have cleared their debts), making HECS the first income contingent- 
32 In $1998 
33 In $2006 
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repayment scheme, and thus an important part of higher education funding 
history. 
In his 1997 paper, Bruce Chapman examines the effect of HECS ten years on, in 
the context of the Dearing enquiry and its then forthcoming report on funding in 
the UK. 
The current UK HE finance system mimics HECS in many ways, with the tuition 
fee amounts being roughly similar, Australia charging around US$7,000 per year 
for students living in halls of residence34 in 2006/07. 
In considering the effect of HECS on the access of the disadvantaged, Chapman 
first looks at overall enrolments over time before and after the introduction of the 
scheme. He finds no evidence of a negative effect of HECS — enrolments of 
students in higher education rose by an average of 4% per year from 1988 
onwards. However, as Chapman acknowledges, this gives no real insight into the 
direct effect of HECS. 
Chapman then uses data from the Australian Council of Educational Research 
(ACER), examining the composition of 18-year olds in HE the year immediately 
before HECS, and repeating this for 1993, in particular looking at their parental 
income (as constructed from variables on material possessions, number of 
bedrooms, number of bathrooms etc). The results of this analysis show the 
proportion of students from low wealth backgrounds has increased significantly 
between 1998 and 1993 — 13% of low wealth were enrolled in university in 1998, 
compared to 17% in 1993. On this level, there appears to be no evidence that the 
HECS system has discouraged disadvantaged children from entering HE. The 
proportion from high wealth backgrounds increased by a similar magnitude, 
however (25% in 1998 v 33% in 1993) meaning the gap in attendance between 
students from rich and poor families remains wide. However, a grant system was 
also in place at the same time as HECS, potentially distorting these results. 
Galindo-Rueda, Marcenaro-Gutierrez and Vignoles (2004) also look at changes in 
participation before and after reforms — this time in the UK. Their efforts 
concentrate on how the socio-economic gap in participation may have changed as 
a result of the 1998 reforms (in which up-front tuition fees were introduced and 
34 Source: The international comparative Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project, 
University of New York at Buffalo 
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grants abolished — see Chapter 3 for more details). The nature of the gap they are 
investigating is wide — they report that over 75% of those from professional 
backgrounds study for a degree, versus only 14% from unskilled backgrounds. 
This gap has persisted over the last 40 years. 
Galindo-Rueda et al point out the difficulty in determining the impact of tuition 
fees, since there was no "natural experiment" at the time of their introduction in 
1998 — circumstances for all students changed — making difference-in-difference 
type analysis difficult. Examining student enrolments before and after the 
introduction of fees is also misleading, since there have been rises in participation 
every year for 30 years, so it is difficult to disentangle the true effects from that of 
normal growth. 
The authors instead attempt to make inferences by augmenting their data with 
household income level, thus allowing some insight into how the reforms may 
have affected individuals from different income groups. They go on to use a very 
rich dataset with a large number of controls, again to improve their estimates. 
In their analysis, Galindo-Rueda et al use data from HESA (Higher Education 
Statistics Agency) on student enrolments. While this is a rich source of data on 
institution and subject choices, it provides little information on students' socio-
economic backgrounds, so they would be unable to control for parental income. 
To deal with this, the authors augment their data by using postcode matching —
they merge CACI household income data (a commercially produced data set of 
4million households, giving the income distribution for each postcode) to student 
postcode (which is available through HESA, and in most cases is their parental 
postcode, therefore a direct link to their parents wealth/SES status). This is 
boosted with Census data on socio-economic profiles of each neighbourhood (as 
measured by proportion of heads of household in each SES group) and numbers 
of 18-24 year olds in each neighbourhood, enabling the construction of a 'pseudo' 
HE participation rate for each postcode. Note that in each case there is some 
measurement error since Census data was only available for 1991 and 2001 so 
had to be extrapolated. 
Galindo-Rueda et al use OLS regression to model the relationship between the 
HE participation rate and mean neighbourhood income, by year. They find that a 
1 log point increase in mean postcode income results in a 0.13 unit increase in HE 
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participation. The analysis also exposes a widening in the participation gap 
between incomes over time — in neighbourhoods with mean income levels 
(£21,890 per annum in 1999 prices), participation in HE rose from 10% in 
1994/95 to 19% in 2001 — a 9 percentage point increase. Over the same time 
period, though, neighbourhoods with income levels at 50% of the mean (£10,950 
per annum in 1999 prices), participation only grew by 1 percentage point (0.89% -
1.77%). This analysis is purely descriptive, though, and so it is impossible to tell 
whether tuition fees, the declining real value of student grants, or declining 
attainment in formative education years are to blame for the increase in 
inequality. 
A second set of analysis is therefore carried out using YCS (Youth Cohort Study) 
data — Government-run longitudinal survey data on under-19s, which includes 
their parent's socio-economic status (although not parental income), their HE 
attendance, qualifications etc. 
Looking first at 18 year olds in 1996, the authors run a probit model, with 
dependent variable whether a person is in HE at age 18 or not. Explanatory 
variables in the MLE analysis are gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity, 
parental education and school type — i.e. all measures of a person's socio-
economic background. Note that prior academic achievement is not included at 
this stage, since the aim is to measure the impact purely of someone's background 
(which of course, may impact their prior attainment). The results indicate that a 
student's background has a large impact on their likeliness to participate in HE. 
Students from professional/managerial backgrounds are almost 3 percentage 
points more likely to attend HE compared with those from skilled backgrounds 
(although those from unskilled backgrounds are equally likely to attend as those 
from skilled backgrounds). However, once prior academic attainment (i.e. number 
of A-levels) is included in the model, the impact of socio-economic background 
disappears. It seems then, that socio-economic background has an indirect impact 
only — by limiting educational attainment early in life. 
The analysis is repeated for 18-year olds in 2000 — i.e. after the introduction of 
tuition fees. The results are quite different — the impact of coming from a 
professional/managerial background has risen to 12 percentage points, and more 
importantly, is still significant even when A-level attainment is included in the 
model. Students from unskilled backgrounds are meanwhile 10 percentage points 
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less likely to attend HE. However, again socio-economic background drops out 
when prior attainment is included for this group. When controlling for GCSE 
performance as well as A-level performance, and restricting the comparator group 
to those with 5 good GCSEs, which is arguably a more meaningful comparison 
since those without such qualifications are highly unlikely to be able to attend 
HE, socio-ecomomic status becomes insignificant, with A level attainment the 
biggest driver of participation. 
Overall, the results certainly indicate a large and growing gap in HE participation 
between those from rich and poor parental backgrounds. However, the authors 
conclude that this gap is part of a long-term time trend and so is not likely to be 
attributable to HE policy. 
A further example of examining data on participation over time to make 
inferences about the UK reforms comes from Blanden and Machin (2004). They 
find a similar result to Galindo-Rueda et al — i.e. that the gap between rich and 
poor in HE has widened over time — though not necessarily as a result of HE 
finance policy — in their analysis of the impact of the UK HE expansion on 
inequality. The authors use longitudinal data from the BHPS, NCDS and BCS to 
study the changing participation rates of students from different income 
backgrounds over time. 
They find that while participation in HE is largely driven by prior attainment and 
parental income, the gap in participation between the rich and the poor actually 
widened between the years of 1981 and 1999. This coincides with the time period 
of rapid expansion in HE, a time when student numbers were rising so rapidly that 
the Government had to find ways to reduce the costs per student. Over this time 
period, benefits such as housing benefit were removed from students, and grants 
were first frozen and then totally withdrawn and loans were introduced for living 
costs (see Chapter 2). Again, however, while Blanden and Machin's findings 
suggest that the continual loss of income in the form of benefits and grants slowed 
the growth of participation of low-income students, and was outstripped by 
growth in the participation rates of high income students, this is likely part of a 
long-term trend unrelated to HE finance policy. 
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4.2.4 Qualitative methods 
While unable to deal with the issue of bias caused by the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity, qualitative methods are a popular means of gauging opinion on 
higher education funding policy. Often, these methods are mixed with other types 
of methodology such as self-completion surveys. 
Forsyth and Furlong (2000; 2003), and Furlong and Cartmel (2005) use a mixed 
methodology to explore in great detail the transition from school to higher 
education by young people living in disadvantaged areas in Scotland. 
They use a mixture of large scale postal surveys and detailed qualitative 
interviews to explore the impact of several types of disadvantage thought to affect 
HE participation (defined in this case by those doing a degree or an HND) by 
young people in Scotland. They chose 4 areas which were particularly deprived 
(as measured by the DEPCAT index of deprivation35) but in geographically 
contrasting areas of Scotland, each of which represent an element of deprivation 
thought to be relevant to access. An initial sample of 531 children is chosen, in 
the following areas — i. Glasgow, representing an area of severe deprivation —
Glasgow contains the greatest number of deprived postcodes in Scotland, ii. 
Lanarkshire, representing an area of low qualifications — Lanarkshire has suffered 
many years of decline in its industries, leaving its workforce unemployed and 
uneducated. iii. Ayreshire, representing an area of high unemployment and 
population decline and iv. Argyll, an area with no university in commuting 
distance, to capture the added disadvantage from having to move away from 
home to attend HE. In this way, a mixture of children of different classes is 
contained within the sample, though all are from deprived areas described. 
It should be noted though, that this study, while revealing interesting results, does 
not control for prior attainment or background characteristics. However, the 
15 Deprivation categories are used to divide a population into groups based on the material 
affluence / deprivation of the area where they live. There are 7 deprivation categories: 1 being the 
most affluent (least deprived) and 7 the most deprived. Every postcode sector is allocated a 
'deprivation score' or 'depcat', derived from four sets of information collected in the census: 
overcrowding; male unemployment; car ownership and the proportion of people in households in 
social class 4 or 5. 
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sample is made up of youths who have enrolled in the sixth form of school. This 
is an optional year in Scotland and is generally taken by the more academically 
ambitious children, so provides a sort of control for prior attainment, and also 
means the sample of children are atypical. 
The survey contains 3 waves — an initial wave in 1999 when the children were in 
sixth form and so at the critical stage of deciding whether to enter into HE, in 
2001 when those children who had decided to go on to HE were in their first year, 
and in 2004 when the respondents were nearing the end of their degrees. At each 
stage a mixture of postal questionnaires and face-to-face interviews is carried out. 
At the first stage, 531 children were in the sample, while by the third wave the 
sample still contained 395 respondents. In each wave, response rates were very 
high, averaging 72%. 
The study shows clear links between socio-economic disadvantage and access to 
HE — those children from SEI and II had on average 13 higher points (the Scottish 
equivalent of A-level) whilst those from SE V had gained only 5.5 points by the 
beginning of sixth year. The study also shows a negative relationship between 
social class and likeliness to apply to HE — 82% of children from SE I had applied 
to university by this time, whilst 51% of those from SE V had done so. This 
statistic may seem surprisingly high, but could be explained by the research 
design chosen by Forsyth and Furlong, of having only children enrolled for sixth 
year at school. As stated this optional year tends to be taken by students with 
greater academic ambition than average. This means the sample may contain a 
higher proportion of successful children who happen to live in areas of social 
disadvantage. (the authors themselves postulate that some of the children in the 
sample may be from the "sunken middle class" — a phrase coined by Jackson and 
Marsden in their book "Education and the Working Class" (1968) to describe 
children who have a parent from the middle class, but have become working class 
over their lifetime. This is usually a female through marriage, but could also be 
due to bankruptcy, illness etc.) 
By the time of the first follow up survey, social class effects were as pronounced 
as ever — 64% of those in SE I were doing a degree, while 6% were doing an 
HND. For SE V, 22% were doing a degree, 8% an HND, 30% were doing an NC 
and the remainder were not in education. 
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A well as uncovering a direct link between socio-economic status and access to 
university, the study also uncovered more subtle effects of socio-economic 
disadvantage in terms of HE such as choice of subject type (the sample were 
over-represented on 'vocational' versus 'academic' subjects), university type and 
location — 58.8% of HE students in the sample — attended the university nearest 
their home, and only 6% of the Glasgow sample actually left home to attend 
university, while 46% of those in Ayrshire stayed at home, despite having to 
endure an average 2hr36m commute per day to do so. Whilst many of those from 
the Glasgow area attended Glasgow or Strathclyde universities (an ancient and a 
`red brick' respectively), no-one was found to be attending an ancient or red brick 
university outside of Scotland. Again, social class among the sample was apparent 
in university type — 22% of those from SE I were attending an ancient institution 
(Glasgow or Edinburgh) and 60% were attending a red brick, with the remainder 
at 'new' universities. Of those in SE V, only 5% were attending an ancient 
university, 15% were in a red brick school, and 10% were in a new university. 
The remainder were in FE institutions. 
While these findings provide evidence of socio-economic disadvantage in HE, it 
is of greater relevance to this thesis to look at the impact of HE finance on the 
children in the sample. 
Those children in the sample who had enrolled in a degree in the second phase of 
the study were subject to a £1,00036 tuition fee for each year that they attended 
HE. However, the majority had qualified for the fee remissions which were 
available to disadvantaged students at that time, meaning that only 25% of those 
doing a degree were actually paying a full or partial fee. 
The longitudinal nature of the study meant that students could be asked about 
their knowledge of tuition fees before and after they enrolled in HE. The survey 
uncovered a huge incidence of uncertainty regarding the fees — 73% of students 
were not aware of what fee they would be liable for before entering HE. Only 
12% of students anticipated paying the full fee before entering, while 26% 
actually ended up paying it. More seriously, there was a tendency to over-estimate 
the cost of HE, even among those who eventually went on to study — only 13% of 
36 1998 prices 
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students believed they would be exempt from the fee, although 36% actually 
turned out to be. 
At the time of the second wave of research in 2001, the endowment fee had just 
been introduced (see Chapter 2), and the upfront fee abolished. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, those respondents who were now considering enrolling for a 
degree (either later than their peers, or following on from an HND) were unhappy 
with this move — which meant they would now be eligible for an expensive 
endowment fee at the end of their degree, since they would have been exempt 
from the upfront fee. While it is not clear from the research whether the 
endowment dissuaded study participants from entering HE it remains one of the 
few pieces of qualitative evidence of negative attitudes towards fees, and the (now 
defunct) Scottish endowment system. 
As well as fees, lack of information impacted respondents in many other ways. 
Respondents in HE complained of not being advised correctly in what degree to 
do, the logistics of UCAS forms and which subjects to take both at university and 
at school. The main source of information for the respondents was friends and 
siblings — a major concern since this group are least likely to have a sibling or 
friend at university. 
The survey also uncovers several interesting findings regarding students attitudes 
towards maintenance loans. 
In exploring this, Forsyth and Furlong used willingness to take out a student loan 
immediately upon enrolment as a measure of debt aversion (i.e. those who did not 
take a loan out straight away were considered to be more debt averse than those 
taking one up straight away). Indeed, many of the poorer students did not actually 
take out the full loan, but instead worked to get by, rather than have to face the 
debt later, perhaps eroding their experiences as students, both socially and 
academically. This finding is supported by the findings of Callender and Jackson 
(2005) who find that working class students have far more negative feelings 
toward debt than their richer counterparts. 
Financial worries were the biggest barrier to entry and success in HE, and the 
qualitative interviews carried out are effective at isolating issues caused by credit 
constraints and debt aversion. The participants described a host of fears about 
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their finances, which were a mixture of credit constraints (not being able to afford 
the up-front costs of university) and debt aversion (being reluctant to borrow the 
money needed). Many students actually deferred entry into HE in order to save up 
to be able to afford it, while one student dropped out of her HE course as she was 
unable to afford the commute each day. Finance was the main reason given for 
students choosing to live at home. Debt aversion resulted in many students 
working during term-time to avoid spiralling debt, then working over the summer 
to re-pay the debt they had incurred. 
In general Forsyth and Furlong note that debt aversion is not the sole reason for 
lack of success in HE by those from low socio-economic groups, but is very often 
the 'tipping point' when other things go wrong. Many respondents who were on 
the cusp of either staying on for more HE or leaving after an HND, cited fear of 
debt as the tipping point towards a negative outcome. As one student put it, 
regarding her mounting loans "It makes you think twice" 
This indicates that while fear of debt may not be a main factor in most students 
HE decision-making, it may be a major factor for those students on the margin —
i.e. who are undecided about whether to participate or not participate in HE. 
4.3 Conclusions and analysis 
While Chapter 2 presented the established view that the major factors in 
determining whether a young person will go to university or not is their prior 
attainment and family background characteristics, there are a number of studies 
that attempt to go beyond this and look for real affects of Government HE finance 
policies. This Chapter has presented those studies. 
The difference-in-difference methodology employed by Dynarski and 
Linsenmeier, Rosen and Rouse is one of the most appealing. This methodology 
has the advantage of mimicking a controlled experiment and therefore can 
provide credible causal results. Furthermore, particularly in the case of Dynarski, 
such a methodology lends itself well to calculating elasticities of college demand 
with respect to costs and aid. However, the main disadvantage is that the 
difference-in-difference requires a clean natural experiment of which there are 
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few available in UK HE policy (see Chapter 2), and also, crucially, requires the 
treatment and control groups to be unaffected by anything other than the policy 
change being examined (other than characteristics that can be controlled for). For 
the difference-in-difference experiment to be robust, it is a required assumption 
that changes experienced by the control group would have happened to the 
treatment group too, in the absence of the policy change. This assumption is 
probably the most difficult to maintain in the HE debate, especially if the 
treatment and control groups come from difference socio-economic groups, as is 
the case with many of the policy changes described in Chapter 2, largely due to 
the tendency for policy changes to be means tested. This issue will be re-visited in 
Chapter 6. While Dynarksi's analysis concerns a treatment and control group that 
are assumed to be different only at random (due to the death of a parent), the 
results imply surprisingly sizeable effects of the reforms and a resulting large 
elasticity of demand with respect to grants, perhaps suggesting the results are still 
suffering from some sort of bias. 
The panel within groups approach as exemplified by Kane has similar appeal to 
the difference-in-difference methodology in that there is a clear attempt to prove 
causality experimentally. This method is perhaps more flexible in that no "clean" 
experiment such as that of Dynarski's is required — the method can be used when 
several policy changes have taken place, affecting different groups, as is the case 
in the UK. Particularly in the case of within groups (fixed effects) estimators, 
however, the key assumption is that unobserved effects are fixed over time, and 
requires variation in the explanatory variables over time. The method also 
requires detailed data with observations on individuals or groups repeated over 
time. 
The time-series and cross-sectional approaches discussed have the obvious 
advantage of simplicity, involving observations of university participation before 
and after a policy change. As discussed this does not imply causality, though 
authors such as Chapman (1997) attempt to overcome this by splitting data into 
income bands. Blanden and Machin (2004) and Galindo-Rueda et al (2004)'s 
methodology is perhaps more appealing in that a very rich set of controls is used. 
However, in practice, obtaining such a set of controls is difficult — as the authors 
illustrate — and the authors' parental income measurement in particular may be 
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subject to measurement error. Furthermore a fundamental issue with this study is 
that it does not control for unobserved factors such as motivation. 
Finally, the qualitative methodology employed by Forsyth and Furlong, and 
Furlong and Cartmel's appeal lies in the depth of information uncovered, though 
unable to provide a credible estimate of demand for university with respect to 
costs and aid. Forsyth and Furlong uncover many findings which are perhaps too 
subtle to be drawn from large-scale empirical work — such as the detrimental 
effect of information constraints, or the effect of liquidity constraints on 
institution and subject choice. Such issues would not be picked up in a study 
examining overall change in participation rates. 
Forsyth and Furlong also uncover an important point — that while HE finance may 
not be a major issue for the majority of students, those students on the margin —
i.e. students from poorer backgrounds, who are already affected by debt aversion, 
lack of information or other problems, and who are therefore at a pivotal stage in 
their decision making, may be the most impacted. This indicates that 
methodologies must look in particular at marginal students since the impact of 
debt aversion (potentially exacerbated by the increasing requirement to borrow 
money for maintenance and fees), while unlikely to dissuade those who have 
strong leanings towards a university education, appears to be a potentially 
decisive factor for students on the margin. 
Finally, and in order to find these marginal students, analysis which takes into 
account parental income would be of particular value. Such evidence is few and 
far between with the majority of studies discussed here using some sort of proxy, 
such as free school meals, or a regional level income. Since HE funding 
arrangements are predominantly means-tested it would seem vital to have 
knowledge of parental income for accuracy in the results, and to have full 
knowledge of the grants and fees actually received, rather than assuming all 
students are eligible for the maximum grant or fee, or a mean level. 
Table 4.1 summarises the findings of the studies described above, in which 
marginal effects and / or elasticities37 of HE demand with respect to fees and aid 
37 For simplicity, marginal effects rather than elasticities are shown. All have been converted into 
2006 prices (GDP deflator). 
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are calculated. To clarify, in the case of Kane, a $1000 increase in fees results in a 
1.9 percentage point decrease in participation of low income students. 
Interestingly, the results seem to be remarkably consistent, despite the variety of 
methodologies and data-sets used. Particularly in the case of the impact of net 
costs and fees, the range of estimates obtained is quite narrow, with the majority 
of coefficients similar in magnitude at around a 3 percentage point impact for 
$1000 (for fees, net costs and grants), though in the case of Kane, grants are not 
found to have an effect, suggesting the value of grants as a tool for increasing 
participation is not yet clear. 
That all the results are quite well in line seems somewhat surprising, given that 
the earlier studies, as discussed, did not control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
However, Dynarski (1999) suggests this may be because of competing biases at 
work; cross-sectional estimates of the coefficient on fees may be biased 
downward since eligibility for fees is correlated positively with propensity to 
attend college, and estimates of the effect of grants may be biased upward, since 
eligibility for this type of aid is correlated negatively with the underlying 
propensity to attend college. 
Table 4.1: Summary of marginal effects of a $1000 increase in fee and aid eligibility on 
university artici ation (2006 urices 
Author Year Country Data ME: $1000' increase in 
grant / fee / net cost 
on participation (ppt)2: 
Mansld & 
Wise 
1983 US NLS (Class of 
1972) 
Grant 	 0.031 
Leslie & 
Brinkman 
1988 US Review of 23 
econometric 
studies 
Net cost2 	 -0.033 
McPherson 
& Schaprio 
1991 US CPS / AFS 
(1974-1984) 
Net cost 	 -0.027 
(low income) 
Kane 1994 US CPS (1970- 
1988) 
Net cost 	 -0.032 
Fee 	 -0.031 (low 
income) 
Grant 	 no effect 
Dynarski 2001 US NLSY (1979- 
1996) 
Grant 	 0.03 
I At 2006 exchange rates, $100£525; at 2009 exchange rates, $1000-1613 
2 Leslie & Brinkman, McPherson & Shapiro calculate net costs as (fees — grants — loans); Kane calculates as 
(fees — grants) 
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This chapter's aim is to describe the many methodologies employed by 
researchers to uncover the impact of fees and aid on college participation, and to 
examine their findings. In the majority of cases, a significant effect of the correct 
sign is found. 
The implication of this chapter is that there is strong evidence of a role fees and 
grants in university participation, alongside the well-established roles of prior 
attainment and socio-economic status described in Chapter 2. However, in many 
cases it is not clear why youths respond to the levels of grants and fees as they do. 
For example, while Dynarski's analysis shows a positive response to grants, it is 
not clear whether the decrease in participation resulting from the removal of the 
grant was due to credit constraints, or youth's responses to changes in the price of 
college, possibly driven by students valuing the upfront costs of education more 
than possible future returns. 
Similarly, it is difficult to draw conclusions of this nature from the work of Kane. 
While he finds low income students to be more sensitive to tuition fees than high 
income students, this could be because low income students are more likely to 
experience credit constraints, but could equally be because these students are 
more responsive to upfront costs than anticipated future benefits to HE. 
Perhaps the only study which sheds any light on the reasons behind youth's 
responsiveness to HE systems is that of Forsyth and Furlong. This study did find 
clear evidence of debt aversion among the students involved, as proxied by those 
choosing not to take up a low-cost maintenance loan. A number of these students 
also appeared to be credit constrained. However, as discussed, Forsyth and 
Furlong's study had a number of other methodological issues which may have 
affected the validity of the findings. 
A further crucial finding from this chapter is that there is a clear gap in research 
for the UK, where, to date, no studies have attempted to calculate the marginal 
effect of grants and fees on participation, despite the many changes in HE finance 
policy that have taken place. 
The evidence presented in Chapters 3 and 4 is somewhat contradictory, and the 
conclusion may be that early child development factors and HE financial systems 
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may both play roles in university participation decisions of youths. It is likely, 
given the strong evidence of Chapter 3, that while aid eligibility and fee 
obligations may matter, they are not as influential as early-years factors, as 
suggested by Heckman. This matter will be investigated fully in Chapters 6-8, 
which will add to add to the body of work described in this chapter, by presenting 
an estimation of the impact of fees and grants on participation using some of the 
methodologies described above. 
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Chapter 5 Using the Labour Force 
Survey to examine higher education 
participation 
5.1 Introduction 
The intention of the first strand of this thesis is to add to the body of work 
described in Chapter 4 by estimating the impact of tuition fees and maintenance 
grants on university participation in the UK. The study will concentrate on the 
major UK higher education reforms of the last decade, in particular the following: 
i. The introduction of the £1,20038 up-front tuition fee in 1998/99 
ii. The reduction and subsequent abolition of grants over the period 1998/99 
— 1999/00 
iii. The abolition of tuition fees in Scotland in 2000/00 
iv. The re-introduction of maintenance grants in Scotland in 2001/02 
v. The re-introduction of maintenance grants in England and Northern 
Ireland in 2004 
And, to estimate by regression analysis the overall impact of tuition fees and 
maintenance grants on university participation using this variation in funding 
policy, and testing and refining this specification by experimenting with a range 
of methodologies based on those described in Chapter 4. 
Data on young people aged 18-19 (spanning school leaving age and first year at 
university) covering the last two decades, with information on the youths' 
activities, educational or not, is therefore required. In particular, it is preferable to 
observe only young people immediately after they have left school and therefore 
eligible for first year of university — the reasoning for this is that it is essential to 
know what policy is in place when they make their decision whether to attend 
university or not. For example, if one looked at the behavior of 20 year-olds in 
2004, one could not be sure if they had decided not to attend university in 2003 
38 For the subsequent chapters, all financial amounts will be expressed in 2006 prices (GDP 
deflator) 
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because there were no grants, and then, upon the re-introduction of grants in 2004 
had decided to attend — or they had simply decided to take a gap year. 
By restricting the sample to only immediate school leavers, the HE finance policy 
in place at the time of their decision making will be clear. 
During the period of analysis (1992-2005) grants and fees were means tested, so it 
is also crucial to know the youths' parental incomes in order to understand the 
amount of grant and fee they are potentially eligible for (a further reason behind 
this is; even if the survey in question had information on fees and grants received, 
this would only be available for the part of the sample actually participating in 
university). It will also be necessary to know the amount of student maintenance 
loan the youth is eligible for, since this will be an important factor — maintenance 
loans (which were also means tested) obviously have a major impact on the up-
front costs of going to university and will therefore be crucial in youths 
participation decisions39. 
To establish parental income it will be useful to observe individuals in the 
parental home, ideally the year before they decide whether or not to participate 
(since at time of writing, no surveys which interview a young person directly and 
also ask them their parents' income are known to exist, so a survey is needed in 
which both parents and their children are interviewed, which establishes parental 
income). 
Because of the variation in grant, fee (and loan) amounts by year due to policy 
changes and inflationary increases, it is obviously essential to know which 
academic year the youth would be eligible for immediately upon leaving school 
(as discussed above), in order to understand what level of finance s(he) would be 
subject to. This will be determined using month and year of birth. This is 
necessary because of the nature of the UK academic system — the university 
39 As will be discussed in Chapters 6-7, while maintenance loans will be controlled for, putting a 
causal interpretation on the loans coefficient is not advisable. Loans are inherently different to up-
front fees and grants since they represent both an up-front benefit and a future cost. Furthermore, 
loan repayments are linked to future earnings so will vary by individual, as will discount rates. In 
addition, there are many other types of loan (such as credit card debt) also not included in this 
analysis. Future research will aim to tackle this with a more dynamic model, incorporating 
individuals' future debt obligations based on predicted future earnings, but is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
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academic year a youth is eligible for varies according to their month and year of 
birth — simply knowing their age is not sufficient. 
Given these criteria, in choosing a dataset, the following conditions must be met: 
i. Large scale survey data on young people aged 16-19 (spanning school 
leaving age — to collect parental incomes — and first year after leaving 
school) over the time period in question — 1992-2005, covering the four 
constituent countries of the UK. 
ii. Status of the young person — i.e. whether they are at school, university, or 
otherwise, and preferably whether they are studying at degree level, since 
the reforms primarily affected degree students. 
iii. Year and month of birth of the child. As discussed above this is essential 
in order to derive the university academic year each child is first eligible 
for. Simply knowing the age of the young person is not sufficient to derive 
the academic year they are immediately eligible for upon leaving school. 
This is because of the nature of the UK academic system — children in 
England start school aged between 4 and 5 years old, depending on their 
date of birth. The school academic year begins in September and policy 
dictates that children must start school in the academic year in which they 
turn 5. Thus, the year in which you start school is dependent on your date 
of birth, in turn meaning that the age at which you qualify for university, 
after the 14 years of school needed to acquire the required number of A-
levels, will also vary by date of birth. In short, those born before 
September will start university at age 18, while those born September-
December will start a year later. The system is Scotland is different still, 
with the academic year running from March - February (see Appendix 2 
(Chapter 5): Education systems in England and Scotland for more details). 
Without knowing at least month and year of birth, it is impossible to tell 
which academic year a child qualifies for, and thus whether they are in the 
treatment or control group. 
iv. Parental income data. This is also essential due to the means-testing nature 
of the UK reforms — in order to know if the young person would have 
been eligible for the grant or fee in question, and indeed the amount of fee 
owing or grant/loan eligible for, it is essential to know their parents 
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income in the year prior to attending university, when means testing 
would take place. 
Given these extensive criteria, and the fact that no research of this nature has been 
carried out before, and therefore no dataset previously identified as suitable, 
finding an appropriate dataset was a major part of the research undertaken in this 
thesis. Three major UK Governmental studies were carefully examined over a 
number of weeks, paying heed to the above criteria. This chapter describes the 
research carried out and the reasons for the choice of the LFS as the most suitable 
dataset for the analysis and indeed any analysis which attempts to identify the 
impact of HE finance on participation. 
The Chapter concludes with descriptive statistics on the LFS, description of the 
variables used and the cleaning process involved. 
5.2 Datasets considered 
Three datasets are examined for the purposes of this analysis — the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), the Family Resources Survey (FRS) and the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). Below, a discussion of the merits of each is 
presented. 
5.2.1 The BHPS 
This is a UK representative longitudinal survey which began in 1991 and runs to 
2005 at the time of writing. 
Structure: The longitudinal nature of the BHPS lends itself well to this research 
question. The survey panel starts in 1991 with 5,000 families. Should any family 
member move out of the house, for example to go to university, they are followed 
by the BHPS and are thus not lost from the survey. In addition, the leavers' new 
housemates/husbands/wives/children are also added to the sample. The 
longitudinal nature of the study plus the unique method of following panel 
members wherever they go means that it is possible to see children reach school-
leaving age and then observe them at the critical time of deciding whether to go to 
university or not, even if they leave home to do so. 
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Availability of data: The BHPS has information on month and year of birth so it is 
possible to compute a students' eligibility for university using the rules discussed 
previously. Since the BHPS is a study of families, data on school leavers' parents' 
income (and other characteristics of their parents) is available. 
Sample Size: The study starts with 5,000 households, or around 10,000 people in 
total in 1991. As discussed, if people leave home they are followed, bringing with 
them additional panel members. In addition, sample boosts for Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland were added in 1999. Despite all this, the BHPS samples are 
still very small, particularly when trying to look at eligible school leavers (17-19 
year olds) in the constituent countries of the UK. For example, for the 2001/02 
academic year, around 460 respondents are eligible for university, with 15% 
participation — or 73 university participants. Looking only at Scotland reduces the 
sample size to around 20 eligible people, and even fewer participants — rendering 
estimation meaningless. 
Key issues: Other than the obvious issues with sample sizes, the nature of the 
BHPS brings about several estimation problems: 
a) University start dates. All interviews are carried out in September of the year. 
This is problematic since university term dates tend to begin in September or 
October, and vary throughout the month depending on the institution. The result 
is that a BHPS respondent being interviewed on September 10th who is intending 
to start university on October 1st will be recorded as not being at university that 
year. It will only be until the following year that they will be recorded as a 
university student. Conversely, a respondent might be interviewed on October 
24th, who started university on September 10th, and who will be recorded as 
being at university in that academic year. This means that it is never clear when 
an individual actually started university and thus whether they attended university 
during a policy year. 
There are, however, details of a persons' university end date, from which start 
date can be imputed (using the general rule that degrees take 4 years in Scotland 
and 3 years in England) and in 2000, a university start date question was added. 
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However, in many cases both university start and end date is missing — partly for 
reasons to be explained below — further reducing sample sizes. 
b) New Panel Members and Additional Household Members. The BHPS has an 
unusual way of dealing with new panel members (e.g. panel members whose 
family are in the panel but were below the minimum interview age, panel 
members from the Scottish sample boost in 1999, and respondents entering the 
panel through marriage or co-habiting). For example, questions regarding 
university attendance and start date are based on changes since the previous wave, 
and so are routed only to those who have been interviewed in a previous wave. So 
those entering the panel for the first time will not be asked these questions. In 
some cases, slightly different questions are asked instead — e.g. in the case of 
university attendance, new respondents are asked if they are still in education and 
what type, so their university status can be garnered from this. But their university 
start or end dates will not be recorded unless they re-appear in the panel the next 
year. This is a further major problem since, particularly in the case of university 
entrants, they will move into shared accommodation in their first year. Thus, 
additional panel members will be added to the sample who will have no attached 
information about their university start year. In a large number of cases, the 
original panel member will find different accommodation the following year, in 
another house. Thus the new entrants from his previous house-share will not 
reappear, and another set of new housemates will be added — again with no 
information on university attendance or start date (see illustration in Figure 6). 
While an obvious solution would be to disregard these new entrants, the already 
limited sample sizes in the BHPS mean that it is of priority to capture as many 
respondents as possible. Thus other means must be used to impute university 
start-dates of new members. 
c) Parental income data. Since students themselves are not asked about their 
parents incomes, in order to capture parental income it is necessary for a studept's 
parents to be in the sample too. The BHPS is in fact an excellent source of 
parental income data, since panel members typically live with their parents in the 
years prior to university, and all family members are interviewed with regards to 
total income from employment, benefits and investment. However two problems 
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arise — again when panel members are added from shared accommodation, in 
which case no parental information is available, or when 18 year olds eligible for 
university happen to be living outside the home at the time they enter the panel 
(this occurs occasionally). 
In summary: the main issue with the BHPS is sample sizes, which make the 
estimation very unstable, particularly for estimating models including Scottish 
data. Attempts to boost sample sizes by adding information from individuals 
entering the survey through shared accommodation or marriage causes additional 
problems due to the lack of background data on them. A further major issue is the 
uncertainty around the academic year in which the individual is participating in 
university. 
5.2.2 The FRS 
This is a UK representative cross-sectional survey of UK families which began in 
1992 and runs to 2005 at the time of writing. The FRS has particular emphasis on 
collecting information about the income of the family in question, be it income 
from employment, benefits, investment or any other source. 
Structure: Unlike the BHPS, the FRS is not a longitudinal survey, so it is not 
possible to observe individuals at different points in time, and observe their 
behaviour before the decision to attend or not attend university. Instead, 
individuals are only present at one point in time. Thus, for the purposes of this 
thesis it is necessary to find individuals who are eligible for university in the year 
they were surveyed, and observe whether they attended university or not. 
Availability of data: The FRS has excellent and detailed income data, for reasons 
outlined above. 
However, date of birth is no longer available in the FRS survey, since it was 
removed by the National Statistics office following a tightening of security 
measures. As discussed previously, it is therefore impossible to tell which funding 
regime a student would have been subject to, whether they would have had to pay 
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tuition fees or not. This problem effectively renders the FRS unsuitable for the 
purpose of this study. 
Sample Size: The FRS has an annual target of 24,000 households or 60,000 
people, a good sample size for the purpose of this research. 
Key issues: 
a) Parental income data. Similar to the BHPS, the unit of observation is the 
household, so an individuals' parental income is only observable if they live in 
the same household as their parent or parents. Since it is not possible to observe 
individuals transitioning from the year before university, when they usually are 
living with their parents, to their first year of university or work, instead they 
must be observed in their first year at university. However, in this case there will 
be two groups of people who are not living at home, and therefore whose parental 
income will be unknown — this will be anyone at university living away from 
home, either in halls of residence or in private accommodation, and similarly, 
anyone who has moved away from their parents home to work (or who is 
unemployed, training or any other activity than studying). 
The FRS structure goes some way to solving the former of these problems by 
asking each parent whether they have a dependent child, aged 16-24, in education, 
but living away from the family home. While it is not clear what the nature of the 
education is, it is a reasonable assumption to assume anyone over 16, in education 
and living away from home is at university or college rather than school. The 
children themselves are not interviewed, but their parents are asked a very brief 
set of questions about them, and because of this, their parental incomes are 
known. 
However, a major problem with this 'external child record' is that the actual age 
of the child is not recorded anywhere, just that they are aged between 16 and 24. 
Without age (or to be precise, month and year of birth) it is not certain which 
higher education funding policy the child is subject to, rendering this information 
inadequate. 
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b) Absence of month and year of birth. As detailed above, another issue with the 
FRS is the absence of date of birth, making it impossible to tell whether an 
individual is in a treatment or control group. 
c) University Participation. A further issue arises as a result of the interview 
timings. Unlike the BHPS, FRS interviews are carried out all throughout the year. 
This presents some issues when attempting to identify whether an individual is 
eligible for university and whether they are a university participant. For example, 
if a child is eligible for university in the academic year 2003/04, they will start 
university in September or October. But if they are interviewed in June, say, they 
will be recorded as not being at university in that year, even if they go on to enroll 
in September. 
This means it is necessary to look for people who are interviewed in the calendar 
year after they were first eligible for university. For example, if someone is 
eligible for university in the academic year 2003/04, they need to have been 
interviewed in or after September 2003 in order for it to be certain whether they 
are at university or not. 
This somewhat lowers the chances of finding panel members suitable for analysis, 
but is a far lesser problem than the absence of information on date of birth and the 
missing parental income data on a large proportion of the group of interest. 
However the issue of missing age of external children is the largest problem with 
FRS data. 
5.2.3 The LFS 
The LFS is something of a hybrid of the previous two surveys, having both cross-
sectional and longitudinal elements. The survey began in 1975 as an annual 
survey, but became a quarterly survey in 1992. As in the previous two surveys, 
information is collected by household, and as the name suggests, there is 
particular emphasis on the labour market activities of each panel member. 
Structure: As mentioned, the LFS has both cross-sectional and longitudinal 
elements. Households are interviewed longitudinally for 5 consecutive quarters 
before they are removed from the panel and replaced. This means that it is 
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possible to observe a family in the base year, and then again exactly a year later. 
While this is clearly a limited amount of time compared to the BHPS, it is ideal 
for this analysis, since individuals in the year immediately before their decision to 
participate in higher education can be observed, and observed again the year later 
when they carry out this decision. 
Availability of data: The LFS has good information on income from earnings 
from employment, but has much less detail on income from benefits or 
investment. Thus, the income of an unemployed or inactive person or their parent 
must be imputed. Since individuals are observed the year before their university 
eligibility year, they will usually be at home, and thus it is possible to observe 
their parents income. 
Month and year of birth is also available for all individuals, as is detailed 
information on their labour market activities — as a student, employee or 
otherwise. 
Sample Size: The LFS has by far the largest sample size of all three studies, with 
60,000 households interviewed in each wave. 
Key issues: 
a) Transitions out of the family home. Again, a major issue arises as a result of 
the household-based structure of the LFS. Interviews of households, as opposed to 
particular individuals are carried out, and when an individual leaves the 
household, be it to go to work, university or otherwise — unless (s)he chooses to 
live in a university hall of residence, (s)he is lost from the sample. This precludes 
the observation of his/her parental income (and hence his/her fee and grant 
eligibility). Independent individuals are of course observed in the LFS as 
independents, but are not asked about their parents' incomes at any time of their 
appearance in the LFS, and therefore this information is missing (even though in 
the case of a student living in a house-share rather than hall of residence, their 
student grant and fee amounts would be calculated on the basis of their parents' 
incomes by the Government.) 
More detail on the means of dealing with this is below. 
101 
b) University Participation. In exactly the same way as the FRS, LFS interviews 
are carried out all throughout the year. Thus, the same method must be used to 
match up a person's interview timing with their eligibility and participation. i.e. 
look for people who are interviewed in the calendar year after they were first 
eligible for university and check their university status (see 5.3.2. for details of 
participation measure used). 
In summary, the LFS appears to be the most appropriate dataset for this piece of 
work. While this dataset has some issues with parental income data of certain 
groups of individuals, this problem can be surmounted — while the BHPS's small 
sample sizes, and the lack of age data on a large portion of the sample of FRS 
data are problems too great to overcome. Thus, the LFS is chosen for the main 
strand of this thesis. It is important to note at this point, that the LFS sample 
which will be used in the remainder of this thesis, contains data going up to and 
including 2005. While data were available for 2006 and 2007 at the time of 
analysis, certain restrictions were placed on the dataset from 2006 onwards 
meaning month and year of birth (or any other indicator of year of university 
eligibility), were not. Therefore all analysis that follows uses data from 1992-
2005. 
5.3 Issues and solutions in using the LFS dataset 
As detailed above, there are a number of issues arising when using the LFS 
dataset for this research. These issues and the solutions used are described below. 
5.3.1 Parental Income data 
As discussed, a proportion of the LFS sample in question have missing parental 
incomes. As described above, these individuals are those aged 18-19 who are not 
living with their parents or living in a university hall of residence. 
Helpfully, given the 'first year eligibility' status required, the majority of the 
sample of interest do live at home or, if they go on to university, in halls of 
residence (in which case parental income is observed), meaning these "missing 
parental income" youths make up only 11% of the sample of interest. Table 5.1 
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shows the make-up of youths in the sample by academic year of university 
eligibility - those living independently will have missing parental incomes. 
Table 5.1 Distribution of status of sample members (% of total) 
academic 
year 
living: 
at home in hall of residence' independently 
1992/93 
1993/94 
1994/95 
1995/96 
88.2 
86.7 
87.4 
86.4 - 
11.8 
13.3 
12.6 
13.6 
1996/97 79.8 6.1 14.1 
1997/98 83.4 7.8 8.8 
1998/99 81.8 8.0 10.2 
1999/00 82.4 6.9 10.8 
2000/01 81.5 7.8 10.8 
2001/02 81.6 7.9 10.6 
2002/03 82.3 7.6 10.0 
2003/04 83.1 7.0 10.0 
2004/05 82.6 7.1 10.4 
2005/06 81.6 6.8 11.5 
Total 82.02 7.32 11.2 
# 20,593 1,366 2,773 
'prior to 1996, the LFS did not contain a "flag" for students living in halls of residence, 
though these were included in the sample, as living at home. Hence there are a higher proportion of -home" students in the 
years prior to 1996. 
2 only calculated for academic years 1996/97 - 2005/06 
To overcome this problem, the independent individuals' fee, loan and grant 
eligibility are estimated on the basis of their own characteristics (GCSE, gender, 
ethnicity, region - described in full in section 5.3.2) using the year of university 
eligibility for identification. The sensitivity of this approach is tested by excluding 
them from the model completely. The results are found to be similar - see 
Appendix 3. 
Descriptive statistics for these "missing income" youths are also examined in 
order to understand further their similarity or difference from the rest of the 
sample, to be sure that this approach is reliable (i.e. that they are roughly in line 
with the rest of the sample). These are shown in Table 5.2. The results indicate 
that these youths are likely to be in the lower income category, given their 
similarity with youths in this category - in terms of ethnic status and prior 
attainment, again as presented in Table 5.2. This group, given their private 
residence status, may also be more likely to be attending universities with limited 
halls of residence, such as colleges of the University of London. 
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Note that a further small proportion of the sample also has missing parental 
income data even though they do live with their parents, due to simple non-
completion of the survey. However, response to the income question is reasonably 
high and the LFS have employed a number of strategies to overcome reluctance to 
respond, such as only asking individuals in the last wave of sampling. 
Nevertheless, those with missing parental incomes who do live at home make up 
around 13% of the entire sample. In all the analysis that follows, these individuals 
are discarded from the sample — this is necessary since all the regression 
specifications that follow require knowledge of parental income. The individuals' 
observable background characteristics are found to be close to the average 
implying that removing them from the sample should not result in major bias. 
Further details are contained in Appendix 4. 
Having dealt with this issue of missing income data, the sample of potential 
participants is divided into three groups based on their parental incomes in the 
year prior to first year eligibility (i.e. at age 17-18 when ideally living at home) —
'low' (defined as those whose parental incomes were such that they would have 
received a full grant prior to 1998/99 and paid no fees after 1998/99; joint annual 
parental income of roughly £17,000 or less), 'medium' (those who would have 
received a partial grant before 1998/99 and would pay partial fees after 1998/99; 
parental income of £17,000 - £37,000) and 'high' (those whose parental incomes 
were high enough that they would have received no grant before 1998/99 and paid 
the full up-front fee after 1998/99; joint parental income of around £37,000 or 
more). All three groups would receive a loan of between £300 and £3000 in 2006 
prices. As mentioned 'missing' income groups are also included in all models. 
The reasoning for this income categorisation is as follows: 
(1) each income group is affected predominantly by only one element of the 
reforms in question, which will make it easier to draw conclusions based on their 
behaviour. Figures 5.1-5.3 illustrate this crucial point — average eligibility for 
grant, fee and loan differs by both academic year and parental income. For 
example in Figure 5.1, youths from low income groups are displayed. The chart 
shows the constant erosion of real grants throughout the 1990s until grants are 
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finally abolished in 1999/00 and then restored in 2004/05. Loans are increased 
more or less in line with the erosion of grants (indicating the importance of 
controlling for loans) while low income students are never eligible for fees during 
the period up to 2005/06. By contrast, figure 5.3 shows fee and aid eligibility for 
high income students. These students are never eligible for grants, by definition, 
but are eligible for the full £1,200 fee introduced in 1998/99 and also experience 
increases in loans, though at a lesser rate than for low income students. This 
illustrates the variation in policy arising as a result of means testing, but is also 
useful for the purpose of analyzing the impact of the reforms; for example if, in 
2004, participation increases among low income students compared with 
participation of high income students, it can be inferred that this may be due to 
the increase in grants — since this only affects low income students (this will be 
explored in more detail in Chapter 6). 
(2) government/policy tends to focus on participation among income groups of 
this nature 
(3) this provides more variation in the data. These groups will hereon be referred 
to as 'low', 'medium' and 'high'. 
Figure 5.1 Variation in Fees and Support by Parental Income — Low Income 
England, Wales, Northern Ireland (LFS) 
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Figure 5.2 Variation in Fees and Support by Parental Income — Medium Income 
England, Wales, Northern Ireland (LFS) 
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Figure 5.3 Variation in Fees and Support by Parental Income — High Income 
England, Wales, Northern Ireland (LFS) 
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This variation will obviously differ by country — again this point will be covered 
in Chapter 6. 
Of course, with fiscal drag, (i.e. the process where income thresholds are either 
not adjusted for inflation, or fail to keep pace with earnings growth) the 
proportions of families falling into each of the three income groups will change 
over time. This could potentially cause estimation issues if the characteristics of 
individuals in each group changes. This issue will be fully explored in Chapter 6, 
Section 6.4. 
5.3.2 Participation and grant, fee and loan variables 
The data source does not carry information on grants, fees and loans that 18-19 
year old youths are eligible for, so these variables are instead constructed (for 
both participants and non-participants, in the latter case in terms of what they 
would have received if they had gone to university) using knowledge of the 
students parents' incomes at age 17-18 as described above, and the governments 
own means-testing rules. However, as previously mentioned, LFS income data 
measures only income from earnings, and does not contain information in income 
from other sources such as benefits and investments, which are taken into account 
in means-testing calculations. Therefore, there may be some measurement error 
associated with the grant, fee and loan variables because of this approach. This 
issue will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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A further issue, particularly with grants, arises as a result of the approach of 
calculating individuals' grant and fee eligibility according to parental income, as 
described above, since this takes no account of their actual take-up behaviour. It 
may be the case, for example, that certain youths do not take up their grants, 
perhaps because they do not have knowledge of what they are eligible for, or 
believe their grant award will be so low as to not justify the paperwork etc 
involved. By using this approach the effect of grant and fee eligibility rather than 
actual uptake is being assessed. This means the "intention to treat" or ITT is being 
analysed. 
Indeed this is preferable, being a key policy question — policy makers' main 
concern is how individuals respond to what is offered to them, rather than what 
they actually take up, since this is the measure policy makers are most able to 
control. Furthermore, analyzing take-up, rather than eligibility will result in 
selection issues if only certain individuals decide to take up a grant. 
Two possible variables in the LFS are considered as the outcome variable —
"enrolled at university, college or polytechnic" or "currently studying for first 
degree". The latter is chosen as the outcome variable since this is the least 
ambiguous — it is certain that all those in this category (and potential people 
eligible for university) will be subject to the same government policy on loans, 
grants and fees, whereas those in the former, broader definition may not be —
finance is very different for students on college and polytechnic courses. Figure 
5.4 illustrates participation, again by income categorization. 
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Figure 5.4 Degree participation by parental income background, 1992-2005 (LFS) 
As can be seen in Figure 5.4 above, unsurprisingly, participation is significantly 
higher for high income youths and significantly lower for youths from low 
parental income backgrounds. There is a significant amount of noise in the data in 
the earlier years — particularly for high income youths for whom sample sizes are 
smallest (see Table 5.2) The significant increase in participation in 1992/93 
academic year arising from the 1992 HE act is also somewhat apparent4°. 
Finally, an upward trend in participation is apparent for all income groups, though 
for the high income groups this is less true if the year 1992/93 is excluded. 
5.3.3 Youth's personal and background characteristics 
Table 5.2 shows summary statistics and sample means for the individual level 
data, including the selection of control variables which will be used throughout 
the rest of this piece of analysis. The control variables are ethnicity (a binary 
variable taking the value of one if the individual is white and zero otherwise)41, 
youth's prior attainment (a binary variable taking the value of one if the youth has 
five or more good GCSEs and zero if the youth has less than five)42, parents 
40 In a sensitivity testing stage, all models are re-estimated excluding 1992/93, with little effect on 
the results. 
41  While a number of ethnic groupings are available in the LFS dataset, white represents the 
majority with the others spread throughout several smaller categories, so for simplicity a binary 
variable is created 
42 A variable measuring number of A-levels is available in the LFS dataset, but only from 1993 
onwards, and is limited in granularity to less than 1 or 1 or more, and to English, Welsh and 
Northern Irish students. Scottish students undertake Scottish Highers, which are one-year courses 
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education (this is available for each parent and is measured in 3 categories of 
attainment using the National Qualification Framework of both educational and 
vocational qualifications — see Appendix 5 (Chapter 5): NVQ Level Framework 
for full details of qualifications included), current parental income (this is the sum 
of both parents' annual income in the current year — i.e. when the youth is eligible 
for university at age 18-19) and region (using 20 regional dummies in total, 
representing 16 major regions of England, as well as two dummies for two major 
Scottish regions, and one each for Wales and Northern Ireland). Note that region 
represents the region of home domicile of the individual. This means that those 
living at home or in halls of residence will have their home domicile as their 
region, rather than the region of the institution they are attending. This is in fact 
preferable, since HE finance is dependent on country of domicile rather than 
location of institution. For example, English, Welsh and Northern Irish students 
studying in Scotland would still have to pay fees even though they were abolished 
for Scottish students, so knowing the location of their institution is irrelevant. 
However, for Scottish students studying in non-Scottish institutions, fees would 
be payable, even after their abolition in Scotland, somewhat complicating matters. 
It is widely known though, that Scottish institutions have a somewhat captive 
market, with over 85% of Scottish students studying in Scottish institutions 
(Hoare, 1991), so this would seem to be a minor problem. 
A further control variable, as discussed, is the level of maintenance loan 
entitlement, as depicted in Figures 5.1-5.3. 
In each case, the data are split by each of the three income groups which are also 
added as controls (with additional information on those with missing income, for 
whom the value of grants, loans and fees is imputed, as discussed). The average 
participation rate of the sample is 16.1% though participation varies considerably 
by income group, as seen in Figure 5.4, with only 11.4% of individuals from low 
income backgrounds doing a degree, versus 31.8% from high income 
backgrounds. The sample is evenly split between males and females, those with 
and without five good GCSEs and parental education types. Again it can be seen, 
and so not comparable with A-levels. For these reasons GCSE or equivalent is chosen as a more 
robust measure of prior attainment. 
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unsurprisingly, that those with high parental incomes have very highly educated 
parents, and vice versa. 
Table 5.2 Summary Statistics (LFS, 1992-2005)' 
parental income 	 sex 
all low medium high missing male female 
% all sample 	 - 	 51.4 	 48.6 
% of participants 	 16.1 	 14.4 	 17.9 
% of non-participants 	 83.9 	 85.6 	 82.1 
ethnicity 
white (%) 	 85.6 	 85.5 	 85.7 
non-white 	 8.3 	 8.3 	 8.3 
missing (%) 
	
6.1 	 6.2 	 6.1 
youth's education 
GCSES >= 5 (%) 	 47.3 	 43.5 	 51.3 
GCSES < 5 (%) 	 49.6 	 53.1 	 45.8 
parent's education' 
45.5 
11.4 
88.7 
28.3 
16.7 
83.3 
14.9 
31.8 
68.2 
11.2 
12.9 
87.1 
81.7 
11.8 
6.5 
90.6 
4.4 
5.0 
92.2 
3.6 
4.3 
79.9 
10.4 
9.7 
41.5 
55.4 
3.1 missing (%) 
	
3.1 	 3.4 	 2.9 
51.5 
45.9 
2.6 
69.5 
28.8 
1.7 
30.6 
62.8 
6.7 
NVQ level 4 + 	 34.8 	 35.8 	 33.6 
NVQ level 2 or 3 	 22.3 	 23.3 	 21.4 
NVQ level <2 	 27.1 	 28.8 	 25.3 
missing (%) 
	
15.8 	 12.1 	 19.7 
parental income £ 	 22,279 	 21,906 	 22,719 
	
24.4 	 44.4 	 74.0 
	
25.8 	 29.5 	 15.0 
	
44.2 	 20.7 	 7.3 
	
5.5 	 5.3 	 3.7 	 100.0 
6,319 27,929 57,568 
region 
England 80.4 
Scotland 9.1 
Wales 5.3 
Northern Ireland 5.2 
sample size 24,732 
	
80.6 	 80.2 
	
9.1 	 9.1 
	
5.1 	 5.5 
	
5.2 	 5.3 
	
12,721 	 12,011 
Sample below is all those first year eligibles with known parental incomes or, for those living independently, but of 
78.6 
8.9 
5.5 
7.1 
11,263 
81.1 
9.9 
5.2 
3.8 
6,999 
84.2 
8.6 
4.8 
2.5 
3,697 
81.0 
8.6 
5.4 
4.9 
2,773 
eligibility age, imputed parental incomes 
2  This is the education level of the more educated parent. 
The sample is heavily skewed towards white ethnic groups, and English youths, 
reflecting the UK population as a whole. As will be seen in the following chapter, 
small sample sizes for Scotland means limited inferences can be made on this 
particular group. Regional information (including unemployment rates) is also 
available for 16 regions of England and 2 regions of Scotland. This will be further 
explored in Chapter 7, but in the models that follow, regional dummies for each 
region are included in the explanatory variable set, as are unemployment rates. 
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Those youths with missing parental income tend to have the least information 
available on them in general — and obviously no information on their parents —
though a range of information is still available for them. In general they are 
reflective of the sample as a whole, though they are slightly over-represented in 
terms of non-whites and have lower likelihood of having 5 or more GCSEs. 
In the regression analysis that follows throughout this thesis, where individuals 
have missing information on certain covariates, dummy variables are created, 
with the value of 1 if the covariate is missing, and 0 otherwise, in order to include 
all individuals in the regressions. 
5.4 Conclusions 
This Chapter began with an exploration of viable datasets which could be used to 
explore university participation with regards to higher education funding policy. 
While no dataset can be described as perfect for this task, the Labour Force 
survey is found to be the most suitable dataset, having information on parental 
income for the great majority of potential university participants as well as being 
a suitable source of university participation information. 
This dataset contains a good set of background variables on individuals in the UK 
including the control variables discussed in Chapters 2 and 4 which are crucial to 
form an understanding of participation behaviour — such as GCSE scores, to be 
used for prior attainment measures, essential to any analysis — as discussed, as 
well as parental background factors such as education. 
The chapters that follow aim to explore different methodologies, such as those 
discussed in Chapter 4, to investigate the relationship between HE finance and 
participation. In Chapter 6, individual-level data is first explored, with difference-
in-difference models tested, as well as the specification of a university demand 
equation. 
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Chapter 6 Using individual-level data 
to estimate the impact of fees and 
support on participation 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to estimate the impact of upfront fees and student 
maintenance grants on participation in university at the age of 18-19 (the first year 
after the completion of secondary school), using the LFS dataset described in 
Chapter 5. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, estimating a simple equation in which grants, fees and 
a set of control variables are regressed on participation may result in biased 
estimates if there are unobserved characteristics that are correlated with aid, fees 
and attendance. 
However there are a number of methodologies available that can overcome this, 
and other problems such as measurement error, to obtain unbiased and consistent 
results. 
The aim of this chapter, then, is to attempt to implement some of these 
methodologies on individual-level data, exploiting the HE policy changes 
occurring over the period 1992-2005 in the UK. The first part of the chapter 
attempts to use difference-in-difference analysis, exploiting a number of "natural 
experiments" that occurred over the period in question, both as a result of 
differing policies between countries of the UK, and as a result of differing 
eligibility criteria arising from Government means-testing rules. 
This is followed with a time-series type approach, using OLS and Probit 
regression, using fees and grants, as well as a composite "upfront costs" measure 
as explanatory variables, with a rich set of controls. A number of specifications 
are tested and discussed. The Chapter concludes with a discussion of the merits of 
these approaches and the case for attempting a panel-level approach to overcome 
problems and sources of bias that still exist in these specifications. 
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6.2 Difference-in-Difference analysis of the HE funding policy 
reforms 
As discussed in Chapter 4, difference-in-difference is a useful methodology to 
employ when a "natural experiment" occurs as a result of a policy or external 
event such as an increase in student grants. The analysis requires a "treatment" 
group — a group affected by the policy change in question, and a "control" group 
for whom nothing changes over the same time period. 
The reforms of the past 15 years have generated four such natural experiments43: 
i. 	 2000/01 — Tuition Fees Abolished — Scotland 
In 1999, Scotland was granted powers of devolution. The devolved Scottish 
Government went on to completely abolish tuition fees at Scottish universities 
for the academic year 2000/01. Only Scottish students studying at Scottish 
universities benefited from this reform — those Scottish students choosing to study 
in England, for example, would still have to pay their fees, while English students 
studying in Scotland would similarly have to pay. In place of the fee, Scottish 
students would have to pay a Graduate Endowment — this would be payable only 
upon graduation and was set at £2289 — a much lower figure than the £1200 a 
year for a four year course that was previously in place. 
The abolition of tuition fees affected only those responsible for paying fees — i.e. 
those with parental incomes above £33,000 in 2000 — or £40,000 in 2006 prices. 
However, those with parental incomes below £40,000 cannot serve as a control 
group because their circumstances were also changed by the policy in that their 
grants were restored the following year (see ii). 
However, English, Welsh and Northern Irish students were unaffected by the 
policy, and continued to pay tuition fees of £1,200 per year up to 2006, so can 
serve as the control group to measure this policy impact — i.e. for them, nothing 
changed in terms of tuition fee obligations and therefore they can be used as a 
suitable comparison group. 
43 Again, all monetary values that follow are in 2006 prices unless otherwise stated. Note, as 
previously stated, all grant, loan and fee thresholds are applied to the data in current prices, by 
year, according to government rules. 2006 prices shown for convenience of comparison. 
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It is important to note at this point, that there was no incentive for non-Scottish 
students to study in Scotland as a means of escaping the tuition fee, since non-
Scottish students were not eligible to have the fee paid on their behalf, and instead 
would have to pay the £1200 fee themselves, just as they would if studying in 
their own country. 
Treatment: Abolition of tuition fees in Scotland 
Treatment Group: Students with parental incomes >=£40,000 in Scotland 
Control Group: Students with parental incomes >=£40,000 in England, Wales, NI 
ii. 	 2001/02 — Grants restored — Scotland 
Again, as a result of devolution, the Scottish parliament decided to restore grants 
— which had been abolished UK-wide in 1999 — to poor students. This policy 
affected low income students — those whose parental incomes were below 
£15,000 (£17,500 in 2006 prices) who experienced a £2150 increase in grants in 
2001/02. While high income Scottish students did not experience this increase 
since they were not eligible for grants, they are not a suitable control group since 
their tuition fees were abolished the previous year, and furthermore, by virtue of 
being from high parental income backgrounds, their behavior may be quite 
different than those from low income backgrounds. However, again non-Scottish 
low income students should be a suitable control group since their grants were not 
restored. 
Treatment: Grants restored in Scotland 
Treatment Group: Students with parental incomes <—£17,500 in Scotland 
Control Group: Students with parental incomes <=£17,500 in England, Wales, NI 
Note here, that again non-Scottish students were not eligible for this newly 
restored grant if they studied in a Scottish institution. However, potential 
contamination of this experiment could occur if Scottish students chose to study 
in England, since such students would be eligible for the grant44. 
44 A brief examination of UCAS data shows no apparent increase in Scottish students studying in 
England, or vice versa, over this time period 
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iii. 	 1999/00 — Grants Abolished — UK wide 
In 1999/00, the year immediately following the introduction of tuition fees, the 
UK Government abolished student grants. The average pay-out had already been 
halved in 1998 but had nevertheless remained in place while loans and fees were 
introduced. By 1999/00 they were completely removed. 
Grants had been given out to those with parental incomes under £14,000 (£16,000 
at 1999 prices)45 and this was the group solely affected by this reform. This group 
received loans but their value remained unaffected from the previous year. 
Tuition fees were already in place by this time for those with parental incomes 
over £35,000 (£40,000 at 2006 prices). This group were mostly unaffected by the 
removal of grants, and thus can serve as a control group. A potentially major issue 
here, though, is the difference between the treatment and control groups. As 
mentioned in Section 4.2.1, difference-in-difference analysis works best when the 
treatment and control groups are drawn from the same population; if the treatment 
and control groups are very different, and/or on different trajectories, this will 
invalidate the analysis. Unfortunately in this case, there is no better control group 
available, as the reforms affected all students in the UK46. 
Treatment: Removal of student grants in UK 
Treatment Group: Students with parental incomes <=£16,000 
Control Group: Students with parental incomes >= £40,000 
iv. 	 2004/05 — Grants re-introduced — England, Wales, NI 
In the run up to the introduction of top-up fees, the UK Government took the 
decision to re-introduce student grants, which had been abolished in 1999. This 
policy affected those with parental incomes equal to or below £15,000 (£16,000 at 
2006 prices) who now qualified for the grant of up to £1000 (£1050 at 2006 
prices)47. Those with incomes above £40,000 did not qualify for this new grant, 
45 Note, this is a slightly different treatment group from ii above, as grants were restored in 
Scotland in 2001 to a slightly different income group than those UK wide youths losing grant 
eligibility in 1999. 
46 Kane (2005) performs a difference-in-difference analysis similar to this one, comparing US 
youths from the bottom quartile of parental income groups, with youths from the top three 
quartiles. 
47 Again, a slightly different income reference category is used for low income students compared 
with ii and iii above — i.e. those for whom grants were restored in 2004/05. 
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and so can serve as a control group. Again it is important to note that inherent 
differences between the two control groups, similar to those in iii above, cast this 
analysis somewhat into doubt. The results are presented in the following sections. 
Treatment: Re-introduction of Student Grants in England, Wales, NI 
Treatment Group: Students with parental incomes <=£16,000 in England, Wales, 
NI 
Control Group: Students with parental incomes >=£40,000 in England, Wales, NI 
6.2.1 Abolition of tuition fees in Scotland 
In the case of the first natural experiment (the abolition of the £1,200 tuition fee 
in Scotland), the "pre" cohort will be high school leavers in 2000, whose parental 
incomes are higher than £40,000 in 2006 prices — i.e. those paying full tuition fees 
before the reform. In the interests of maximizing available sample sizes and also 
since the reforms affected cohorts over a number of years, the data are pooled in 
the years before and after the reforms. 
The "post" cohort is therefore high school leavers eligible for entry into academic 
years from 2000/01 — 2005/06 inclusive, with parental incomes above £40,000 
(versus those from the years 1998/99-1999/00, when the full fee was in place for 
those of the same parental income). The group eligible for fees during the before 
period but not the after period — i.e. Scottish school leavers — will be the 
"treatment" group, and the "control" group will be all other school-leavers — i.e. 
those from England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and thus not affected by the 
tuition fee legislation. 
The estimating equation will thus be: 
Pit = a + 11(Scot 1t * Postid+ 8Scotit + OPostit + vit 	 6.1 
where Scott is a binary variable set to 1 if the student is from Scotland and 0 if 
not. Posta is a binary variable set to 1 if a student becomes eligible for university 
in the academic years between 2000/01-2005/06 and set to 0 if the student 
116 
becomes eligible for university in 1998/99 or 1999/00. The estimation is restricted 
to those with parental income backgrounds over £40,000 p.a. 
Sample means and standard errors for the treatment and control groups, before 
and after tuition fees were eliminated in 2000, are presented in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics: youths with high parental incomes' 
Academic year youth eligible for: 
1998/99-1999/00 ("Before") 
Scotland 	 England, Wales, NI 
2000/01-2005/06 ("After") 
Scotland 	 England, Wales, NI 
White 99.8 97.3 99.3 94.9 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Male 50 54.3 52.8 51.6 
(0.061) (0.020) (0.037) (0.011) 
GCSE attainment2 90.3 83.9 88.6 88.2 
(0.037) (0.015) (0.026) (0.008) 
Parents' ed. NVQ 4+3 84.1 75.6 86.2 74.5 
(0.046) (0.019) (0.027) (0.01) 
Parents' ed. NVQ 2-3 9.5 20.4 8.0 14.6 
(0.04) (0.017) (0.021) (0.01) 
Parents' ed. NVQ <2 6.3 3.9 5.7 10.8 
(0.031) (0.08) (0.017) (0.07) 
Parental income 56,564 59,051 .54,468 56,564 
(1054) (1963) (635) (1054) 
Grant - 
Fee 1,200 1,200 0 1,200 
Loan 2,361 2,430 1,295 2,752 
n 63 561 174 1883 
'Missing values not included in calculated means 
2 Where 1=5 GCSEs or more, 0 = less than 5 GCSEs 
This is the education level of the most educated parent 
As table 6.1 shows, the sample has a high proportion of highly educated students, 
with around 90% attaining 5 or more GCSEs. The sample also comprises those 
with highly educated and well-off parents. This is not surprising since the sample 
is restricted to those who would qualify for full fees in 2000/01. 
Comparing the treatment and control groups; both Scottish and English youths in 
the sample appear to have quite similar characteristics before 2000, although there 
are slightly more whites in the Scottish sample, and parental incomes are slightly 
lower, though slightly better educated. 
After 2000, there are few changes in characteristics of the samples, though 
interestingly, average real parental incomes have decreased slightly. 
By definition, none of these high parental income students received any grants 
before or after the reforms - but Scottish students experienced a change in their 
tuition fee obligation from £1,200 to £0. 
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Two major issues are apparent in Table 6.1. Firstly, sample sizes for Scotland, 
particularly pre-2000 are extremely small — restricting the sample to only two 
years of data, for high parental income students only, seriously limits the sample 
size. 
A further major issue can be seen by examining the maintenance loan statistics —
as can be seen average loan amounts before the 2000/01 reforms were very 
similar for English and Scottish youths, but after the reforms, loans continue to 
increase for English students, whilst there is a significant drop for Scottish 
students. This is because the Scottish parliament decreased student maintenance 
loans for Scottish students at the same time as fees were abolished. The SNP 
Government of the time was (and still is) against increasing the debt burden of its 
students and was instead committed to replacing part of the loans system with 
grants. 
"An SNP government will abolish the Graduate Endowment tuition fee and 
replace the expensive and discredited Student Loans system with means-tested 
student grants. We will remove the burden of debt repayments owed by Scottish 
domiciled and resident graduates "(SNP Manifesto, 2007) 
This is critical for the analysis and may damage the validity of the "natural 
experiment" depending on youths' attitudes to loans. This will be explored in 
much greater detail in Chapter 7 (but see Appendix 6 for more details of the 
Scottish loan reforms) 
Table 6.2 contains the probabilities of attending university, for the treatment and 
control groups, before and after tuition fees were abolished. 
Table 6.2: Difference-in-differences, probability of attending university degree course (LFS) 
n=2681 
Scotland England, Wales, NI Difference 
Eligible for academic yr 1998/99 - 1999/00 
Eligible for academic yr 2000/01 - 2005/06 
(%) 
(%) 
33.3 
39.1 
27.8 
31.9 
5.5 
7.2 
Difference 5.7 4.1 1.71 
Note, some numbers may be subject to rounding errors 
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For the cohort of students in the years between 1998-1990, Scottish youths were 
more likely to participate in university than their English counterparts; 33% of 
Scottish high income youths went to university versus 28% of English youths — a 
difference of 5.5 percentage points. This is a widely documented difference 
between the two countries, with Scotland traditionally having a higher proportion 
of youths at university. For the cohort after the reforms in 2000, Scottish youths 
were still more likely to participate in university, and (following the withdrawal 
of tuition fees), their advantage had increased to 7.2 percentage points. 
The estimated effect of eligibility for tuition fees on the probability of attending 
college is the difference in these two differences: 1.7 percentage points. 
As discussed above, this difference-in-difference can also be calculated by 
estimating equation 6.1 by OLS. The results of this estimation are contained in 
column 1 of Table 6.3 below: 
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Table 6.3 Difference-in-Differences, probability of attending university degree course 
Scottish * academic yr 2000-2005 
academic yr 2000-2005 
Scottish 
male 
	
(0.017)** 	 (0.017)** 
parental income (£'000s) 	 0.01 	 0.03 
	
(0.000)** 	 (0.000)** 
white 	 -0.074 	 -0.075 
	
(0.043) 	 (0.046) 
GCSE 	 0.271 	 0.343 
	
(0.029)** 	 (0.027)** 
father, NVQ Level 2-31 	 -0.042 	 -0.041 
	
(0.023) 	 (0.023) 
father, NVQ Level <2 	 -0.059 	 -0.064 
	
(0.026)* 	 (0.026)* 
mother, NVQ Level 2-3 	 -0.047 	 -0.044 
	
(0.023)* 	 (0.022)* 
mother, NVQ Level <2 	 -0.109 	 -0.110 
	
(0.022)** 	 (0.020)** 
unemployment rate 	 0.005 	 0.005 
	
(0.002)* 	 (0.002)* 
Constant 	 0.278 	 -11,617.982 
(0.020)** 	 (11,934.153) 
Year dummies 	 Y 	 Y 	 Y 
Region dummies 	 N 	 Y 	 Y 
Observations 	 2681 	 2681 	 2681 
R-squared 	 0.00 	 0.13  
(1) 
Difference-in- 
differences 
(2) 
Add Covariates 
(3) 
Probit2 
0.017 0.031 0.027 
(0.072) (0.068) (0.070) 
0.041 -0.035 0.002 
(0.022) (0.051) (0.033) 
0.055 -0.004 0.005 
(0.062) (0.060) (0.060) 
-0.065 -0.065 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
1 In each case, omitted category is "parent educated to >NVQ level 4" 
2 Marginal effects of probit are presented for ease of comparison, using STATA's `dprobit' 
command 
The coefficients in the regression give some insight into participation in the 
treatment and control groups before and after the reforms. The constant shows the 
average participation rate of a non-Scottish student before the reforms - i.e. 
27.8%. The "Scottish" coefficient of 5.5 shows the difference between Scottish 
and non-Scottish students' participation rate, again before the reforms (i.e. 33.3% 
participation in Scotland vs 27.8% in England, Wales and NI), "academic yr 
2000-2005" meanwhile shows growth in non-Scottish students after the reforms -
i.e. the increase in participation in England, Wales and NI was 4.1 percentage 
points. So, as described in Chapter 4, the difference-in-difference is calculated as 
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the incremental difference in participation in Scotland after the reforms (39.1%), 
controlling for: participation of non-Scottish students (27.8%), the difference in 
participation between Scottish and non-Scottish students (5.5), growth in 
participation in England, Wales and NI (4.1). This calculation (i.e. 39.1-27.8-5.5-
4.1=1.7) gives the difference-in-difference estimator. 
The difference-in-difference coefficient in this case is the coefficient on 
"Scottish*academic year 2000-2005". The estimate of 1.7 percentage points is not 
significant, indicating that tuition fees had no impact on participation rates. In 
fact, the model itself seems quite imprecise, due to very low sample sizes. A set 
of covariates as described in Chapter 5, comprising parental income, ethnicity, 
GCSE attainment, parental education and the regional unemployment rate is 
added to the model. The addition of these covariates increases the coefficient 
from 1.7 percentage points, to 3.1 percentage points (as shown in Column 2), but 
the estimator remains insignificant. 
Dynarski (1999) points out that difference-in-difference estimators can be 
sensitive to non-linear transformations of the dependent and independent 
variables. The sensitivity of the specification is therefore tested using a Probit 
analysis — the results of this are contained in Column 3 and indicate the model is 
robust to a non-linear specification; the OLS and Probit marginal effects are quite 
similar, and again no significant effect of the treatment is found. 
The results of this analysis seem to quite clearly indicate that the withdrawal of 
tuition fee obligations for high income students in Scotland did not significantly 
impact on their propensity to participate in higher education. However, there are 
several issues with this particular finding. Firstly, the sample sizes for the Scottish 
cohort are extremely limited, making statistical inference extremely problematic. 
Secondly, and crucially for this analysis, the Scottish parliament significantly 
decreased maintenance loans for Scottish students following the abolition of 
tuition fees and re-introduction of maintenance grants. It is possible that the 
reduction in loans experienced by Scottish high income students relative to their 
English, Welsh and Northern Irish counterparts may have negatively impacted 
their propensity to attend university. This factor will be further explored later in 
this chapter, and also in Chapter 7; the issue of the abolition of tuition fees in 
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Scotland will also be returned to in Chapter 7 with a view to obtaining a richer 
understanding of movements in participation. 
6.2.2 Re-introduction of maintenance grants in Scotland 
The second "natural experiment" of interest is that which followed the abolition 
of tuition fees in Scotland — namely the re-introduction of maintenance grants the 
following year, in 2001/02. As opposed to the tuition fee reform, maintenance 
grants were re-introduced only for poor students, (and were entitled "Young 
Students Bursaries"), having been abolished as part of the UK-wide reforms in 
1998/99 — 1999/00. Since the sample in question only consists of students of low 
parental incomes, these students will not have been affected by the abolition of 
fees that had just occurred in 2000. 
So, in summary, Scottish students with parental incomes below £17,500 received 
no maintenance grants since 1999, then had a maintenance grant of up to £2150 
re-instated in 2001/02, which continued beyond the end of the LFS sample period 
of 2005/06. The treatment group, then is Scottish students eligible for the 
academic years 2001/02 and beyond, where again academic years are pooled to 
maximise sample sizes. 
English students with the same income criteria and over the same time period will 
again serve as the control group — these students continued to receive no 
maintenance grants following the 2001 reforms in Scotland, so their financial 
situation remained unchanged. However, these students did begin receiving grants 
again in 2004, so the 'after' period is restricted to up to 2003. 
The estimating equation is thus becomes: 
Pit = a + y(Scotit * Posti )+ IScotit + Vostit + Eit 	 6.2 
Where Scott is a binary variable set to 1 if the student is from Scotland and 0 if 
not. Posta is a binary variable set to 1 if a student is eligible for university in the 
academic years between 2001/02-2003/04 and set to 0 if the student becomes 
eligible for university in 1999/00 or 2000/01. This equation will only be estimated 
for students from low income backgrounds as described above. 
122 
Sample means and standard errors for the treatment and control groups of this 
low-income sample, before and after grants were re-instated in 2001, are 
presented in Table 6.4. 
As the sample in question is now comprised of low parental income students by 
definition, there are a number of differences in the summary statistics as 
compared with Table 6.1. In this case, GCSE attainment, parental education and 
parental incomes are all lower, with parental incomes being around £7000 in real 
terms. Again, the differences between Scotland and England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland are minimal, though Scottish students are more white and with slightly 
higher GCSE attainment. Comparing the periods before and after the re-
instatement of grants, there is little change in the attributes of the youths in 
question, aside of course, from the significant increase in grants - from zero to 
over £2,000 for Scottish low income first year eligible students. 
Table 6.4 Summary statistics, youths with low parental incomes'  
Academic year youth eligible for: 
White 
Male 
GCSE attainment2 
Parents' ed. NVQ 4+3  
Parents' ed. NVQ 2-3 
Parents' ed. NVQ <2 
Parental income £ 
grant 
fee 
loan 
n 
'Missing values not included in calculated means 
2 Where 1=5 GCSEs or more, 0 = less than 5 GCSEs 
3 This is the education level of the most educated parent 
However, as in Section 6.2.1, the estimation suffers from the same problems of 
extremely low sample sizes for Scotland (although improved slightly due to the 
use of the more prevalent low income sample) and crucially again, the significant 
1999/00-2000/01 ("Before") 
Scotland 	 England, Wales, NI 
2001/02-2003/04 ("After") 
Scotland 	 England, Wales, NI 
98.1 86.2 96.3 84.2 
(0.011) (.009) (0.012) (.007) 
57.7 53 48.7 55.3 
(0.037) (0.012) (0.032) (0.010) 
79.8 70.4 74.4 70.4 
(0.034) (0.013) (0.033) (0.011) 
33.5 27.0 32.6 26.1 
(0.045) (0.011) (0.031) (0.008) 
27.7 29.0 25.2 22.4 
(0.031) (0.012) (0.031) (0.007) 
38.7 43.9 42.1 51.4 
(0.037) (0.012) (0.031) (0.008) 
6,977 6,903 6,719 7,014 
(569) (267) (521) (210) 
2,150 - 
- - - 
3,475 3,492 1,959 3,491 
182 1683 232 2450 
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reduction in student loans received by low income students between the time 
periods in question. Again, a major concern is that this negative change in upfront 
support of poor students will counteract the potentially positive effect of the re-
instatement of grants, and will make distinguishing the impact of grants and loans 
impossible. 
With this in mind, Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the changes in mean participation for 
the treatment and control groups before and after the reform, and by LPM 
regression. 
In this case, the re-introduction of grants appears to actually have had a negative 
impact — participation of low income students in Scotland appears to have 
decreased between the periods before and after the re-introduction of grants, 
while participation in England over the same period rose by a small amount. 
However, the difference-in-difference estimate of -2.3 percentage points is not 
significant, so drawing any kind of conclusion, other than that of "no change" is 
ill-advised, particularly in the light of the change in student loans experienced by 
students in the treatment group. 
Table 6.5: Difference-in-differences, probability of attending university degree course (LFS) 
n=4547 
Scotland England, Wales, NI Difference 
Eligible for academic yr 1999/00 - 2000/01 
Eligible for academic yr 2001/02 — 2003/04 
(%) 
(%) 
12.1 
10.3 
13.3 
13.8 
-1.2 
-3.5 
Difference -1.7 0.5 -2.3 
The results obtained in these two sections are far from persuasive. As stated, the 
small sample sizes for the treatment groups are an issue, but more importantly the 
experiment may not be "clean" as a result of changes to loan legislation in 
Scotland over the periods studied. 
This issue will be returned to in Section 6.3.2. where separate impacts of grants 
and fees will be obtained. 
This chapter now turns to examine the further two "natural experiments" 
occurring in the UK over the last two decades — this time with cleaner policy 
changes — but unfortunately, as will be discussed, less suitable control groups. 
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Table 6.6: Difference-in-differences, probability of attending university degree course 
anIMB 
(1) 
Difference-in-difference 
(2) 
Add Covariates 
(3) 
Probit2 
Scottish * academic yr 2001-2003 
Academic yr 2001-2003 
-0.023 
(0.035) 
0.005 
-0.023 
(0.033) 
0.011 
-0.014 
(0.021) 
0.013 
(0.011) (0.023) (0.014) 
Scottish -0.012 -0.024 -0.015 
(0.027) (0.025) (0.016) 
Male -0.020 -0.017 
(0.010)* (0.007)* 
parental income (£000s) 0.001 .002 
(0.000) (0.003) 
white -0.077 -0.069 
(0.015)** (0.015)** 
GCSE 0.200 0.172 
(0.013)** (0.016)** 
father, NVQ Level 2-31 -0.045 -0.020 
(0.015)** (0.009)* 
father, NVQ Level <2 -0.062 -0.042 
(0.013)** (0.009)** 
mother, NVQ Level 2-3 -0.081 -0.032 
(0.020)** (0.009)** 
mother, NVQ Level <2 -0.088 -0.042 
(0.017)** (0.010)** 
unemployment rate 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Year dummies 0.133 -6,581.004 
Constant (0.008)** (13,394.716) 
4547 4547 4547 
Observations 0.00 0.14 
R-squared -0.023 -0.023 -0.0 14 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
In each case, omitted category is "parent educated to >NVQ level 4" 
2 Marginal effects of probit are presented for ease of comparison, using STATA's `dprobie 
command 
6.2.3 Grants abolished UK-wide in 1999 
This policy change affected all constituent countries of the UK. To summarize, 
low income students - those with parental incomes of less than £16,000 in 
1989/99 received a "full grant" of just over £900. This maintenance grant had 
already been reduced significantly throughout the 1990s and had been halved 
from the previous year. 
The following academic year, in 1999/00, this grant was completely abolished for 
all UK students - though as discussed above, Scottish students had their grants 
restored in academic year 2001/02. Because of this, Scottish students are excluded 
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from the following analysis. As tuition fees were already in place in 1998/99 for 
high income students, and these students were unaffected by the abolition of 
grants since their parental incomes precluded them from being eligible, these 
students are used as the control group. 
Thus, the treatment group is English, Welsh and Northern Irish students with 
incomes below £16,000; these students lost £900 in grants in 1999. The control 
group comprises English, Welsh and Northern Irish students with incomes above 
£40,000 in 1989/99 — for whom nothing changed. Note, "medium income" 
students cannot be used in this analysis, since they received (and therefore lost) a 
partial grant at the time of the reforms, and became eligible for a partial fee 
during the analysis period. Note also, that the period of estimation may only go up 
to 2003/04, since in 2004/05 grants were restored (see iv). Again, it is important 
to point out that this is not an ideal natural experiment, since the treatment and 
control groups are obviously quite different in nature (for example, they are 
unlikely to have the same time trends), by virtue of being from different income 
groups. 
So the estimating equation is now: 
Pit = a + .1.(FullGrant1t * Posta) + pPostit + 7rFullGrant1t + it 6.3 
Where FullGranta is a binary variable set to 1 if the student is received a full 
grant in 1998/99 — i.e. had parental income below £16,000, and 0 if the student 
received no grant (and full fees) in 1998/99 — i.e. their parental income was above 
£40,000. 
Postit is a binary variable set to 1 if a student becomes eligible for university in 
the academic years between 1999/00-2003/04 and set to 0 if the student becomes 
eligible for university in 1998/99 — the only year in which treatment students 
received a full grant and control students had tuition fees in place. This equation 
will only be estimated for students from England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Below in Table 6.7 are sample means and standard errors for the treatment and 
control groups, before and after grants were abolished in 1999. 
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A concerning feature of table 6.7 is the differences in the covariates between the 
control and treatment groups. As the control group comprise low income students 
— those who received a full grant in 1998/99, they have fewer GCSEs, less 
educated parents, and obviously, poorer parents. 
The "full grant" group also contains more ethnic minorities, reflecting the relative 
lower incomes of this group. Thus, as discussed, the treatment and control groups 
in this particular exercise are quite different, compared to the relative similarity of 
Scottish versus non-Scottish students in the first two examples. The differences 
described in Table 6.7 are obviously controlled for — though any other differences 
between the two groups will not be. Nevertheless, this exercise has advantage 
over those used in the previous two difference-in-difference estimators — firstly 
there are relatively few issues with sample size since Scotland is not being used as 
a control group, and secondly, maintenance loans are relatively stable for the two 
groups meaning the experiment is not polluted with changes in financial 
circumstance. Furthermore, the abolition of grants in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland was a major policy shift and so warrants some sort of 
investigation. 
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Table 6.7 Summary statistics, youths from England, Wales and Northern Ireland' 
Academic year youth eligible for: 
white 
male 
GCSE attainment2 
Parents' ed. NVQ 4+3  
Parents' ed. NVQ 2-3 
Parents' ed. NVQ <2 
parental income £ 
grant 
fee 
loan 
n 
'Missing values not included in calculated means 
2 Where 1=5 GCSEs or more, 0 = less than 5 GCSEs 
3 Where 1=NVQ level 4 or more, 2=NVQ level 2-3, 3=NVQ level <2 
Table 6.8 and 6.9 show the difference-in-difference estimators for this 
experiment, both non-parametrically and by OLS and Probit regression: 
Table 6.8 Difference-in-difference, probability of attending university degree course (LFS) 
n=6413 
Full Grant 	 No Grant 	 Difference 
Eligible for academic year 1998/99 (%) 	 9.2 	 25.2 	 -16.0 
Eligible for academic yr 1999/00 - 2003/04 (%) 	 13.4 	 32.5 	 -19.1 
Difference 	 4.2 	 7.33 	 -3.11 
1998/99 
Full grant 	 No grant 
1999/00 - 2003/04 
Full grant 	 no grant 
87.4 96.1 84.7 95.2 
(0.012) (.012) (0.005) (.005) 
54.9 55 54.5 51.9 
(0.018) (0.031) (0.07) (0.013) 
68.6 83.4 70.3 88.3 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.008) (0.009) 
26.9 75.0 26.2 76.3 
(0.016) (0.269) (0.007) (0.011) 
26.8 20.7 24.5 13.7 
(0.017) (0.025) (0.007) (0.009) 
46.0 4.0 49.1 9.8 
(0.018) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
6,179 55,575 6,566 58,184 
(422) (1337) (164) (737) 
917 - 
1,200 - 1,200 
2,849 2,173 3,491 2,714 
759 262 4005 1387 
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Table 6.9 Difference-in-difference, probability of attending a university degree course  
(1) 	 (2) 	 (3) 
Difference-in- 
differences 	 Add covariates 	 Probit 
Full grant* academic yr 1999 	 -0.031 	 -0.026 	 0.007 
	
(0.029) 	 (0.027) 	 (0.021) 
academic yr 1999 	 0.073 	 0.037 	 0.030 
(0.025)** 	 (0.033) 	 (0.015) 
full grant 	 -0.160 	 0.011 	 -0.016 
(0.027)** 	 (0.028) 	 (0.023) 
male 	 -0.027 	 -0.022 
(0.009)** 	 (0.007)** 
parental income (£000s) 	 0.004 	 0.001 
	
(0.011) 	 (0.009) 
white 	 -0.069 	 -0.072 
(0.015)** 	 (0.015)** 
GCSE 	 0.217 	 0.204 
(0.012)** 	 (0.014)** 
father, NVQ Level 2-3 	 -0.049 	 -0.026 
(0.013)** 	 (0.009)** 
father, NVQ Level <2 	 -0.059 	 -0.046 
(0.012)** 	 (0.009)** 
mother, NVQ Level 2-3 	 -0.061 	 -0.026 
(0.015)** 	 (0.009)** 
mother, NVQ Level <2 	 -0.088 	 -0.051 
(0.014)** 	 (0.009)** 
unemployment rate 	 0.002 	 0.002 
(0.001) 	 (0.001) 
Constant 	 0.252 	 -12,167.614 
(0.023)** 	 (11,541.406) 
Year dummies 	 Y 	 Y 	 Y 
Region dummies 	 N 	 Y 	 Y 
Observations 	 6413 	 6413 	 6413 
R-squared 	 0.05 	 0.17  
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
1 In each case, omitted category is "parent educated to >NVQ level 4" 
2 Marginal effects of probit are presented for ease of comparison, using STATA's `dprobit' 
command 
Here, the abolition of grants in England, Wales and Northern Ireland appears to 
have no impact, since the sign on the difference-in-difference estimator "Full 
grant * academic year 1999" is insignificant. 
Again a set of covariates (which now include a set of regional dummies - this was 
not possible in the regressions involving Scotland, which has only 1 region) is 
included, and the model is also estimated using a probit model. 
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A number of issues must be noted: Firstly, a potential issue is that — although 
nothing changed in terms of fee obligation between the before and after time 
periods for the control group, tuition fees had just been implemented for this 
group in 1998/99. This could have potentially slowed growth for this group. 
Ideally the experiment would take place a number of years after the 
implementation of fees, to be sure this did not pollute the experiment. 
Secondly, the sample sizes of the control group, although larger than in the 
previous two experiments considered, are still quite small, as reflected in Figure 
6.1 below, which shows the average participation by year for each group, with 
standard errors. 
Thirdly, the "before", period comprises only 1 year of data, which again reduces 
the sample sizes of the experiment. 
Finally, the loss of £900 maintenance grants experienced by the treatment group, 
while substantial, was far less than had been previously lost by this group over the 
course of the 1990s. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, grants had been eroded all 
throughout the 1990s — having peaked at almost £3,000 in 1992 in real terms, to 
reach just below £2,000 in 1997, before halving in 1998. Thus, low income 
groups may simply have become "used" to this erosion of grants. 
Figure 6.1 Treatment and control groups: grants abolished in 1999/00 
199899 199900 200001 200102 200203 200304 
academic year 
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Figure 6.2 Difference-in-difference, low income vs high income groups before and after 
1999 maintenance grant abolition, n=6413 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the difference-in-difference in this case. Average 
participation for high income students between 1998/99 and 1999/00-2003/04 can 
be seen in the black solid line, rising from 25.2% to 32.5%, and average 
participation over the same time period for low income groups is the grey line, 
rising from 9.2% to 13.4%. The dashed line illustrates the difference between the 
two groups — 4.2 percentage points in 1998/99 and 7.3 percentage points in 
1999/00-2003/04. Thus, the difference-in-difference is described by the difference 
of these two points on the dashed line; -3.11. But, as the dotted line illustrates, the 
confidence interval of the difference-in-difference estimator is quite wide, with 
the range between +2.9 percentage points and -8.8 percentage points — indicating 
that there is no statistically significant difference between the change in the 
treatment and control groups. 
6.2.4 Grants restored in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, 2004 
The final "natural experiment" this thesis considers is that of the restoration of 
maintenance grants in 2004 for non-Scottish students. This is perhaps the cleanest 
and most robust of the experiments available over the time period in question. 
Again the experiment concerns youths of different parental income groups. 
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In summary: from the years 1999/00 — 2003/04 low income students (those of 
parental income less than £16,000 in 2004) received no grants. In 2004 these 
students had grants of £1050 restored to them (again it is preferable to deal only 
with students qualifying for the full grant rather than include those with tapered 
grants which would confuse matters). Over the same period of time, high income 
students (parental incomes above £40,000) experienced no change in financial 
circumstances, tuition fees having been in place since 1998/99 and grant 
entitlement being zero in all years for this group. Thus, high income students are 
used as the control group, with the treatment being the re-instatement of grants for 
low income students in 2004, as equation 6.5 illustrates. 
Pit = a + p(FullGrantit * Posta) + (Posta + ifrFullGrantit + Tit 6.4 
Where FullGranta is a binary variable set to 1 if the student's parental income is 
low enough to receive a full grant in 2004/05 (less than £16,000) and 0 if the 
student's parental income precludes them from being eligible for a grant after 
2004.48 Posta is a binary variable set to 1 if a student becomes eligible for 
university in the academic year 2004/05 or 2005/06 and set to 0 if the student 
becomes eligible for university between 1999/00 and 2003/04. Again, this 
equation will only be estimated for students from England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland due to changes in grant and fee eligibility in Scotland in 2000/01 —
2001/02. 
Below in Table 6.7 are sample means and standard errors for the treatment and 
control groups, before and after grants were restored in 2004/05. Again the issue 
of inherent differences in the control and treatment groups is apparent; the control 
group, being of higher parental income, have better GCSE scores, are more white, 
and have better educated parents. 
The experiment is illustrated by the change in grants in the "after" time period 
versus the "before" time period — an increase from zero to £1050 for the treated 
48 Note, in this instance it is not possible to include "medium income" students as part of the 
control group as they did not experience any change in grants after 2004 — grants were only re-
introduced to the very poorest students. However, students of this income level received partial 
grants prior to 1999 and so for reasons of consistency these students are excluded. 
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group. Helpfully, again the loan eligibility amount for the two groups remains 
relatively stable over time. 
Table 6.10 Summary statistics, youths from England, Wales and Northern Ireland' 
Academic year youth eligible for: 
1999/00 - 2003/04 
Full grant 	 No grant 
2004/05 - 2005/06 
Full grant 	 No grant 
White 84.3 95.2 86.1 94.7 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (.007) 
Male 54.4 51.9 53.6 52.9 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) 
GCSE attainment2 70.3 88.2 71.9 88.7 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.016) 
Parents' ed. NVQ 4+3 25.6 75.8 29.7 77.6 
(0.007) (0.113) (0.012) (0.017) 
Parents' ed. NVQ 2-3 24.3 14.2 23.3 14.7 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) 
Parents' ed. NVQ <2 50.1 10.1 46.9 7.6 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012) 
parental income £ 5,860 57,658 6,274 55,924 
( 166) ( 718) (316) (1331) 
Grant - - 
Fee 1,200 1,050 1,200 
Loan 3,490 2,718 3,464 2,734 
N 3764 1433 1287 565 
'Missing values not included in calculated means 
2 Where 1=5 GCSEs or more, 0 = less than 5 GCSEs 
3 Of the most educated parent, where 1=NVQ level 4 or more, 2=NVQ level 2-3, 3=NVQ level <2 
Again, difference-in-differences are calculated in Table 6.11 below, and by OLS 
and Probit regression, including a number of covariates, in Table 6.11. 
Table 6.11 Difference-in-difference, probability of attending university degree course (LFS) 
n=7049 
Full Grant No Grant Difference 
Eligible for academic year 1999/00 - 2003/04 
Eligible for academic year 2004/05-2005/06 
13.2 
13.9 
32.2 
33.3 
-19.1 
-19.4 
Difference 0.7 1.0 -0.3 
Table 6.11 describes the difference-in-difference in this case; participation of 
students with low incomes increased by 0.7 percentage points after the restoration 
of grants, versus an increase of 1 percentage point for those with high incomes. 
This renders a difference-in-difference estimator of -0.3. 
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Table 6.12 contains OLS and Probit estimators. Again, the difference-in-
difference estimator is not found to be significantly different from zero, implying 
no significant increase in participation as a result of the re-instatement of £1050 
maintenance grant. 
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Table 6.12 Difference-in-difference, probability of attending university de:ree course 
(1) 
difference-in- 
difference 
(2) 
Add 
covariates 
(3) 
Probit 
(4) 
Add time- 
varying 
covariates 
-0.003 -0.014 -0.003 -0.017 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.017) (0.035) 
0.010 0.005 0.014 -0.023 
(0.019) (0.029) (0.018) (0.067) 
-0.191 -0.031 -0.030 -0.030 
(0.012)** (0.017) (0.014)* (0.019) 
-0.027 -0.023 -0.026 
(0.009)** (0.007)** (0.009)** 
0.001 0.002 0.001 
(0.000)** (0.001)* (0.000)** 
-0.076 -0.079 -0.076 
(0.016)** (0.017)** (0.018)** 
0.214 0.220 0.227 
(0.013)** (0.015)** (0.014)** 
-0.062 -0.036 -0.057 
(0.013)** (0.009)** (0.015)** 
-0.070 -0.057 -0.059 
(0.012)** (0.010)** (0.014)** 
-0.057 -0.029 -0.050 
(0.015)** (0.010)** (0.018)** 
-0.072 -0.045 -0.077 
(0.013)** (0.010)** (0.016)** 
0.015 0.010 0.015 
(0.006)* (0.005)* (0.006)** 
full grant* academic yr2004 
academic yr 2004 
full grant 
male 
parental income (£000s) 
white 
GCSE 
father, NVQ Level 2-31 
father, NVQ Level <2 
mother, NVQ Level 2-3 
father, NVQ Level <2 
unemployment rate 
parental income * 2004 	 0.000 
(0.000) 
White * 2004 	 0.001 
(0.033) 
GCSE * 2004 	 -0.075 
(0.033)* 
father, NVQ < 2 * Yr2004' 	 -0.020 
(0.029) 
father, NVQ 3-4 * Yr2004 	 -0.039 
(0.026) 
mother, NVQ < 2 * Yr2004 	 -0.022 
(0.034) 
mother, NVQ 3-4 * Yr2004 	 0.023 
Constant 
Year dummies 
Region dummies 
(0.030) 
0.322 8,269.788 4,971.645 
(0.010)** (7,758.261) (7,866.507) 
Y Y Y Y 
N Y Y Y 
Observations 	 7049 
	 7049 	 7049 	 7049 
R-squared 
	 0.05 	 0.16 	 0.17  
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
1 In each case, omitted category is "parent educated to >NVQ level 4" 
2 Marginal effects of probit are presented for ease of comparison, using STATA's `dprobie 
command 
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As can be seen in Table 6.12, as well as estimating the regression with covariates 
and as a Probit, time-varying covariates are added in column (4). The reasoning 
behind this is as follows: the relationship between the set of explanatory variables 
and university participation may have changed after 2004. For example, GCSE 
attainment has a strong positive effect on participation, as can be seen in column 
(2). However, after the re-introduction of grants in 2004 GCSE may have a lesser 
effect on participation. Indeed, this seems to be the case — the coefficient on 
GCSE*2004 is one of the few significant time varying covariates. 
But, while the addition of time-varying covariates has a small impact on the 
"difference-in-difference" coefficient, it remains insignificant. Again, this is 
illustrated in Figure 6.3 below. 
Figure 6.3 Treatment and control groups: grants restored in 2004/05 
It is clear from Figure 6.3 that the increase in participation of the treated group 
after the treatment in 2004/05 is not substantial, indicating an increase of £1,050 
in maintenance grants has no impact on participation. 
However, the large difference in participation in the treatment and control groups 
must be taken into consideration. While the overall increase in participation 
before and after the reforms for the low-income treatment group is just 0.7 
percentage points compared with 1 percentage point for the high-income control 
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group, the low-income participation rate was only 13.2% to begin with, versus 
32% for high-income students, so in relative terms this increase is substantially 
larger. To clarify, low-income students' participation rate was 13.2% pre-reform, 
then rose to 13.9% after the reforms. This represents a 5.5% increase. This 
compares with a 3.2% increase in participation for the high income control groups 
after the reform. 
Table 6.13 illustrates: 
Table 6.13 Difference-in-difference 
Full Grant No Grant Difference 
Eligible for academic yr 1999/00 — 2003/04 (%) 
Eligible for academic year 2004/05-2005/06 (%) 
13.2 
13.9 
32.2 
33.3 
-19.1 
-19.4 
Difference 0.7 1.0 -0.3 
Difference (%) 5.5 3.2 2.3 
Unfortunately it is not possible to test the statistical significance of the 2.3% 
difference-in-difference estimator calculated in this way (other than by 
bootstrapping). But it does suggest that there may be a significant positive effect 
of maintenance grants. 
Of course, this exercise could also be carried out for the abolition of fees in 
section 6.2.3, but given the many other associated issues with that particular 
scenario, and the unavailability of standard errors to verify significance, this 
analysis is not carried out. 
6.2.5 Summary of Difference-in-Difference approach 
So far, this chapter has used difference-in-difference analysis to estimate the 
impact of higher education funding policy changes on university participation. 
The results of this analysis are inconclusive for a number of reasons: 
1) 
	
	 The sample sizes for the treatment and control groups are quite small 
on a number of occasions, increasing variability in the data and 
reducing precision in the estimates. 
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2) Some of the experiments, particularly those comparing Scottish and 
English youths are not "clean" in that student maintenance loan 
amounts were also changing at the time of the reforms. This may have 
impacted participation at the same time as the reforms. 
3) The control and treatment groups are different. Ideally, an experiment 
would use control and treatment groups that are as similar as possible 
before the treatment. This is not possible for the purpose of this 
analysis and instead suitable control groups must be found in other 
countries and in individuals of different income levels. While much of 
the differences may be controlled for, as described in 6.2.4, this could 
reduce the chance of finding a significant effect. More generally, a 
potential problem with the difference-in-difference methodology is 
that it cannot account for different prior trajectories of the two groups. 
A common way of dealing with such an issue is to carry out a 
"placebo test" — i.e. carry out the analysis in a year prior to the year of 
the policy change (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). If a 
similar significant effect is found this suggests the treatment and 
control groups are different in ways that are not being controlled for 
and the experiment may be invalid. Since no significant effect is found 
in any of these experiments the placebo test is not appropriate in this 
instance. 
4) Using this type of methodology — particularly where more than one 
reform happened simultaneously, and affected different income groups 
in different ways, such as the changes occurring in 1998/99 — 1999/00, 
does not offer any insight into the separate impact of tuition fees and 
grants on participation. 
Since the aim of this thesis is to estimate the impact of fees and aid, it is desirable 
to "unpack" the reforms — i.e. gain some understanding of the separate impact of 
grants and fees on participation. This is where the thesis turns to next. 
6.3 Time-series regression analysis of individual-level data 
In this section, the aim is to use the LFS data described in Chapter 5 to estimate a 
model of participation with respect to grants and fees and a rich set of controls; 
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being mindful of the issues of measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity 
described previously. 
In the analysis that follows, the sample is restricted to youths in England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland since as previously mentioned Scotland experienced a 
significant departure from UK policy in 2000, and as part of this, introduced a 
endowment of £2289 per student, to be paid upon graduation. This renders the 
Scottish system somewhat different to the English system, with no comparable 
series in the rest of the UK. Thus, the total sample size, including those living 
away from home and not in halls of residence for whom parental income is 
imputed, but excluding those with missing parental income for other reasons, is 
22,486 youths of age 18-19. 
Table 6.14 provides summary statistics and sample means for these individual 
level data, again split by each of the three income groups (with additional 
information on those with missing income, for whom the value of grants, loans 
and fees is imputed, as discussed in Chapter 5). The average participation rate of 
the sample of English, Welsh and Northern Irish students is 15.9% though 
participation varies considerably by income group, with only 11.4% of 
individuals from low income backgrounds doing a degree, versus 31% from high 
income backgrounds. The sample is evenly split between males and females, 
those with and without five good GCSEs and parental education types. 
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Table 6.14: Summary Statistics, English, Welsh and NI university eligible youths (LFS)  
parental income: 
all 	 low 	 medium 	 high missin 	 male 
sex: 
female 
% all sample 
% of participants 
% of non-participants 
ethnicity 
15.9 
83.9 
45.6 
11.4 
88.7 
28.1 
16.6 
83.3 
15.0 
31.0 
68.2 
11.3 
12.9 
87.1 
51.4 
14.1 
85.9 
48.6 
17.9 
82.2 
white (%) 84.8 80.6 90.0 92.0 79.2 84.8 84.8 
non-white (%) 8.5 12.7 4.8 3.9 10.9 9.0 9.0 
missing (%) 
youth's education 
6.7 6.7 5.2 4.1 9.9 6.3 6.2 
GCSEs >=5 (%) 46.9 41.2 51.1 69.2 30.0 43.2 50.9 
GCSES < 5 (%) 49.9 55.7 46.3 29.1 63.7 53.4 47.6 
missing (%) 
parent's education 
3.2 3.1 2.6 1.7 6.4 3.4 1.5 
NVQ level 4 +(%) 34.2 24.0 43.7 73.1 35.2 33.1 
NVQ level 2 or 3(%) 22.4 25.8 29.6 15.7 23.3 21.5 
NVQ level <2(%) 27.6 44.7 21.6 7.5 29.5 25.7 
missing (%) 15.8 5.5 5.1 3.7 100 12.0 19.8 
parental inc 
region 
22,227 6,315 27,914 57,449 21,872 22,649 
England (%) 88.4 86.2 90.0 92.1 88.8 88.7 88.2 
Scotland (%) 
Wales (%) 5.8 6.0 5.8 5.2 5.9 5.7 6.0 
Northern Ireland (%) 5.8 7.8 4.2 2.7 5.3 5.7 5.8 
sample size 	 22,486 10,264 	 6,308 	 3,380 	 2,534 11,567 	 10,919 
this is the education level of the most educated parent 
Again, those youths from low income backgrounds tend to have poorer GCSE 
attainment (41% achieved 5 good GCSEs versus 69% from high income 
backgrounds) and less educated parents (24% of low income parents are educated 
to NVQ level 4 or above, versus 73% of high income parents). Due to the 
exclusion of Scotland, regions are heavily biased towards England. 
The models that follow use variation in participation over time, and between the 
income groups described in Chapter 5, to identify the effects of grants and fees on 
participation - in other words, changes in HE funding policy over time and across 
different income groups due to means testing (illustrated in Figures 5.1-5.3), 
brings about variation in individuals fee and grant eligibility, which can be 
exploited to identify the individual impact on participation. 
140 
The equation of interest is therefore: 
Pit = a + fli Fit + 112 Git + I33Lit + yXit + Pr  + Tt litt 	 6.5 
Where Pit is a binary variable with the value of 1 if individual i attends university 
in year t and zero otherwise; Fit, Git and Lit measure the level of up-front fees 
payable and grants and loans eligible for, for individual i, in time t ; Xit are all the 
other characteristics that determine university education of individual i at time t, 
including parental education, whether students come from a low (LOW), medium 
(MED) or high (HIGH) income family (based on the estimate of family income 
when they were 17-18 previously described), academic outcomes at age 16, 
ethnicity, regional unemployment rate, gender and family income at age 18-19. 
Common regional effects (pr ) and time effects (Tt) are also included, in the case 
of the latter (Tt) by including a quadratic time trend interacted by family income 
group at the age of 17-18. That is: 
rt = (61 + 62 * MEDi+ 63 * HIGIII) * t + (64 + 65* MEDi + 66 * 
11/6711*t2 
6.6 
In the sections that follow, a number of approaches are adopted to attempt to 
estimate equations based on equation 6.5, firstly using a composite "upfront 
costs" variable, then modeling the separate effects of grants and fees on individual 
participation, before moving on to panel-level specifications in Chapter 7. 
6.3.1 The impact of net upfront costs on participation 
The first specification attempts to examine how upfront costs affect the 
probability that a given youth will attend a university degree program. This 
strategy follows the work of McPherson and Shapiro (1999), and Kane (1995) 
(see Chapter 3), who calculate net upfront costs for each individual as (tuition 
fees — grants — loans49), giving an overall measure of how financial obligation at 
the point of entry to university may affect participation. Note, though students 
49 In Kane (2005) loans are excluded from the analysis altogether, so upfront costs is defined as 
fees-grants 
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also face other costs, such as rent, food costs, etc, these are not included in the net 
costs calculation since all youths, student or otherwise would have to face these 
costs50. The advantage of using this measure is that this variable expresses an 
overall upfront obligation and therefore measures how upfront costs faced at point 
of entry to university impact a youths decision to participate (because loans are 
treated purely as an upfront benefit in the same way as grants — future debt is 
assumed to have no impact on the decision — this means youths reaction purely to 
the benefit they will receive upfront is being captured). Effectively we assume all 
youths have a zero future discount rate — in practise this is plausible, since 
government loans of the type discussed here are heavily insured in that they are 
only repayable once the individual is earning over a certain amount, and only a 
small percentage of income must be repaid each month. These loans are therefore 
very different to other debt such as credit card debt.) 
Hence the starting point is thus: 
P it = a + 801Cit + eXtt + pr +rt + utt 	 6.7 
Where NC,t is the net upfront cost for each individual based on his or her fee, loan 
and grant obligations as described above. All other variables are as described in 
Section 6.3. 
Figures 6.4 — 6.6 illustrate the net cost series for low, medium and high income 
students. 
50Students in the UK were previously eligible for housing benefit, but this was abolished in 1990 
51 Of course, this variable could also be constructed as net upfront benefits — the money a student 
has available to him/her to live on during each year at university. This would instead be calculated 
as (grants + loans — tuition fees) and would give identical results, but with the opposite sign. 
However in the interests of comparison with existing literature, the "net costs" approach is used in 
the following section. 
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Figure 6.4 Net upfront costs (fees — loans — grants), low income students (LFS) 
n=10,264 
Figure 6.5 Net upfront costs (fees — loans — grants), medium income students (LFS) 
n=6,308 
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Figure 6.6 Net costs (fees — loans — grants), medium income students (LFS) n=3,380 
Low income students, understandably, have the lowest net upfront costs. (In fact, 
in each year since 1992 they have negative net costs — i.e. they receive more than 
they must pay out). As can be seen in Figure 6.4, in 1992, their net costs are 
around -£3,700 — i.e. they have £3,700 per year to spend on maintenance if they 
take out their full loan and accept all their grant eligibility. This contrasts with 
high income students, whose net costs are around -£800 — i.e. they have only £800 
leftover per year, comprising wholly of a maintenance loan. 
Over the course of the 1990s, low income students experience a slight increase in 
net upfront costs — falls in grants are not quite made up for by increases in loans. 
A sharp decrease in net costs is apparent in 2004, though, when grants are 
restored. By contrast, high income students experience falling costs throughout 
the 1990s as loans are steadily increased, until 1998, when fees are increased and 
there is a sharp increase in net costs as a result (rising from around -£2000 to 
around -£1500 after the increase in fees). Note the spike in net costs in 1998 
which comes about because of the loan amount set by the DIES in this year, 
which was significantly higher than in previous years — but significantly lower 
than in subsequent years (see Appendix 6 for maximum loan rates for the years 
above). 
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The starting point is to estimate model 6.7 using OLS52. As previously mentioned 
the dependent variable is a binary variable, hence the model is also estimated 
using Probit analysis, and the two are compared in Table 6.15. In Column 1 are 
the OLS estimates, while the Probit estimates are in Column 2 along with 
standard errors (in the case of the Probit model the marginal effects are reported —
i.e. the impact of a one unit change in the explanatory variables). 
The OLS and Probit estimates are quite similar. In both cases, net upfront costs 
are expressed in £1000's (£2006), so the coefficient on each shows the increase in 
the probability of participation caused by a £1000 increase in net upfront costs. 
For both the OLS and Probit results, net costs have a significant negative effect on 
participation. For example, in the case of the OLS specification, a £1000 increase 
in upfront costs leads to a 9.8 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
undertaking a degree, versus a somewhat lower 4.4 percentage point decrease in 
the Probit specification. 
Given the presence of linear and non-linear time trends, as well as the rich set of 
controls, it is quite difficult to interpret the coefficients on low, medium and high 
income groups, but the estimates in Column 1 (OLS with no controls) indicate, 
unsurprisingly, that low income students are the least likely to participate, and 
high income students the most likely. 
52 Since the dependent variable in all main regressions is a binary variable, in each case Linear 
Probability Models are used 
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Table 6.15 Analysis of university degree participation decision 
(1) 
no controls 
(2) 
with controls 
(3) 
probit 
low' -0.345 -0.152 -0.826 
(0.020)** (0.031)** (0.325)* 
med -0.241 -0.211 -1.138 
(0.020)** (0.036)** (0.357)** 
lowY*time 0.006 0.003 0.023 
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.005)** 
medY*time 0.004 0.003 0.008 
(0.001)** (0.001)* (0.006) 
highY*time 0.003 -0.000 -0.004 
(0.002)* (0.002) (0.007) 
lowY*time2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 
(0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)** 
medY*time2 -0.000 0.000 0.003 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
highY*time2 -0.000 0.001 0.005 
(0.000) (0.000)** (0.002)** 
net costs -0.066 -0.098 -0.044 
(0.004)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
father, NVQ Level 2-32 -0.054 -0.216 
(0.007)** (0.033)** 
father, NVQ Level <2 -0.062 -0.303 
(0.007)** (0.034)** 
mother, NVQ Level 2-3 -0.066 -0.216 
(0.008)** (0.037)** 
mother, NVQ Level <2 -0.086 -0.340 
(0.007)** (0.035)** 
Male -0.017 -0.088 
(0.005)** (0.023)** 
White -0.063 -0.343 
(0.009)** (0.044)** 
GCSE 0.223 1.012 
(0.015)** (0.077)** 
GCSE*low' -0.042 0.158 
(0.016)* (0.081)* 
GCSE*med -0.012 0.209 
(0.017) (0.085)* 
parental income 0.001 0.002 
(0.000)** (0.008)* 
parental income*low' 0.001 0.004 
(0.000)* (0.002) 
parental income*med 0.003 0.002 
(0.000)** (0.002)** 
unemployment rate 0.010 0.052 
(0.003)** (0.013)** 
Constant 0.186 -0.092 -3.353 
(0.016)** (0.034)** (0.325)** 
Regional dummies N N N 
Observations 22486 22486 22486 
R-squared 0.05 0.17 
High income category omitted 2omitted category "parent educated to >=NVQ level 4" 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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In an initial testing stage, all explanatory variables (including net upfront costs) 
were interacted with low, medium and high income categories and t-tests were 
performed to ascertain which were significant — i.e. which variables had a 
significantly different effect on participation, for each income level. 
Only two variables found to have significant interactions were GCSE, parental 
income. The impact of upfront costs was found to vary by income level but the 
coefficients were highly erratic, often with incorrect signs, suggesting the 
specifications were not robust to interacting this variable with income group. 
The set of explanatory variables is highly significant. Parental education and prior 
attainment are key drivers of participation, in line with the theory described in 
Chapter 2. In the case of parental education, for example, a child whose father is 
educated to NVQ level 2-3 is 5.4 percentage points less likely to participate in 
university than a child with a father educated to NVQ level >=4 (the omitted 
category), controlling for all other factors, including mother's education. 
GCSE attainment has a strong positive impact on participation — an increase from 
less than 5 good GCSEs to 5 or more good GCSEs leads to a 22 percentage point 
increase in the probability of attending university, though the impact varies by 
income level, as described above. In this case being from a low income 
background reduces the effectiveness of having 5 good GCSEs on participation 
by 4 percentage points from the average, while being from a medium income 
category only has a very slight downward impact from the average. 
Current parental income (also expressed in £1000s) also has a strong positive 
effect on probability of going to university, while whites are less likely than non-
whites to go to university and females slightly more likely than males to 
participate. 
Finally, differentiating the linear and non-linear time trends provides the rate of 
change in participation for each income group since 1992 — meaning it is possible 
to see which income groups have experienced the fastest expansion of 
participation53. The results are contained in Table 6.16 below. 
53 E.g. for high income groups, the time trend in participation is (63 * time) + (66 * time2), so 
the rate of change will be (83 + 286time) 
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Table 6.16 Rate of increase of participation by income croup 1992-2005 
Income group Rate of increase of participation (evaluated 
at mean level of time) 
Low -0.012* (0.004) 
Medium 0.009* (0.004) 
High 0.024** (0.006) 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The results indicate that participation of medium and high income groups have 
expanded at the fastest pace since the 1990s — with high income groups 
apparently accelerating most, and that the rate of growth participation of low 
income groups has actually slowed. These results are in line with the findings of 
Blanden and Machin (2004) as discussed in Chapter 1, that the expansion of HE 
throughout the 1990s benefitted the rich over the poor. 
Two concerns arise from this first specification. Firstly, in terms of the coefficient 
on net costs in particular, the OLS and Probit estimates are slightly different. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on net costs seems quite sizeable (though compares 
quite favourably with the results of around -0.03 from Kane (1994) and similar 
from Leslie and Brinkman (1983) — both in 2006 $US), particularly for the OLS 
specification, suggesting some sort of bias may be at play, such as that driven by 
unobserved heterogeneity, as previously discussed. 
The next step is to attempt to untangle "net costs" and estimate separate series for 
grants and up-front fees, whilst controlling for maintenance loan availability. 
6.3.2 Untangling the impact of grants and fees 
The next step, then, is to estimate a model of the form: 
Pit = a + 131F it + 1I 2Git + 113 Lit + yXit + Pr  + Tt 	 6.8 
Where all variables are the same as above, but in this case NCit is replaced by Fir 
Gil and Lit which measure the level of up-front fees payable, and grants and loan 
eligible for by individual i. X. includes the same controls included in equation 6.7. 
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Again the model is estimated using OLS and Probit and is shown in Table 6.17 
below. Here, grants, fees, loans and parental income are expressed in real prices 
in £1000's, so the coefficient on each shows the increase in the probability of 
participation caused by a £1000 increase in the particular variable. 
For both the OLS and Probit specifications, the coefficients on grants and fees 
are significant (except in the case of OLS with no controls, where fees is not 
found to have a significant impact on participation) and their signs are intuitive —
upfront fees have a significant negative effect on participation, whereas grants 
have a significant positive impacts on participation. In the case of the OLS 
specification, a £1000 increase in fees leads to a 6.4 percentage point decrease in 
participation, while a £1000 increase in grants leads to a 9.4 percentage point 
increase in participation. The Probit specification generates slightly lower values 
for the coefficients on grants (0.063) and fees (-0.04), which are perhaps more 
realistic (indeed given the low average rate of participation a Probit model would 
normally be preferable), and as with the net costs model, the coefficients are 
reasonably in line with the US research of similar nature described in Chapter 4, 
though the coefficient on grants seems somewhat high. 
An interesting, and counter-intuitive result, is that loans appear to be worth more 
as a participation influence than grants — i.e. the coefficient on loans is higher 
than the coefficient on grants. However, as previously discussed, while it is 
important to control for the amount of loan a youth is eligible for, putting a causal 
interpretation on this parameter is inadvisable. In fact, the coefficient could be 
interpreted as causal only if individuals are assumed to have a zero discount rate —
i.e. they completely discount the future repayments they will have to make and 
react purely to the upfront cash benefit of the loan — while this may be plausible 
for some youths, given the income-contingent features of the loan, others are 
more likely to take account of future repayments they may have to make. 
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Table 6.17 Analysis of university degree participation decision 
low' 
med 
low*time 
med*time 
high*time 
low*time2 	 -0.000 
(0.000) 
med*time2 	 0.001 
(0.000)** 
high*time2 	 0.002 
(0.000)** 
fee 	 -0.005 
(0.09) 
grant 	 0.071 
(0.005)** 
loan 	 0.142 
(0.006)** 
father, NVQ Level 2-32 
father, NVQ Level <2 
mother, NVQ Level 2-3 
mother, NVQ Level <2 
male 
white 
GCSE 
GCSE*low' 
GCSE*med 
parental income 
parental income*low' 
parental income*med 
(0.000)** 	 (0.002)** 
unemployment rate 	 0.014 	 0.010 
(0.003)** 	 (0.002)** 
Constant 	 0.107 	 -0.511 
(0.017)** 	 (0.078)** 
Regional dummies 
Observations 	 22486 	 22486 	 22486 
R-squared 
	 0.06 	 0.18 
I High income category omitted 2 In each case, omitted category is "parent educated to NVQ level 
4+" Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
(1) 
no controls 
(2) 
with controls 
(3) 
probit 
-0.353 -0.142 -0.115 
(0.022)** (0.032)** (0.050)* 
-0.240 -0.187 -0.117 
(0.021)** (0.036)** (0.034)** 
-0.012 -0.013 -0.007 
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.001)** 
-0.017 -0.015 -0.011 
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.001)** 
-0.017 -0.015 -0.011 
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** 
-0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
0.002 0.001 
(0.000)** (0.000)** 
0.003 0.002 
(0.00)** (0.00)** 
-0.064 -0.040 
(0.010)** (0.007)** 
0.094 0.063 
(0.006)** (0.005)** 
0.158 0.104 
(0.006)** (0.005)** 
-0.053 -0.030 
(0.007)** (0.004)** 
-0.060 -0.042 
(0.007)** (0.005)** 
-0.064 -0.029 
(0.008)** (0.005)** 
-0.084 -0.049 
(0.007)** (0.005)** 
-0.016 -0.013 
(0.005)** (0.004)** 
-0.064 -0.065 
(0.009)** (0.009)** 
0.221 0.166 
(0.015)** (0.014)** 
-0.042 0.026 
(0.016)** (0.014) 
-0.012 0.035 
(0.017) (0.016)* 
0.001 0.002 
(0.000)** (0.001)* 
0.001 0.004 
(0.000) (0.022) 
0.004 0.017 
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It may be the case that the impact of fees and grants is different depending on 
parental income — i.e. an additional £1000 of grants may be worth more to 
someone from a low income background to someone with a medium income 
background. 
To test this, interactions between grants, fees, loans and parental income groups 
are added, and the model below is estimated: 
Pit = a+ 61F1t * highit + 82F1t *med1t + 63Git * lowit + 84G1t  *medit + 
85 Lit * Iowa + 66 Lit *medit + 87 Lit * highit +yXit + Pr  + Tt + Utt 6.9 
However, the coefficients resulting from this model (not shown), particularly in 
the case of high income students, are unfeasibly high in some cases, suggesting 
sample sizes are too low to support multiple interactions. 
Returning, then, to the main model 6.8, as discussed, the coefficients on /31  and 
/32 give the marginal effect of £1,000 increase in fees and grants respectively, on 
participation. For example, a £1000 increase in grants results in a 6.3 percentage 
point increase in participation according to the Probit specification. 
Given that the data seems unable to support interactions by income, as discussed 
above, a useful way to examine the impact for different income groups is to 
calculate the elasticities of demand for university with respect to grants and fees 
for each income group. 
The elasticity of demand is the percent change in y for a 1% change in x — in 
other words, the percent change in participation brought about by a 1% change in 
grants or fees. While this is less intuitive than the marginal effects given by the 
coefficients above, the elasticities can be calculated for each income group and 
take into account of the different HE finance obligations and participation rates of 
each group, thus shedding some light on the impact of HE finance for different 
income groups. 
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It is possible to calculate at the means of participation and HE finance eligibility 
for each income group, as shown below (where the coefficients from the probit 
specification in Table 6.17 are used): 
Table 6.18 Elasticity of demand for university with respect to fees and grants 
Income group: 
variable 
fees 
grants 
Low (P=0.114) 
0.97** 
Med (P=0.166) 
-0.166** 
0.546** 
High (P=0.31) 
-0.27** 
    
Calculated using STATAs MFX command 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
1 As previously stated, the coefficients and interactions on loans should be treated with a degree of 
caution. 
The results in Table 6.18 imply that fees have a stronger effect for high income 
youths than medium income; a 1% increase in fees results in a 0.27% decrease in 
participation for high income students and a 0.16% decrease for medium income 
groups. 
A 1% increase in grants results in a 0.97% increase in participation for low 
income youths versus a 0.55% increase for medium income youths, implying 
grants have 
Finally, as with the net costs specification, it is possible to examine the linear and 
non-linear time trends to ascertain the rate of growth of participation among 
income groups. Table 6.19 illustrates. 
Table 6.19 Rate of increase of participation by income group, 1992-2005 
Income group Rate of increase of participation (evaluated 
at mean level of time) 
Low -0.013** (0.003) 
Medium 0.009* (0.004) 
High 0.023** (0.006) 
The results, unsurprisingly given the similarity of specification, again illustrate 
the average rate of growth of participation of high income students outstripping 
that of medium and especially low income students over the 1990s to the mid 
2000s. 
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6.4 Sources of bias in individual-level models 
In order for the models described above to provide an unbiased estimate of the 
impact of upfront fees and grants, these variables must be exogenous. That is, 
grants and fees must be uncorrelated with the error term uit. 
As previously discussed, if there is an unobserved effect that affects parental 
income at age 17-18 (which totally determines the level of fees and grants a youth 
faces) and university participation, then the estimates of the impact of upfront fees 
and grants will be biased. Such factors could include having highly motivated 
parents — such parents are likely to have higher incomes, and thus be more likely 
to encourage their children into university. Thus higher fees, payable by those 
with these higher income parents, will be associated with high university 
attendance. 
If this is ignored, the effect of fees (which are positively related to parental 
income) will potentially be over-stated, and the effects of grants (which are 
negatively related to parental income) will be underestimated. 
Even after successfully controlling for parental income, there may be additional 
reasons why fees and grants may be endogenous — for example if there was a 
shock to parental income that also affected participation. 
This could happen if a youths' parent suffers an injury. In this case their income 
may decrease, and thus the youth will be entitled to a higher grant level and lower 
fees. But this student may be more inclined to go to work rather than university, 
to support his/her parent, given their loss of earnings, or to stay at home to look 
after the parent rather than go to university. 
There may also be additional unobserved variables — such as additional parental 
financial support or credit card borrowing which may be related to grants, fees 
and participation, which are also omitted from the model. Again this may result in 
biased estimates. 
A further issue may arise if parents attempt to alter their income levels (either 
falsely in the means-testing forms or by deliberately reducing their earnings 
through hours worked etc) in the time period immediately before their children go 
to university in order to increase their child's grant award or reduce their fee 
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obligation. This creates a further endogeneity issue: such parents are again more 
likely to be more financially motivated, and better off, and by the same rationale 
are also likely to encourage their children to participate in university. Furthermore 
fees for this group will appear higher than they are, and therefore the impact of 
fees will be overestimated for this group. 
In addition to these issues, there may be a number of other potential problem 
areas in the model described above, which will directly affect the estimates of 
grants and fees: 
1) As described in Section 5.3.1, the three parental income categories used in 
the models above are created according to government criteria for who 
should receive full grants, or who should be eligible for full fees each 
year. However, this categorisation method causes a potential problem. The 
relationship between parental income and unobservables may vary over 
time as the proportion of individuals qualifying for the maximum levels of 
fee or grant changes. Figure 6.7 shows the proportion of those falling into 
the low, medium and high income categories over time (missing income 
youths are excluded in this chart). As is apparent, the proportion of high 
income students is increasing over time. This is because of fiscal drag —
that is, household earnings increased at a faster rate than the minimum 
earnings criteria set by the Government for the level of full fee eligibility, 
meaning more and more youths found themselves eligible for the full fee 
each year. Thus, the pool of high income students has widened, meaning 
students eligible for full fees each year may include those less motivated 
(e.g. with slightly lower household incomes and therefore less motivated 
parents) and less likely to go to university. Since fees were increasing over 
the years of observation, this may result in an over-estimate of the impact 
of fees. The same may be true for low income students, the proportion of 
whom is decreasing over time. 
2) Given the limitations of the LFS income data (as described in 5.3.2), there 
is also a possibility that the estimates of the fees and grants (and loans) an 
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academic year 
individual would face may be measured with error. This would have the 
effect of downward biasing the estimates54. 
3) Policy changes in one year may not only affect contemporaneous HE 
participation rates — there may be more dynamic processes at work. For 
example policy reforms may have reduced the likelihood of 18-19 
finishing school in 1997 undertaking gap years in 1997 as if they did they 
would be subject to the upfront fee when they started in September 1998 
whereas if they went straight to HE in 1997 they would not. In addition, in 
response may be other dynamics at play if pupils change their behavior in 
response to anticipated changes in the finance regime. For example, 
youths may be less motivated to undertake GCSEs or A-levels if they 
believe they will not be able to afford to go to university in the future. 
These potential dynamics are not dealt with in the models above. 
Figure 6.7 Proportion of youths in each parental income category (England, Wales 
and NI only) 
In the case of the first issue, the problem is that part of the results may be driven 
by changes in the composition of the groups caused by fiscal drag. A means of 
dealing with this is to select a year as typical and ensure that the sample 
composition is the same for all the other years. This is accomplished by using 
Kernel based propensity score matching.55 
s4 See Wooldridge (2004) Chapter 4, Section 4.4.2., pp73-76 
55 See for example Sianesi (2001a; 2001b) 
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In this case, the mid-point year of 1998 is chosen. For each income group 
separately, each individual in the base year is given a 'score' based on their 
characteristics, to create a profile of characteristics for each income group in the 
base year. Then, again based on his / her characteristics, if a youth in the high 
income sample in 1992, say, is 'similar' in composition to the characteristics of 
high income students in the base year (i.e. has a similar propensity score), he / she 
is given a high weight. If the youth is very different in composition to the 
characteristics of high income students in the base year (i.e. has a very different 
propensity score), he / she is given a low weight. The effect of weighting is 
illustrated in Figure 6.8 below. As is clear, the proportions of youths in each 
income group, after weighting, is now steady. 
Figure 6.8 Proportion of youths in each parental income category (England, Wales 
and NI only) after matching to 1998 characteristics 
Model 6.8 is then re-estimated, with individuals weighted according to these 
criteria. The results are found to be very similar to those described in Table 6.17, 
indicating that the issue of changing proportions of youths by income level is not 
a major problem. 
Issues 2 and 3, however, as well as the ongoing issue of endogeneity of the grant 
and fee variables, are more difficult to deal with using individual-level data. 
Instead, these issues will be dealt with using the well-established panel-data 
techniques described in 4.2.2. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
This Chapter has used individual-level LFS data to attempt to estimate the impact 
of HE finance on university participation using two different approaches 
commonly used with data of this nature. 
The first approach was to use a difference-in-difference method, such as that used 
by Dynarski (1999), taking advantage of the natural experiments generated by 
differences in policy between constituent countries of the UK, as well as across 
different income groups as a result of means testing. 
None of the experiments uncovered a significant impact of HE finance — in this 
case maintenance grants and up-front fees — on participation. 
However, this approach raised a number of issues which brought the results into 
doubt. Firstly, in some cases, more than one policy change occurred at the same 
time (i.e. loans were cut in Scotland at the same time as fees were abolished), 
meaning it was not possible to establish the true effect of the treatment being 
studied. Secondly, the control and treatment groups were very different from each 
other in terms of parental income and hence their base levels of participation 
before the reforms, again making comparison of the two groups before and after 
treatment difficult. 
The second approach was to simply regress HE finance variables against 
participation, with a rich set of controls (including lagged and current parental 
income). This approach is similar to strategy of Galindo-Rueda (2004), though no 
studies have to date attempted to model HE finance variables explicitly for the 
UK. 
The results were quite different from those generated by the difference-in-
difference approach. The estimates revealed a strong negative impact of up-front 
fees on participation and a strong positive impact of maintenance grants. 
The average rate of growth of participation of high income students was found to 
have outstripped that of medium and especially low income students over the 
1990s to the mid 2000s. This is in line with the findings of Blanden and Machin 
(2004) that the expansion of HE throughout the 1990s benefitted the rich over the 
poor. 
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The latter, regression based approach would seem to be preferable to the 
difference-in-difference approach for a number of reasons. As stated, the 
difference-in-difference models suffered from a variety of problems, most 
seriously that the experiments themselves were not always clean, and that the two 
groups were quite different, and potentially on different trajectories before the 
policy change took place. Given this, the results from the difference-in-difference 
models would seem to have little credibility, and the regression of HE finance on 
participation would seem the more robust and preferred option. 
However, this estimates generated from this second approach may be subject to 
bias caused by the presence of measurement error in the explanatory variables, as 
well as unobserved heterogeneity arising from omitted variables. 
A solution to these potential problems would be to use a method such as fixed 
effects, as described in Chapter 4, in which any fixed unobserved heterogeneity is 
removed by demeaning or by another method such as first-differencing. 
However, in order to apply this methodology it is necessary that individuals in the 
data are observed in two or more time periods. As described, though, individuals 
in the LFS dataset are not observed over time but only appear once each year (and 
obviously, only make the decision of whether or not to go to university once), so 
it is not possible to use this type of methodology. 
The next Chapter seeks to rectify this issue by collapsing the LFS data into a 
`pseudo-panel' such as that used by Kane (1995) — data are collapsed to regional 
level, by year, creating repeated levels of participation by region over time. In this 
way, panel data approaches such as those described in Chapter 4 can be used to 
deal with the issues encountered in this chapter, by re-estimating the models at a 
panel level and testing a number of specifications. 
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Chapter 7 Using a 'pseudo panel' to 
estimate the impact of fees and 
support on participation 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 was an attempt to model the impact of HE finance on university 
participation using individual level data from the LFS. This chapter follows up 
this analysis by re-estimating the models used in Chapter 6 but for regional panel 
data. This will allow the use of alternative methodologies such as fixed effects, 
designed to deal with the presence of bias arising from measurement error in the 
explanatory variables, as well as from unobserved heterogeneity. 
In this chapter several specifications (some based on studies mentioned in Section 
4.2.2.), commonly used for estimation with panel data, are tested. These include 
random and fixed effects models as well as dynamic specifications. The preferred 
specification is chosen, based on model selection techniques, and finally, the 
results are put into context in terms of fee obligation and financial support given 
to individuals from different income backgrounds over the period following the 
1998 and 2006 reforms. 
7.2 Creating a 'pseudo-panel' 
Returning to equation 6.8 (repeated here for convenience), 
Pit = a + /11Fit + P2Git +133 Lit +yXit + Pr  +rt +utt 	 6.8 
whilst it is not possible to create an individual panel data over time that would 
potentially deal with the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, it is possible to 
create such a panel by taking advantage of the regional information contained 
within the LFS dataset. 
Similar to the individual-level data is it desirable to observe lots of variation in 
participation, grants and fees over time, in order to be able to identify the impact 
of the HE finance variables. 
Indeed, there have been very different regional differences in university 
participation, grants and fees over time, largely arising from the compositional 
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differences in these regions - particularly household income levels. Table 7.1 
shows mean participation levels and mean grants, fees and loans by region and 
income group before and after the 1998/99 tuition fee reforms (note, while 
potentially more variation could be found by using a more detailed regional 
breakdown, such as local authority, sample sizes would be insufficient to carry 
out robust analysis). 
Table 7.1 Regional Variation in university_ articipation and finance 
1992-1997 
Region ppn low med high miss grant fee loan 
Tyne and Wear 9.6 49.8 25.1 9.9 14.2 1842 0 1375 
Rest of North East 14.8 39.0 36.5 12.7 10.3 1689 0 1365 
Greater Manchester 11.6 48.8 25.0 10.5 13.7 1850 0 1371 
Merseyside 14.2 54.6 26.2 8.6 9.7 1841 0 1401 
Rest of North West 16.4 41.2 32.2 16.3 8.9 1657 0 1405 
South Yorkshire 14.5 38.5 29.7 9.1 20.7 1824 0 1373 
West Yorkshire 14.5 51.3 27.5 8.6 10.9 1802 0 1406 
Yorks & Humber 12.8 43.1 31.0 10.8 13.0 1799 0 1385 
East Midlands 15.1 41.7 32.5 11.2 12.3 1746 0 1370 
W Midlands Metro 11.6 52.4 26.3 7.1 12.8 1964 0 1392 
Rest of W Midlands 14.1 40.6 37.6 12.5 8.0 1726 0 1377 
Eastern 14.2 40.3 33.1 15.7 9.3 1628 0 1431 
Inner London 9.5 58.6 15.8 5.4 18.4 2824 0 1482 
Outer London 13.4 48.6 27.8 15.3 7.1 2435 0 1497 
South East 14.5 40.1 31.1 18.0 9.4 1597 0 1361 
South West 14.4 42.9 33.3 11.4 10.7 1765 0 1380 
Wales 14.8 46.6 30.2 9.7 11.7 1840 0 1401 
Northern Ireland 13.9 62.0 20.4 3.9 12.3 1992 0 1274 
1998-2005 
Region ppn low med high miss grant fee loan 
Tyne and Wear 15.3 49.9 22.4 15.6 11.1 238 353 3220 
Rest of North East 13.1 44.7 27.4 13.7 12.9 224 369 3248 
Greater Manchester 16.6 45.2 27.5 14.7 10.5 195 386 3230 
Merseyside 19.9 52.7 27.2 13.5 5.4 231 357 3247 
Rest of North West 18.4 45.8 29.8 14.1 8.1 194 385 3278 
South Yorkshire 12.4 45.1 25.6 14.0 13.5 223 359 3216 
West Yorkshire 15.3 48.9 25.0 13.8 10.6 200 355 3268 
Yorks & Humber 17.1 42.9 29.1 15.6 11.0 191 395 3253 
East Midlands 16.2 44.9 28.1 15.2 10.0 207 412 3248 
W Midlands Metro 16.0 52.4 23.0 13.4 9.8 203 342 3255 
Rest of W Midlands 17.7 42.1 32.8 16.8 6.9 200 450 3220 
Eastern 16.5 42.7 25.4 21.0 8.9 190 469 3205 
Inner London 15.6 66.5 13.2 6.2 12.4 368 150 3314 
Outer London 20.7 44.7 26.0 19.0 8.5 247 439 3246 
South East 18.2 38.1 29.2 25.0 6.6 170 527 3189 
South West 16.2 39.7 32.5 17.9 8.8 198 441 3239 
Wales 20.1 48.1 26.0 15.4 9.0 243 373 3245 
Northern Ireland 19.5 60.7 20.7 10.3 6.9 237 267 3276 
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It is clear from Table 7.1 that there is a great deal of variation between these 
regions in terms of income level and participation both before and after the 1998 
tuition fee reforms. In both time periods, areas such as the South East contain the 
highest proportions of high parental incomes, and the highest participation rates, 
while more deprived areas such as Greater Manchester contain high proportions 
of students from poor backgrounds, high grant entitlements, and low university 
participation rates. 
Before 1998, youths in Greater Manchester were eligible for grants of £1850 on 
average. Following the reforms, their grants were reduced to zero (though on 
average the value over 1998-2005 is £195 due to the grant of maximum £1050 
that was re-introduced in 2004), while average fees went up to £386 from zero 
pre-1998. 
Meanwhile, the South East, being a relatively well-off region, was eligible, on 
average, to grants of £1597 before the reforms, with no fees to pay. After 1998 
this region's grant entitlement was reduced to just £170 and fee obligations 
averaged £527 for the region. 
Such variation within region over income group and time assists the identification 
of the impact of HE finance — for example in estimating a fixed effects model, 
adding more variation in the explanatory variables improves the chances of 
identifying and removing effects which are constant over time, while still 
identifying the impact of time-variant variables. 
Thus, the approaches that follow involve creating a pseudo panel data set that 
exploits this variation in the variables of interest by region. Variation in 
participation, grants and fees by gender is also apparent (even though HE finance 
amounts do not vary by gender, random differences in the gender of youths will 
be associated with different parental incomes and hence HE finance amounts), 
and so gender is added as an additional layer of variation. Hence for each of the 
18 regions (16 in England, plus Northern Ireland and Wales) in the data, the data 
are averaged for all of the variables of interest by gender, income group 
(including those with missing parental incomes, making 4 income groups) and 
year to construct a pseudo panel data set. 
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The equation of interest then becomes: 
Prt = a + fl i Frgyt + IJ2Grgyt  + /33Lrgyt + yXrgyt + Tt f rgy Vrgyt  7.1  
= a + YZrgyt f r vrgyt 	 7.2 
Where Prgyt represents the mean participation rate in Higher Education in the 144 
regional groupings (18 English, Northern Irish and Welsh regions split by gender 
g (male or female) and income group y (low, medium, high or missing)) at time t 
(between 1992 and 2005). The remaining variables, aside from the error terms, 
are contained in Zrgyt, and are as described in Chapter 6, again at their mean levels 
within region, for each income and gender group, by year. 
Now, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity that is fixed over time is allowed 
for by region V), while vrgyt represents the usual random error component. 
The pseudo panel has 14 years of data (t=1992,1993, ....2005) and a potential 
regional sample size in each year of 144 (18 regions x 2 gender x 4 income 
groups) so potentially a sample size of 2016.56 
Because the data is now set up as a panel, there are a number of methodologies 
that can be deployed to control for unobserved heterogeneity. In the following 
sections, a number of specifications are tested based on equation 7.2 obtain 
estimates of the impact of loans, grants and fees on participation. 
Generally in the literature there are three common specifications for dealing with 
such unobserved heterogeneity at a panel level — random effect models (or multi-
level models), fixed effect models (or within group models), and first difference 
models. In all the approaches that follows, it is assumed that: 
E(Vrgyt) = 0;E(Zrgyt ,vrgyt )= 0 
	
7.3 
56 In practice, this sample size is not achieved as there are a number of empty cells due to limited 
sample sizes. In all the estimation that follows the estimates are weighted by the average cell sizes 
that the pseudo panel are based on. 
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i.e. the explanatory variables are not correlated with the error component vrgyt 
(though in some cases they may be correlated with the fixed component frgy) 
7.2.1 Random effects models 
Random effects models are often used in cases where the data being analyzed 
consists of observations in different levels (e.g. data such as this regional panel, 
where the observations are at a regional level, over time). 
In the random effects (multi-level) model, the unobserved fixed effect fr is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables57: 
E (Zrgyt, f rgy) = E(f rgy) = 0 	 7.4 
As above, random effects also assumes that the explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated with vrgyt, given frgy• 
In the random effects context, frgy can be thought to represent the deviation of the 
average of all participation at the rgyth region, gender and income group from the 
average participation in the whole population, while vrgyt represents the deviation 
of participation at time t from the average participation in that region, gender and 
income group. 
A key feature of random effects is that fgyr is put into the error term. Because of 
this, frgy appears in every time period (academic years in this case), so the result 
is there is likely to be dependence of the composite error term urgyt=frgy + vrgyr 
within region over time. 
As a result of the dependence of the composite error over time, OLS estimation of 
equation 7.2 will produce standard errors that are not correct or efficient. Random 
effects estimation corrects for this by taking account of the dependence of the 
composite error term using GLS. So, if the random effects assumptions hold, it is 
a more efficient model than the fixed effects that will be described below. 
57 For the models that follow, for simplicity, the constant is assumed to be contained within Z. 
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OLS could still be used, in this case, and correct standard errors obtained by 
calculating robust standard errors and by clustering at the regional level. The 
results of this Random Effects specification (which is equivalent to the corrected 
OLS specification) are contained in Table 7.2 alongside the results of the 
specifications explored below. 
7.2.2 Fixed effects models 
The key difference between the fixed and random effects model, is that the fixed 
effects model allows fro, to be correlated with Zrgyt i.e. fixed effects allows: 
E(Zrgyt, f rgy) # 0 	 7.5 
If the fixed effects assumption is true, (i.e. the unobserved fixed effect is 
correlated with the regressors), then the random-effects model will produce biased 
estimates of the causal impact of the variables of interest. The fixed effect model 
(or within group model) solves this problem by removing the impact of the 
unobserved fixed effect altogether. This is accomplished by transforming the 
main equation (equation 7.2) by averaging over time, t=1....T to obtain the cross 
section equation: 
lirgy = 2rgy + frgy + vrgy 	 7.6 
This Pr is the mean participation over time for regions 1...R, Zr contains the mean 
levels of each explanatory variable over time for regions 1-R, and so on. 
Equation 7.6 is then subtracted from equation 7.2, thus removing the impact of 
the unobserved fixed effect — i.e. the fixed effect is invariant over time so will be 
equal to its own mean over time and will drop out of the equation: 
Prgyt - Prgy = Y(Zrgyt - 2rgy) + (vrgyt - 'irgy) 	 7.7 
The fixed effects estimator is called the within estimator because it uses the time 
variation within each cross section (i.e. region, income and gender). The 
164 
information between regions has been removed in the de-meaning process, 
leaving just the differences that occur within regions (rather than in the random 
effects model, in which both the within and between-region effects are modeled). 
Since the fixed effects model is reliant upon variation over time within region 
(and income group and gender), it can only estimate the effects of variables that 
change over time. In this case, this should not be a problem, since, as previously 
described, there is a great deal of variation in all the variables by region and over 
time. 
For the fixed effects estimator in equation 7.7 to be unbiased, a requirement is 
that the Zrgv, in all periods are uncorrelated with the vrgy, in all periods, that is that 
the Zrgyt are strictly exogenous. 
As described, the key consideration between Random Effects and Fixed Effects is 
whether the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the regressors — i.e. does 
E(Zrgyt, f rgy) = 0 . In the case where E(Zrgyt, f rgy) = 0 random effects is the 
more efficient model, so should be used. However, since Fixed Effects is 
consistent when fro, and Zrgyt are correlated, but Random Effects is inconsistent, 
a statistically significant difference between the two is evidence against Random 
Effects. 
The Hausman test can be used to test this — results of the fixed effects 
specification and the Hausman test are again presented in Table 7.2. (note, 
limitations of the Hausman test will also be discussed in Section 7.3). 
7.2.3 First difference models 
An approach which again involves removing the unobserved fixed effect is to use 
a first difference model. In this case, instead of taking the mean effect away as in 
fixed effects, the lag of each variable is removed from the main equation (7.2), 
thus estimating: 
Prgyt Prgyt-1 = Y(Zrgyt Zrgyt-1) (Vrgyt Vrgyt-1) 
	
7.8 
APrgyt = YAZrgyt "rgyt 
	
7.9 
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Again, because of its time invariant nature, fro, is the same in every time period, 
so subtracting its lag will successfully remove it (as was the case with the fixed 
effect model). Again, the Zrgyt must vary over time, otherwise they too will be 
differenced away. 
Again, first differencing specifications assume exogeneity of Zrgyt - i.e. that the 
explanatory variables are not correlated with vrgyt. However, in this case, for 
consistent estimates it is necessary only to assume that (vrgyt — vrgy 1 is t-i, 
uncorrelated with (Zgyrt — Zrgyt_i). This is a much weaker assumption than the 
strict exogeneity assumption of the fixed effect estimator. (with strict exogeneity, 
explanatory variables can't depend on past, current or future values of the error 
term, meaning there can be no lagged dependent variables in Zrgyt.) 
Note to get correct standard errors when estimating the first difference 
specification (which is simply OLS on equation 7.8), it is again necessary to use 
robust standard errors and cluster at the regional level. 
First difference models often suffer from autocorrelation in the errors. If the errors 
are found to be suffering from autocorrelation, first difference will be inefficient, 
in which case it is preferable to use the Fixed Effects method. First difference 
estimations are also shown in Table 7.2 with accompanying tests for 
autocorrelation in the residuals. 
7.2.4 Dynamic models 
All the pseudo panel data approaches that have been discussed so far assume that 
participation in Higher Education is a static rather than a dynamic process. 
But it is conceivable that regional participation in HE may depend on 
participation rates in previous years, or that policy changes in one year may not 
only affect contemporaneous HE participation rates but may also affect 
participation rates in the future. For example, the announcement of the 1998 
policy reforms may have reduced the likelihood of 18-19 year old school leavers 
undertaking a gap years in 1997, because to do would mean they would start 
university in September 1998 and thus incur the up-front fee, whereas if they 
went straight into HE in 1997 they would not. A further possibility is that grant 
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and levels in year t-1 may affect participation in year t if there is a delayed 
response to information. So far, all the models have ignored these potential 
dynamics. 
If there are these dynamics operating, the OLS estimator (or random effects 
estimator) and the fixed effect estimators will be biased. 
So, the final approach involves estimating a flexible dynamic equation, based on: 
Prt = Prgyt-1 + yZrgyt f rgy Vrgyt 	 7.10 
Where lagged values of participation are now included alongside the set of 
explanatory variables. 
As usual, first differences are taken to remove fr,  , giving: 
APrgyt = I10Prgyt-1+ Y _ AZrgyt + Avrgyt 7.11 
Or 
APrgyt = il(Prgyt-1 -  Prgyt-2) + 13(Zrgyt Zrgyt-1) + (Vrgyt vrgyt-1) 
7.12 
Normally (i.e. if the model were in levels), this model could be identified as long 
as E(P rgyt-1, Vrgyt) = 0. Since we are using repeated cross-section rather than 
longitudinal data, in this case Prgyt_i is not correlated with Vrgyt_i, meaning this 
equation can be estimated using OLS or Fixed Effects estimators. In this case, 
Fixed Effects estimators are used. 
It may also be desirable to introduce more dynamics, extending 7.12 to include 
lagged values of fees and grants (this could also potentially contain lagged values 
of loans) as explanatory variables: 
APrgyt = 1APrgyt-1+ PlOAFrgyt + /3200Grgyt + 1J110Frgyt-1 + 
P210Frgyt-1+ /32111Grgyt-1 + YAXrgyt + Avrgyt 	 7.13 
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Where Xrgyt contains all explanatory variables from Zrgyt other than those of fee 
and grant amounts described above. Here, the assumption is that grants in 
previous years as well as current years could affect current participation rates. So 
for example, a shock increase in grants in one year may affect youth's likeliness 
to participate in the following year. Or as explained above, it may be that grant 
levels in year t are impacted by participation rates in year t-/ etc. 
A number of these specifications are tested with the preferred specification 
included in Table 7.2 for comparison with the other models, and with appropriate 
tests for validity of this model. 
7.3 The impact of HE reforms on participation — panel level 
results 
The results of the specifications described above are presented in Sections 7.3.1 
and 7.3.2 below, firstly using the composite net costs variable, and then moving 
on to look at grants and fees separately. 
7.3.1 Results for net upfront costs variable 
Looking first at the upfront costs variable, in each case, other than with the first-
difference model, a significant negative effect is found. Estimates vary between -
0.019 (suggesting a £1000 increase in net costs results in a 1.9 percentage point 
decline in participation) for random effects to -0.056 for the dynamic 
specification. 
The OLS specification is, by definition, identical to the RE specification so only 
one is shown. 
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Table 7.2 Probability of Attending a University Degree Course given £1000 of net 
costs; Static and Dynamic Regional Panel Models  
(1) 
OLS/RE 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
FD 
(4) 
Dynamic 
net costs -0.019 -0.030 -0.058 -0.025 
(0.008)* (0.008)** (0.018)** (0.000)** 
parental income 0.002 0.001 0.00 0.001 
(0.001)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)** 
white -0.054 -0.098 -0.091 -0.109 
(0.021)* (0.035)** (0.041)* (0.038)** 
GCSE 0.249 0.215 0.209 0.19 
(0.028)** (0.027)** (0.038)** (0.029)** 
father, NVQ Level 2-31 -0.073 -0.057 -0.069 -0.041 
(0.031)* (0.028)* (0.042) (0.031) 
father, NVQ Level <2 -0.087 -0.060 -0.078 -0.045 
(0.032)** (0.028)* (0.037)** (0.029) 
mother, NVQ Level 2-3 -0.097 -0.095 -0.097 -0.077 
(0.045)* (0.033)** (0.062) (0.036)** 
mother, NVQ Level <2 -0.107 -0.091 -0.0634 -0.080 
(0.038)** (0.029)** (0.052) (0.031)** 
unemployment rate 0.003 0.010 0.00 0.009 
(0.001)** (0.003)** (0.000) (0.003)** 
Pt-1 -0.074 
(0.025)** 
Pt-2 -0.103 
(0.025)** 
Constant 2,338.5 1,289.2 836.1081 894.056 
(877.4)** (1,069.6) (1011.3) (1543.9) 
Observations 1950 1950 1756 1582 
R-squared 0.33 0.13 
Time trend (lin & non-lin) Y Y Y Y 
Number of groups 144 144 1442 
Reject v 
FE 
Hausman Test (RE v FE) (p=0.02) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
11n each case, omitted category is "parent educated to >NVQ level 4" 
2 Number of instruments=141 
In order to test for the preferred specification, a number of criteria can be used. To 
test between Fixed effects (FE) and Random effects (RE), as previously 
mentioned, the Hausman test can be used. As explained, the fundamental 
difference between FE and RE is that FE allows frgy to be correlated with Zrgyt 
while RE does not. Therefore if frgy and Zrgyt are correlated, the RE model will 
give inconsistent results, but the FE estimator will always give consistent results. 
The Hausman test is simply a test of whether frgy and Zrgyt are correlated. The 
two estimators are therefore compared, and a significant difference between the 
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two indicates that frgy and Zrgyt are correlated. If this is the case FE should be 
used. 
The results of the Hausman test are below: 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(16) = 30.06 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0177 
Since the null is rejected, there is a significant difference between FE and RE, 
suggesting that the FE specification is preferred to the RE (and OLS) 
specification. It is worth pointing out though, that as discussed above, the 
Hausman test is simply a test of whether the coefficients from the RE and FE 
models are different. However, in this case the FE model would seem to be the 
more appropriate choice, since net costs are unlikely to be exogenous — as 
previously discussed, the values of grants, loans and fees are linked to parental 
income, which may be driven by parental motivation, a factor also affecting 
youth's participation. Therefore, the FE model would seem to be a more 
preferable option in this case. 
Looking also at the other models, the First-Difference (FD) model does not find a 
significant impact of net costs on participation. However, the hypothesis of no 
first order serial correlation is rejected, as is common with first difference models, 
suggesting first difference is less efficient and again the fixed effects model is the 
preferred model. 
In terms of the dynamic specification, a number of specifications were tested, 
with results largely similar, regardless of lags of dependent and explanatory 
variables included in the specification (see Appendix 7). Table 7.2 (and equation 
7.16 below) shows the specification with two lags of participation, though these 
were not found to be significant: 
6` Prgyt = ilaPrgyt-1 + I2aPrgyt-2 + Wrgyt + "rgyt 	 7.14 
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AR tests reject the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation in the 
differenced residuals, but do not reject the null hypothesis of no second-order 
autocorrelation. First-order autocorrelation does not imply that the estimates are 
inconsistent, but second-order autocorrelation would imply this. 
It is worth pointing out that, given the dynamic nature of the model, the dynamic 
coefficients displayed in Table 7.2 describe short-run effects of net costs on 
participation. Long-run effects can be computed by transforming 7.16 so that 
Pnet costs  frnet costs = 1-11-12 
This results in the following: 
7.15 
irnet costs = - 0.058** (se=0.017) 
Which is very similar to the long-run effect of net costs, of -0.056, suggesting that 
the long-run effects of HE finance on participation are roughly similar to effects 
occurring in the short-run. 
Nevertheless, since there appear to be no significant effects of lagged 
participation or lagged net costs, it would appear that a static model is sufficient. 
Therefore, the preferred specification in this instance is the Fixed Effects model. 
The results indicate that a £1,000 increase in overall net upfront costs faced by a 
school-leaver induces a 3 percentage point decrease in his / her likeliness to 
undertake a university degree. This figure is quite different from the individual-
level specification estimate in Section 6.3.1, being significantly lower than the 
OLS estimate, and somewhat lower than the Probit model. Reassuringly, the 
panel data estimate appears to be in line with effects found in other studies of this 
nature (see Table 4.1). McPherson and Shapiro find an effect of 2.7 percentage 
point decrease in 2006 US dollars, and Kane (1995) finds a $1000 decrease in net 
costs to result in a 3.2 percentage point decrease in participation. This suggests 
the 3 percentage point figure here is slightly lower than the results above, 
depending on exchange rates, but may be a more credible estimate than that 
generated by the individual-level data suggesting that there were indeed issues 
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with this estimation, such as those of endogeneity and measurement error, as 
described in Section 6.4. 
Again, elasticities are computed for each income group to establish whether 
upfront costs have a different effect by income group. The results are shown 
below: 
Table 7.3 Elasticity of demand for university with respect to net costs (FE model) 
Income group: 
Variable All Low Med High 
(P=0.159) (P=0.114) (P=0.166) (P=0.31) 
Net costs -0.54** -0.98** -0.52** -0.14** 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Here, in each case, a 1% increase in net costs results in a less than 1% decrease in 
participation. The results are intuitive in terms of income group, with net costs 
having the biggest impact for low income groups (almost a 1% drop in 
participation generated by a 1% increase in costs), and the least impact for high 
income groups. Similar to the individual model in Chapter 6, this suggests 
different income groups respond differently to changes in net costs. However, it is 
important to note that these elasticities are, obviously, generated purely by the 
model specification, and are limited in this sense. It would be far preferable to 
interact net costs with parental income group in the model, but this is not possible 
since there are not sufficient observations in the panel model. 
7.3.2 Results for grants and fees estimated separately 
Moving on to look at the results for grants and fees separately, again significant 
effects are found for all specifications except for the first-difference specification, 
as shown in Table 7.4 below. 
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Table 7.4 Probability of Attending a University Degree Course given £1000 of grants and 
fees; Static and Dynamic Regional Panel Models  
(1) 
OLS/RE 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
FD 
(4) 
Dynamic 
0.016 0.032 0.055 0.022 
(0.008) (0.009)** (0.017)** (0.011)* 
-0.029 -0.048 -0.049 -0.039 
(0.012)* (0.014)** (0.026)*** (0.012)** 
0.021 0.052 0.084 0.047 
(0.012) (0.014)** (0.020)* (0.014)** 
0.002 0.005 0.001 0.002 
(0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)* 
-0.055 -0.098 -0.090 -0.11 
(0.021)* (0.035)** (0.041)** (0.038)** 
0.251 0.219 0.20 0.19 
(0.028)** (0.027)** (0.038)** (0.028)** 
-0.074 -0.058 -0.068 -0.042 
(0.031)* (0.028)* (0.042) (0.031) 
-0.090 -0.058 -0.073 -0.045 
(0.032)** (0.028)* (0.037)* (0.029) 
-0.098 -0.097 -0.097 -0.081 
(0.045)* (0.033)** (0.063) (0.036)* 
-0.109 -0.094 -0.06 -0.085 
(0.038)** (0.029)** (0.052) (0.031)** 
0.003 0.011 0.000 0.011 
(0.001)** (0.003)** (0.000) (0.003)** 
-0.078 
(0.025)** 
-0.103 
(0.025)** 
2,707.091 2,453.246 1937.494 3174.381 
(955.9)** (1,215.8)* (1110.9)* (1823.6)* 
Y Y Y Y 
1950 1950 1756 1582 
0.33 0.13 
144 144 1442 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
In each case, omitted category is "parent educated to >NVQ level 4" 
2 Number of instruments=141 
Again, the preferred model is found to be the Fixed Effects model. 
The Hausman test rejects RE at the 1% level (p=0.01), (and furthermore, as 
explained in Section 7.3.1 the dependent variables are believed to be endogenous) 
and again the first difference model, which gives significantly different results to 
the FE model, fails to identify the impact of tuition fees. 
The results of the dynamic specification in Column 4 are quite similar to those of 
the FE model. 
grant 
fee 
loan 
parental income 
white 
GCSE 
father, NVQ Level 2-31 
father, NVQ Level <2 
mother, NVQ Level 2-3 
mother, NVQ Level <2 
unemployment rate 
Pt-1 
Pt-2 
Constant 
Time trend (lin & n-lin) 
Observations 
R-squared 
Number of groups 
Reject v 
FE 
Hausman Test (RE v FE) 
	 (p=0.01) 
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The long-run coefficients for the Dynamic model are below: 
lrf e„ = - 0.036** (se=0.014) 
Irgrants— 0.021** (se=0.011) 
Again, implying that the long and short run effects of increases in grants and fees 
are very similar. 
So, again the preferred specification is the FE model, though there is some 
evidence that the dynamic model may also be relevant. The results imply that a 
£1000 increase in fees results in a 4.8 percentage point decrease in participation, 
whilst a £1000 increase in grants leads to a 3.2 percentage point increase in 
participation. The results also imply, (assuming a zero discount rate, as previously 
discussed), that a £1000 increase in loans leads to a 5.2 percentage point increase 
in participation. 
These results, particularly for grants and loans, are somewhat different to those 
estimated on individual-level data — the coefficient on grants has now reduced 
from 0.063 (Probit) to 0.032, and the loan coefficient from 0.107 to 0.052 
suggesting there may have been issues with the individual-level specification as 
discussed. 
By comparison with other studies that identified separate impacts of grants and 
fees, the panel-level results compare reasonably well. 
Kane (1994) finds a $1000 increase in fees decreases participation by 3 
percentage points in US dollars versus the panel-level decrease of 4.8 percentage 
points for a £1000 increase found in this thesis. Kane thus finds a quite similar 
(though slightly higher) impact of up-front fees, again depending on exchange 
rates. Kane finds no impact for grants, though Dynarski finds that $1000 extra in 
grants induces a 3 percentage point increase in participation (in US dollars) —
somewhat higher than the finding of 3.2 percentage points from this model. 
Looking at results by income group, again, in the absence of interactions of fees 
and grants by income group due to small sample sizes, but in the context of 
relative participation and HE finance obligations of different income groups, 
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elasticities are presented below (again with the caveat that these results are 
imposed by the model, rather than obtained by interacting fees and grants by 
income group). 
Table 7.5 Elasticity of demand with respect to fees and grants: FE model 
Income group: 
Variable All Low Med High 
(P=0.159) (P=0.114) (P=0.166) (P=0.31) 
Fees -0.08** - -0.10** -0.11** 
Grants 0.14** 0.36** 0.15** - 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The elasticities indicate that fees and grants have quite a small impact on 
participation across the board. Fees are found to have a similar impact for both 
medium and high income students, while grants have a much larger impact for 
low income students than medium. 
Finally, it is interesting to see how each model predicts participation. Figure 7.1-
Figure 7.3 show the predicted versus actual participation rates for the preferred 
Fixed Effects model, as well as the Random Effects and dynamic models. 
The Fixed Effects and Random Effects models seem to perform similarly. 
Interestingly, both seem unable to predict the dip in participation seen in 2002, 
though the dynamic specification somewhat picks this up (with something of a 
lag), suggesting the inclusion of dynamics in the model may be worthwhile. 
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Figure 7.1 Actual versus predicted university degree participation rate, FEModel 
Figure 7.2 Actual versus predicted university degree participation rate, RE Model 
Figure 7.3 Actual versus predicted university degree participation rate, Dynamic model 
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So far, this analysis has not taken into account the actual fee, grant and loan 
amounts awarded over the years since 1992, and how the major reforms may have 
altered individual participation rates as a result. 
The next stage in this strand of the thesis is to contextualise these results in terms 
of fee obligation and financial support available to individuals from different 
income backgrounds over the period following the major 1998 reforms. By doing 
so it will be possible to better understand the actual impact on participation of the 
reforms. 
7.4 Estimating the overall impact of the reforms compared to a 
counterfactual 
7.4.1 Contextualising the 1998/99 reforms 
The aim of this next section is to contextualise the results of the preferred Fixed 
Effects specification, by using the coefficients on grants and fees to estimate the 
impact of the 1998/99 reforms. So, rather than just observe what happened to 
participation after the reforms the aim is to calculate the impact of introducing 
tuition fees and abolishing grants, compared to what would have happened had 
these reforms not taken place — i.e. had grants not been abolished and tuition fees 
not been introduced. 
In order to do this, it is necessary to create counterfactual values of grants and 
fees assuming they had continued along the same trend as before the reforms. 
Since maintenance loans were also changing during this time period, and have a 
significant impact on participation, it will be important to control for loan 
amounts in the analysis. Thus, counterfactual values for these are also calculated. 
In order to do this grants, fees and loans are regressed on a time trend and the 
usual set of controls for each of the three income groups separately (see equation 
7.18 below) , thus creating estimates of the average value for each of grants, fees 
and loans, for each income group post 1998, had there been no reforms. 
Git = a + yXit + Pr + tt + Eit 	 7.16 
Equation 7.18 is estimated separately for each income group, and for each of 
loans, grants and fees. Here, for example, Git represents grant eligibility, Xtt 
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includes the usual set of controls, pr are regional dummies, and Tt represents the 
usual time trend interacted with income group (see equation 6.6) as well as 
dummies to capture the 1998/99 reforms, including a dummy taking the value of 
1 if the individual is eligible for academic years from 1998-2003 and a 0 
otherwise, this dummy interacted with a time trend, and a final dummy for 1999 
academic year, to capture the abolition of grants in this time period. 
These values are estimated for the period up to 2004, at which point further 
reforms took place involving the re-instatement of grants. The resulting created 
counterfactual values are in Table 7.6, alongside their actual values, and those 
pre-1998. By way of illustration, counterfactual vs actual grants and loans for 
medium income students are displayed in Figures 7.4 and 7.5 respectively 
(obviously, counterfactual values for fees are zero for all income groups). 
Table 7.6 Average loans, grants and fees, pre and post reforms, and counterfactual (Es, 2006 
prices) 
1992-1997 
actual 
1998/9-20031 
actual 
1998-2003 
counterfactual 
Low income 
Grant 
Fee 
Loan 
2455 
0 
1382 
0 
0 
3398 
1077 
0 
2492 
Medium income 
Grant 1631 0 602 
Fee 0 620 0 
Loan 1408 3338 2472 
High income 
Grant 0 0 0 
Fee 0 1200 0 
Loan 1461 2649 2541 
'for students with a partial or full grant, a small amount of grant was still available in 1998, but on 
average the figure over 1998-2003 is close to zero. 
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Figure 7.4 Actual and counterfactual values for grants; medium income students 
Figure 7.5 Actual and counterfactual values for loans; medium income students 
So looking at medium income groups, for example, grants were on a clear 
downward trend over the 1990's — so the counterfactual of what would have 
happens, predicts that grants continued on this downward trend (note, that the step 
change in 1998, when grants were halved is not taken into account here, so that 
the prediction effectively takes place after 1999 for grants). In terms of loans for 
medium income groups, as the chart illustrates, loans were on a relatively upward 
trend, before being raised significantly at the same time as fees were introduced. 
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So the counterfactual prediction is that this upward trend would have continued, 
though without the large increase in 1998. 
Note, the counterfactual for fees is obviously always zero, since the aim is to 
explain what would have happened had there been no introduction of fees. 
Low income and high income groups (not shown graphically) largely follow the 
same pattern — for low income groups, grants are assumed to have continued to 
decrease in value, and loans continued to increase. For high income groups, loans 
are predicted to have carried on increasing. 
Thus, low income groups therefore lost £1077 in grants — since grants were 
predicted to be at £1077 on average from 1998-2003; medium income groups lost 
£602 in grants and gained £620 in fees, and high income groups gained £1200 in 
fees. As discussed, students from all income groups experienced changes in loan 
amounts. 
The next step, then, is to use these values in conjunction with the coefficients 
from the preferred model in Section 7.3.2 to calculate participation rates after 
1998 — imagining the reforms had not taken place and grants and fees took their 
counterfactual values. The generated participation rates are then compared with 
the participation rates predicted by the model using the real levels of grants and 
fees after 1998, and the difference is estimated. As discussed, it is also important 
to control for maintenance loan amounts, which also changed over the same 
period. 
Since the FE model was the preferred model after selection, the results are 
presented for this model. However, as mentioned, there may be dynamics at play 
in university demand, so the coefficients from the dynamic model are also used in 
the estimation. 
So, the "policy on — policy off" effect is estimated for each income group for the 
Fixed Effects and dynamic specifications, in Table 7.7 below. The results for both 
specifications are similar. 
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Table 7.7 — Predicted effect of policy change 
( policy on — policy off) on 
average participation rates over 1998-200358 
Predicted effect of 1998 
reforms using: 
Dynamic 
Income group 
low income 
medium income 
high income 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The results in this table can be interpreted as the change in participation over the 
period 1998-2003 compared to what it would have been had there been no 
reforms. So, low income students appear to have experienced no significant 
impact of the reforms. That is, the removal of maintenance grants over the period 
of 1998/99 — 1999/00 did not significantly alter their participation behaviour — the 
complete withdrawal of grants does not appear to have reduced participation of 
low income youths. 
Medium income students' participation rates similarly appear to have not been 
impacted by the loss of grants and partial fee they became eligible for in 1998 — a 
slight negative impact is found, but is not significant. 
High income students, however, do appear to experience a decrease in 
participation compared to what would have happened, had tuition fees not been 
brought in, in 1998/99. The estimate is between -0.052 and -0.042, depending on 
the specification chosen. This indicates that high income students' participation 
rates were between 5.2 and 4.2 percentage points lower on average over the 
period 1999-2003 than what they would have been in the case of no reforms. 
Given that participation rates for high income students were around 33% in 2003, 
this seems like a relatively small shift, but nevertheless implies a victory for those 
wishing to narrow the socio-economic gap in participation. 
58 This is accomplished using STATA's lincom command 
FE model model 
0.013 0.018 
(0.008) (0.007) 
-0.004 0.004 
(0.011) (0.12) 
-0.052 -0.042 
(0.017)** (0.018)* 
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In all, these results seem somewhat surprising, given the general consensus that 
high income students are relatively immune to changes in HE finance, whilst low 
income students are most vulnerable. 
However, it is important to note that loan amounts were also changing over the 
period of the reforms. 
So, to understand how the different elements of HE finance impact each income 
group separately, the overall effects are now broken down into the separate effects 
for each income group. The results of this decomposition are illustrated in Table 
7.8, again for both the FE and Dynamic models. 
Table 7.8 Decomposing the effect of the policy change: Predicted effect on average 
participation rates over 1998-2003  
(1) 
Predicted 
effect of 1998 
reforms 
(2) 
Marginal 
effect of grant 
change 
(3) 
Marginal 
effect of fee 
change 
(4) 
Marginal 
effect of loan 
change 
0.013 -0.034 - 0.047 
(0.008) (0.01)** (0.013)** 
-0.004 -0.019 -0.030 0.045 
(0.011) (0.006)** (0.009)** (0.012)** 
-0.053 -0.058 0.006 
(0.017)** (0.017)** (0.002)** 
0.018 -0.023 0.042 
(0.007) (0.012)** (0.012)** 
0.004 -0.013 -0.023 0.040 
(0.014) (0.007)** (0.010)** (0.012)** 
-0.042 -0.047 0.005 
(0.019)* (0.019)** (0.002)** 
FE model 
low income 
medium income 
high income 
Dynamic model 
low income 
medium income 
high income 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 	 * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The decompositions in Table 7.8 above paint an interesting picture about the 
separate effects of the reforms experienced by each income group. 
Column 1 shows the overall impact of the reforms, as described in Table 7.7., 
while columns 2-4 show the overall impact is decomposed, illustrating the 
marginal effects of the changes in HE finance; i.e. the effect of a £1077 drop in 
grants (from £1077 to zero) for low income students; a £602 drop in grants and a 
£620 increase in fees for medium income students; and a £1200 increase in fees 
for high income students (as reported in Table 7.6). 
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For low income students, the decrease in grants they experienced as a result of the 
reforms had a significant negative impact — abolishing grants resulted in 
participation being 3.4 percentage points lower than it would have been, as 
described in Column 2. This itself is a striking result, since no other UK study has 
been able to quantify the effects of the abolition of grants in 1998-1999. However, 
going on to look at Column 4, low income students also experienced an increase 
in loans over the same period, and this appears to have had a positive effect on 
participation. While, for reasons previously stated, it is not possible to untangle 
the positive effects of loans (as a liquidity tool) from their negative effects (as 
future debt), it does appear that the increase in maintenance loan eligibility 
counteracted the negative impact of the decrease in grants. Indeed, if all youths 
were assumed to have a zero discount rate so that the upfront value of loans was 
their only concern, the conclusion would be that the increase in loan eligibility 
given to low income students completely counteracted the decrease in grants; 
once loans are controlled for, no change is apparent in participation of low-
income students as a result of the reforms. The results are similar for the dynamic 
specification. 
For medium income students, similar to low income students, the individual 
elements of the reforms are all significant. As with low income students, medium 
income students also experienced a loss in grants (though this loss was less than 
for low income students) which also had a negative impact on their participation 
rates to the tune of 1.9 percentage points — as shown in Column 2. But medium 
income students also experienced an increase in fees, the impact of which is 
shown in Column 3. This had a significant negative effect, inducing participation 
to be 3 percentage points lower than the counterfactual. Again, this result is 
important, and implies that the policy of introducing upfront fees in 1998 resulted 
in participation levels being below their potential for these students. However, 
again once maintenance loan increases are controlled for (as shown in Column 4), 
the net result is no significant change in participation of medium income students, 
compared to the counterfactual. This again suggests that loans play an important 
role as a tool in maintaining participation rates in the face of increased upfront 
costs. 
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High income students, while enduring no loss in grants, experienced the biggest 
increase in fees as a result of the reforms. The impact of the £1200 increase was 
that participation for this group was 5.8 percentage points lower than it would 
have been (according to the FE specification) had the reforms not taken place. 
Again, this is a striking result, and the main driver of the overall reduction in 
participation of 5.3 percentage points (again using the FE specification) compared 
to what would have been. 
In summary then, the increased costs of university participation imposed in 
1998/99, while reducing participation of high income groups, did not appear to 
sacrifice the goal of widening participation of low income groups. 
7.4.2 Contextualising the 2000 and 2001 reforms in Scotland 
The coefficients from the Fixed Effects model also allow further analysis of the 
Scottish reforms which were examined in Chapter 6 using difference-in-
difference analysis. 
As discussed, although the difference-in-difference analysis revealed no 
significant change in Scottish participation compared to the English 
counterfactual after the abolition of fees in 2000 and the re-introduction of grants 
in 2001, this may be because of changes in loan eligibility amounts in Scotland 
which occurred at the same time. 
Using the counterfactual approach, it is now possible to examine the changes in 
Scotland versus the Scottish counterfactual — i.e. again creating counterfactual 
values of grants and fees — and obviously loans — in Scotland for the post reform 
periods, based on levels before the Scottish reforms, and comparing participation 
rates predicted by the true levels of grants, fees and loans versus the 
counterfactual. In this case, given the similarity of the results of the FE and 
dynamic models, only the FE model is used here, for simplicity. 
However, before this can be done, it is necessary to re-estimate the FE model with 
the inclusion of the two Scottish regions in the panel, in order to obtain results 
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true for Scotland.59 (In this case, given the similarity of the results of the FE and 
dynamic models, for simplicity only the FE model is used here.) This is also an 
interesting test of robustness of the specification. The re-estimated FE model is 
shown in Table 7.9 below with the estimates from the model not including 
Scotland shown alongside for ease of comparison. Reassuringly, the estimates for 
grants and fees are very similar with the inclusion of Scotland. 
Table 7.9 Probability of Attending a University Degree Course given £1000 of loans, grants 
and fees; Fixed Effects models with and without Scottish regions  
grant 
fee 
loan 
parental income 
white 
GCSE 
father, NVQ Level 2-31 
father, NVQ Level <2 
mother, NVQ Level 2-3 
mother, NVQ Level <2 
unemployment rate 
Constant 
Observations 
Number of groups 
R-squared 
FE (inc Scotland) FE (not inc Scotland) 
0.029 0.032 
(0.01)** (0.009)** 
-0.043 -0.048 
(0.013)** (0.014)** 
0.043 0.052 
(0.012)** (0.014)** 
0.001 0.005 
(0.000)* (0.000) 
-0.115 -0.098 
(0.035)** (0.035)** 
0.212 0.219 
(0.025)** (0.027)** 
-0.059 -0.058 
(0.027)* (0.028)* 
-0.066 -0.058 
(0.027)* (0.028)* 
-0.071 -0.097 
(0.031)* (0.033)** 
-0.081 -0.094 
(0.028)** (0.029)** 
0.003 0.011 
(0.002) (0.003)** 
2,629.126 0.052 
(1,136.440)* (0.014)** 
2170 0.032 
160 (0.009)** 
0.13 -0.048 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
	 * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
'In each case, omitted category is "parent educated to >NVQ level 4" 
To recap, the reforms in Scotland were as follows: 
59 Note, it is not possible to estimate this model with only Scotland since there are only 2 Scottish 
regions meaning sample sizes would be inadequate. 
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In 2000, tuition fees were abolished for high income students (here, defined as 
those with parental incomes above £40,000 in 2006 prices) resulting in a net gain 
of £1200 for these students. 
In 2001, maintenance grants were re-instated for low income students (those with 
parental incomes below £17,000), resulting in them being over £2000 better off. 
However, in both cases, maintenance loans were reduced simultaneously. 
Again, counterfactual rates of fees, grants and loans are created for Scotland 
before and after 2000, and 2001 in the same manner as described in Section 7.4.1. 
These are described below in Table 7.10. 
Table 7.10 Average loans, grants and fees, pre and post Scottish reforms, and counterfactual 
(is, 2006 prices) 
High income (fees abolished) 
1998-1999 
actual 
2000-2005 
actual 
2000-2005 
counterfactual 
Grant - - 
Fee 1200 0 1200 
Loan 2363 1350 2500 
1999-2000 2001-2003' 2001-2003 
Low income (grants restored) actual actual counterfactual 
Grant 0 2150 0 
Fee - - 
Loan 3475 1946 3533 
this time period is used for ease of comparison with difference-in-difference model, in which 
English counterfactual was only valid up to 2003. 
Table 7.10 illustrates the changes in Scotland. Firstly looking at high income 
students, fees went down from £1200 to zero, so the counterfactual here is a fee of 
£1200. However, at the same time, loans were also reduced — falling from over 
£2000 in the old system, to a maximum for high income students of just £1400 in 
2004 for students with parental incomes above £45,000 and only £800 for those 
with parental incomes above £50,000 (see Appendix 6). 
So, even though high income students in Scotland benefitted from a saving of 
£1200 a year, their access to cheap maintenance loans was cut dramatically, 
which may have had an impact on their participation decision making. 
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As can be seen in Table 7.11, the abolition of fees in Scotland had a significant 
positive impact on participation of high income students — inducing university 
enrolment rates to be 5.2 percentage points higher than they would have been (on 
average from 2000-2005). However, again looking at Column 4, it appears that 
the large decrease in loans experienced by these students may have affected 
participation levels negatively (again with the caveat that this parameter may 
include confounding effects of debt and liquidity) meaning that overall, no 
significant effect of the reforms is apparent, compared to the counterfactual of 
what would have been. This result is therefore in line with the findings of the 
difference-in-difference approach which also found no significant change in 
participation — as shown in Column 5. 
For low income students who had their grants restored, a similar story is evident. 
Again looking at Table 7.10, even though these students had grants restored in 
2001, thus benefitting from a £2150 improvement in their finances, they also 
faced a sharp decrease in loans available to them. 
So, the increase in grants experienced by this group appears to have had a 
significant positive effect — participation of low income groups was 6.4 
percentage points higher than it would have been, (on average, over the four years 
of 2001-2005) had there been no grants — this is shown in Column 2 of Table 
7.11. 
But the drop in loans experienced by this group again appears to have had some 
sort of counteracting effect. Once the impact of loans is controlled for in the 
model, the net overall impact of these reforms is zero — there is no significant 
improvement in Scottish low income students' participation rates, as Column 1 
illustrates. Again these results are found to be in line with the difference-in-
difference outcome of no impact, shown in Column 5. 
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Table 7.11 Predicted effect of policy change (policy on — policy off) on average participation 
rates after major Scottish reforms; decomposed by loans, grants and fees 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Predicted Marginal Predicted 
effect of effect of Marginal Marginal impact from 
2000/2001 grant effect of fee effect of D in D 
reforms change change loan change 
high income 	 0.003 	 - 	 0.052 	 -0.049 	 0.031 
	
(-0.015) 	 (0.016)** 	 (0.013)** 	 (0.068) 
low income 	 -0.004 	 0.064 	 -0.068 	 -0.023 
	
(-0.012) 	 (0.019)** 	 (0.018)** 	 (0.033) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 	 * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
These results imply that using difference-in-difference analysis is not a 
particularly viable option in this case, though it does provide a useful sanity check 
against the analysis above. It is unfortunate, though, that the Scottish reforms 
were again a mixture of positive and negative changes in loans, grants and fees. 
7.4.3 Contextualising the 2004 reforms in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland 
The 2004 reforms in England, Wales and Northern Ireland are the most 
straightforward to analyse. The reforms concerned the reintroduction of £1050 
grants to low income students (in this case, those with incomes less than 
£16,000). This was the only change in circumstances for this group — their 
maintenance loans remained unchanged at around £3000 before and after the 
reforms (the before period being 1999-2003 and the after period being 2004-
2005). Therefore the counterfactual is easy to construct — the test is simply what 
would have happened had grants not been restored, and remained at zero after 
2004. 
Table 7.12 illustrates the findings, again using the coefficients obtained in the 
Fixed Effects model to determine the difference between the actual and 
counterfactual participation rates. Since there is only one element of HE finance 
being altered, the total figure represents the impact of the restoration of grants. 
The result is positive and significant — i.e. the restoration of grants resulted in 
participation of low income students being 3.2 percentage points higher than it 
would have been had grants not been restored. 
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In terms of comparison with the difference-in-difference results, as seen in 
Section 6.2.4, the difference-in-difference which used high income students as a 
control group failed to find a significant uplift for poor students. However, in 
proportionate terms, (i.e. comparing percentage uplift in the treatment and control 
groups rather than the absolute), the difference-in-difference uncovered a similar 
impact compared to this model — an uplift of 2.3 percentage points in participation 
compared to had there been no grant increase. 
Table 7.12 Predicted effect of policy change (policy on — policy off) on average participation 
rates after 2004 restoration of grants in England, Wales & NI 
 
(1) 	 (2) 	 (3) 
Predicted impact 
Predicted effect of 	 from D in D (non 
2004 reforms 	 Predicted impact from D in D 	 parametric)  
0.032 	 -0.003 	 0.023 
(0.009)** 	 (0.017) 	 n/a  
Income < £16k 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
In this case, the conclusion is somewhat mixed, though there is certainly evidence 
to imply that the restoration of grants in 2004 was beneficial for poor students. 
Again, the methodology employed here of creating a counterfactual for low 
income students, rather than using high income students as a control group seems 
more appropriate, since high income students have such different participation 
patterns. 
7.4.4 The impact of the 2006 top up fees in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland 
Finally, it is of interest to examine the impact of the 2006 introduction of top-up-
fees in England and Northern Ireland. As described in Chapter 2, in 2006, upfront 
fees were abolished and replaced with a £3000 deferred fee — in other words, the 
new, higher fee was no longer up-front but offset by an additional fee loan, which 
students would not have to pay back until after graduation. 
Although the LFS data used in this thesis does not contain data for 2006 and 
2007, official statistics are published (as seen in Chapter 1) showing the changes 
in volume of students and proportion from socio-economic backgrounds after the 
introduction of the 2006 deferred fee. 
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Figure 7.6 Volume of degree accepts by socio-economic group, 2006 fee reforms 
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series, which would be proportions of each socio-economic group going to 
university — this series is not available. 
The figures above are somewhat useful in understanding the impact of the 2006 
reforms — in terms of overall volumes, aside from a noticeable reactionary dip in 
2006 itself, participation volumes seem somewhat flat for all socio-economic 
groups aside from the lower classes of routine and semi-routine, for whom a 
slight increase in participation can be observed. However, in terms of overall 
proportions, this group remain flatly at 15% of the total, though the higher socio-
economic groups' proportion is decreasing largely in favour of the unclassified 
group. 
But again, these statistics do not contribute to the understanding of what degree 
participation would have been like, had the £3000 deferred fee not been brought 
in. 
Unfortunately it is not possible to use the coefficients generated from the panel-
level specifications of Section 7.4 to test the impact of the reforms, for two main 
reasons. 
Firstly, the coefficient for fees in Table 7.4 refers only to up-front fees, whereas 
and youths' reactions to deferred fees could be quite different — and as previously 
stated, appropriate data beyond 2005 are not available to separately analyse the 
impact of these reforms. 
Secondly, while debt levels pre 2006 are at relatively low levels (around £3290 on 
average in 2005), driven by maintenance loans, the 2006 reforms resulted in a 
sharp increase in future debt for all income groups, of £3000 per year. The 
specifications described in this study do not separately control for debt, so it is 
inadvisable to attempt to extrapolate the results to the 2006 reforms. 
The results do imply though, that the introduction of a tuition fee of £3000 
without a fee loan to cover it would, based on this study's estimates of the 
negative impact of upfront fees, have been detrimental to degree participation. 
Future work in this area will be to estimate directly the effects of the reforms 
using data up to and beyond 2006, and to build a more dynamic model of loans, 
incorporating future debt repayments. 
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7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter attempted to estimate the impact of tuition fees and grants on 
participation using an alternative means to the individual-level approaches 
discussed in Chapter 6. At the outset of this chapter, the individual-level repeated 
cross section data from Chapter 6 were converted into a panel with the 
dimensions of region, income group, gender and time. This meant that the 
suspected estimation problems — namely measurement error in the explanatory 
variables and unobserved heterogeneity — could be dealt with using well-
established methods such as fixed effects, since observations were then observed 
in more than one time period. 
The use of panel data also meant that dynamic specifications could be tested, 
where the explanatory and dependent variables were allowed to appear in lags, 
such as would be the case if levels of grants and fees in one year influenced 
participation in the following year. 
A number of specifications were tested and a preferred Fixed Effects model was 
chosen. The outcome was intuitive, showing that upfront tuition fee eligibility has 
a negative and statistically significant effect on university participation, and that 
maintenance grants have a positive influence on participation. Dynamic models 
generated similar long-run estimates of the impacts, with slightly higher short-run 
impacts. 
A £1,000 increase in tuition fees reduces degree participation by 4.8 percentage 
points, while a £1,000 increase in maintenance grants increases participation by 
3.2 percentage points. 
The major funding reforms of the past 20 years were tested against a 
counterfactual which was created using the data and estimates. The introduction 
of tuition fees in 1998 was found to have a negative impact on participation of 
students from high income backgrounds, while the abolition of grants in 1999 was 
found to have a negative impact on participation of students from both low and 
medium income backgrounds. 
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For low income students, the loss of full grants resulted in participation being 3.4 
percentage points lower than it would have been, had grants remained in place. 
For medium income students, the loss of partial grants resulted in participation 
being 1.9 percentage points lower than it would have been, and this was coupled 
with an increase in tuition fees of around £620 on average per year, resulting in 
participation being a further 3 percentage points lower than it would have been, 
had fees not been brought in. 
However in the case of low and medium income students, no overall change in 
participation was predicted as a result of the reforms once maintenance loan 
increases were controlled for. It appears that the increase in maintenance loan 
eligibility, which occurred over the same period, counteracted the negative impact 
of the decrease in grants and fees — though it is difficult to conclude this without 
further research into individuals' responses to loans. 
For high income students, meanwhile, the net effect of the 1998 reforms was to 
decrease their participation levels to the tune of 5.3 percentage points, compared 
to what participation would have been with no fees. This decrease was largely 
driven by the large increase in upfront tuition fees that this group experienced, 
which this survey finds to have a significant negative effect on participation. 
These results are highly relevant for policy makers, who should be aware of the 
negative impact of upfront fees — i.e. those not covered by a fee loan — and the 
positive impact of aid on participation. Maintenance grants, in conjunction with 
maintenance loans, can potentially be used to offset the negative influence of fee 
increases, given their opposing influences on participation. 
Policy makers should also be aware of particularly vulnerable groups when 
setting levels of fees and grants, and may need to target specific groups with more 
generous aid to counteract any increases in tuition fees. 
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Chapter 8 Summary and conclusions 
8.1 Summary 
The aim of the first strand of this thesis was to investigate the role of higher 
education finance in university participation. In particular, the thesis aimed to 
ascertain whether maintenance grant eligibility, and upfront fee obligations faced 
by school-leavers make a difference to their decision to attend university over and 
above the well-understood roles of prior attainment and socio-economic 
background. Much research has been carried out looking at the latter two 
influences, finding them to be overarching explanatory factors in youth's 
university enrolment decision-making, and therefore concluding that HE finance, 
which (presumably) becomes relevant only when a youth reaches the last stages 
of compulsory schooling, at age 16 or more, is largely irrelevant to this decision. 
Despite this, the UK has seen much debate over the introduction of cost-sharing 
in higher education, particularly the establishment of tuition fees in 1998/99 and 
the gradual replacement of maintenance grants with loans. The UK system is still 
in a state of evolution. There has been, and continues to be, much concern that 
increasing levels of debt faced by students will dissuade them from going to 
university. Investigation into the impact of increasing fees is therefore necessary 
to provide policy-makers with understanding of the impact and effectiveness of 
their decisions. 
The impact of HE finance has been studied in many other countries with long 
histories of student contribution systems, and many of these studies have 
uncovered robust evidence that youths do consider HE finance as a factor in their 
higher education enrolment decisions. It is important, therefore, to carry out 
similar research for the UK, as this thesis has aimed to do. 
This study has encountered many challenges in its attempt to explore the 
relationship between HE finance and participation. Finding an appropriate dataset 
with adequate sample sizes and information for all types of school leavers, 
including their destination after school and critically, their parents' income levels 
proved to be highly challenging and time-consuming, as explained in Chapter 5. 
Issues with model estimation, particularly the need to deal with endogenous 
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variables, common when estimating causal relationships between fees and aid and 
participation also proved challenging. 
This thesis has overcome these hurdles by using pseudo panel data and 
econometric techniques to generate unbiased and consistent estimates of the 
impact of fees and grants on university participation under reasonable 
assumptions. 
This strand of the thesis has generated a number of interesting findings. Primarily, 
HE finance is found to have a significant effect on university participation over 
and above the roles of prior attainment and socio-economic background; upfront 
tuition fees are found to have a negative influence on school-leavers likeliness to 
go to university, while maintenance grants exert positive influences on 
participation. Moreover, the major reforms of 1998/99 in which fees were 
introduced and grants abolished, were found not to have dissuaded low income 
students from participating in HE, though a small negative impact was apparent in 
participation of high income students. 
The main findings of this first strand of the thesis, and their policy implications 
are discussed in depth below. 
8.2 Main findings and conclusions 
1. 	 Higher education finance, in the form of maintenance grants and upfront 
fees, has a significant impact on the university participation decisions on youths 
of school-leaving age. This study finds that a £1000 increase in tuition fees leads 
to a 4.8 percentage point decrease in likeliness to participate in a university 
degree program, while a £1000 increase in maintenance grant eligibility leads to a 
3.2 percentage point increase in likeliness to participate. 
In each case, these results are statistically significant even in models which 
include the youth's prior attainment in the form of 5 good GCSEs, and socio-
economic background measured as parental education and income levels, as well 
as several other factors such as regional unemployment rates, gender and 
ethnicity. Past research has shown that it is crucial to control for these factors 
since they are extremely influential in youths' university enrolment behaviour, but 
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this research indicates that prior attainment and background factors are not the 
full story. Policy makers must therefore be aware that there are demand responses 
to changes in tuition fees and grants, and that responses to increases in fees are 
significant and negative, while responses to increases in grants are positive. Only 
medium and high income students are eligible for fees, so the negative response 
suggests the price of HE finance does matter, even to students from wealthier 
backgrounds. This information is critical in policy decision making and so far, no 
other work in the UK has attempted to quantitatively estimate the elasticity of 
demand for participation with respect to HE finance. In particular, there has been 
little research to indicate that upfront fees are a deterrent to university 
participation. 
2. 	 Different income groups may respond differently to upfront costs and aid. 
While this study, largely for reasons of inadequate data and sample sizes, has 
been unable to quantify the effects of grants and fees for each income group, there 
is some evidence to suggest that low income students have a stronger response to 
grants than medium students. In calculating the elasticity of demand for university 
for each income group, low income groups were found to be the most sensitive to 
changes in grant eligibility. That is, pound for pound, an increase in grants will 
induce a larger increase in degree participation from low income students than 
from medium or high income students. Likewise, medium income students appear 
to be more responsive to increases in net costs than high income students. 
However, these elasticities were simple calculations based on the model output; 
ideally a model would include income groups interacted with the HE finance 
variables, but as stated above, inadequate sample sizes meant this could not be 
reliably performed. 
Nevertheless, policy makers must be aware that certain groups of youths are more 
sensitive to finance than others and that targets can be met more effectively with 
this understanding. The Governments ongoing Widening Participation policy, for 
example, aims to encourage both poorer and older individuals into HE — this 
study finds that poorer people can be more effectively targeted by increasing 
grants available to them, relative to higher income students. 
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3. The 1998 reforms, in which grants were abolished and up-front fees 
introduced for the first time, affected youths from different income groups in 
different ways. The impact of abolishing grants for low income students was 
significant and negative, while similarly, the impact for medium income students, 
who lost partial grants and gained partial fees in the reforms, was that their 
participation rates were lower than they would have been in the absence of such 
increases in costs. However, in both cases, once increases in student loans were 
controlled for, participation of low and medium income groups was unaffected, 
suggesting increases in loan eligibility may counteract the negative effects 
associated with removing grants and increasing fees. 
High income students, however, experienced a negative impact of the 1998 
reforms, with their participation rates after the reforms 5.3 percentage points (on 
average, between 1998-2003) lower than they would have been, had tuition fees 
not been brought in. These findings emphasise the positive impact of grants and 
the deterrent of upfront fees. 
4. The reforms occurring in Scotland after devolution in 1999, in which 
tuition fees were abolished and grants restored to poor students appear to have 
had a neutral impact on participation despite the large financial benefit to students 
of all income groups. While the abolition of fees had a negative impact and the re-
introduction of grants boosted participation levels, these reforms were 
accompanied by a cut in maintenance loan availability, and once this is controlled 
for, the reforms appear to have a neutral effect. Scottish participation rates 
(though not informative of what would have happened had tuition fees continued 
and grants not been restored) do not display any upturn in participation after the 
reforms. 
5. It is unclear whether the 2004 reforms, in which grants were re-introduced 
to poorer students, encouraged poorer students to university. There is some 
evidence to imply that the restoration of grants in 2004 was beneficial for poor 
students, but the conclusion is somewhat mixed. It is hard to draw conclusion on 
the impact of the 2006 reforms, meanwhile, since while upfront costs fell as a 
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result of the reforms, levels of debt increased significantly. This study does not 
attempt to model the impact of such increasing debt levels. 
6. Participation of medium and high income groups accelerated at a faster 
pace than that of low income groups, between 1992 and 2005. In fact, the rate of 
growth participation of low income groups has actually slowed. These results are 
in line with the findings of Blanden and Machin (2004), implying that the 
expansion of HE throughout the 1990s benefitted the rich over the poor. 
7. Better research is needed in order to fully understand of the role of HE 
finance in university participation. Regression based estimations, including those 
tested in this thesis, are fraught with measurement error and unobserved 
heterogeneity arising from omitted variables such as youths inherent ability and 
parental factors such as motivation. Robust estimation strategies, such as 
difference-in-difference analysis are needed to control for these issues — though in 
practise such methods are troublesome to implement, since UK education finance 
policy changes are rarely "clean" but have tended to occur alongside other policy 
changes, while appropriate control groups are difficult to find. 
Because of these issues and the unavailability of good datasets that provide an 
adequate set of control variables and well-measured parental income data 
(covered in 8 below), the small number of UK-based studies aiming to explore the 
impact of HE finance have tended to estimate the ex-post response to changes in a 
whole package of support, by examining participation changes after the reforms. 
These studies have generally concluded that the UK HE reforms did not impact 
participation and that the low participation rates of those from poor backgrounds 
are part of a long-term trend. 
However, without a counterfactual, such as that used in a difference-in-difference 
analysis, it is not possible to understand the true impact of the reforms on 
participation (i.e. what would the level of participation be in the absence of the 
reforms) — growth or declines in participation after the reforms may have been 
caused by other factors. 
8. Better data are needed to enable a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between access to finance, fee obligations and university participation. This study 
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examined a number of large-scale government run surveys and found a number of 
challenges with the existing datasets, threatening the viability of this study. 
Firstly, there are very few studies which follow individuals after they have left the 
household (the BHPS being an exception). The result is that no information on 
background factors such as parental education or income is held on those living 
independently, meaning income data has to be imputed for such individuals (such 
as by Galindo-Rueda et al (2004), and this thesis), or they are left out of the study 
altogether. Secondly, good data on household income — which includes benefit 
and investment income, crucial to calculate means tested levels of fees, grants etc, 
is rarely available, and proxies such as earnings data must be used instead, 
generating bias through measurement error. Thirdly, sample sizes, when studying 
school-leavers in particular, are often inadequate for the purposes of analysis. 
Datasets with large sample sizes, which follow individuals from the household 
(thus observing parental background factors) into work, university or otherwise 
are needed to further analysis into these important and expensive reforms. An 
excellent example is the recent creating of a dataset of pupils from the PLASC 
dataset (thus containing everyone) which is linked with HESA information, 
enabling the user to observe where the person is and even what subject they are 
studying. Such datasets provide vital insights into the decision-making of youths 
throughout their lives, and but are still extremely rare despite Governments 
continued focus on widening participation and encouraging youths into higher 
education. 
8.3 Discussion 
The aim of this thesis was to test the hypothesis that HE finance affects youths' 
decisions to go to university. The thesis has claims to originality for a number of 
reasons. Almost all studies quantitatively examining the impact of the UK finance 
reforms rely on studying the changing profile of university participants by socio-
economic status over the period of the reforms; this study observes both 
participants and non-participants, and uses parental income to calculate exact 
amounts of finance eligibility — crucial to understanding the impact of finance. 
Furthermore, this study identifies the elasticity of participation with respect to 
university costs, something which no other UK based study has attempted to do 
quantitatively. 
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A number of limitations, however, should be noted: 
1. As outlined in Section 8.2, the datasets available for the study were 
limited in many ways, and the final dataset used suffered from various 
inadequacies, reducing robustness of the results and introducing biases through 
measurement error. A study with larger sample sizes and more accurate data on 
parental income would be able to provide more in-depth analysis, such as the 
effects of HE finance by different income groups, but such data is not currently 
available in the UK. 
2. This study can only be generalized to certain types of HE finance scheme 
since it explores finance policies specific to the UK in the 1990s and 2000s. For 
example, the results do not take into account possibilities such as real interest 
rates being applied to loans, as is the case in other countries, and upfront fees, 
rather than deferred fees are evaluated. Furthermore, the study makes no 
assertions as to individuals demand responses to fees and grants over a certain 
amount. In this study, for example, fees were set at a maximum of £1200; the 
forthcoming UK review could see fees going as high as £5000. It is difficult to 
generalize the results of this study to fees of this level. Moreover, the results do 
not incorporate levels of debt, which increased significantly in 2006 upon the 
introduction of deferred fees of £3000 per year, nor do they incorporate 
individuals' attitudes towards loans — such as their discount rate or knowledge of 
future repayments. Future work will attempt to tackle this using a more dynamic 
modeling approach. 
3. By definition, this study has only examined response to finance eligibility, 
rather than uptake, thus analyzing intention to treat (ITT). It is conceivable that 
certain individuals may lack information on grant availability, for example, and 
therefore may not take up their grant. Since the study wished to examine 
responses purely to eligibility rather than uptake, the study did not consider this. 
However, some surveys do contain information on grant and loan uptake and so a 
possible extension would be to examine this, rather than focusing on ITT. 
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4. 	 It is difficult to make any assertions as to the reasons behind youth's 
responses to fees and grants. For example, the negative response of high income 
students to up-front fees might suggest some type of credit constraint, but this 
seems unlikely given the relatively high earnings of their parents, and could 
instead be a result of price sensitivity. Further research into the reasons behind the 
responses to HE finance would be a useful further step. 
The results imply that there is a role for HE finance in youth's participation 
decisions, with results in line with those found in similar US research. However, 
this study does not wish to underplay the role of youths' background and prior 
attainment in university participation. Undoubtedly these factors are of vital 
importance — indeed without an adequate number of GCSEs or A-levels it would 
be very difficult if not impossible for an individual, however motivated by the HE 
package available to him or her, to go to university. One hypothesis is that there is 
a marginal group of students that may be undecided about university participation 
at the time of decision-making, and the amount of aid available to them, and the 
fees they will have to pay may be the tipping point as to whether to attend or not. 
For example, a youth from a poor background who may have achieved good 
GCSE and A-level scores, may be on the borderline of committing to HE, but 
upon discovering that no grants are available and living costs must be funded by 
loans, may decide against going to university. 
Such marginal students are hard to find in datasets examined in this thesis and 
perhaps qualitative research, such as that carried out by the likes of Forsyth and 
Furlong and Furlong and Cartmel (2005) would help to shed more light on the 
nature of individuals who are motivated by higher education finance. 
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Second strand 
The impact of higher education 
finance on university funding per 
head in the UK 
Chapter 9 The impact of higher 
education finance on university 
funding levels and competitiveness 
9.1 Introduction 
As described in the first strand of this thesis, the Higher Education reforms of the 
past decade since the introduction of tuition fees in 1998 had at their root, the aim 
to increase university funding levels, but also had important economic 
consequences for students. 
A further consequence, arising from the reforms and also from Scottish and 
Welsh devolution, was to significantly alter the landscape between the four 
constituent countries of the UK in terms of funding per head, changing the 
balance of funding between universities in the UK. 
As has been extensively covered in the first strand of this thesis, the actual 
funding systems applied in England and Scotland first diverged significantly after 
devolution in 1999, when the Scottish Labour party decided to abolish the up-
front university tuition fee of £120060 that had been in place across the UK from 
1998, and introduce the Graduate Endowment61. These reforms were fully 
enacted by 2001/02. A further major development occurred as a result of the 2004 
Higher Education Act, when the UK Government abolished the up-front fee for 
English undergraduates, but replaced it with a deferred fee of up to £3000 per 
year for new undergraduates from 2006/07 onwards. The act also gave the 
National Assembly for Wales powers to decide on tuition fees in Wales, whose 
government decided to exempt Welsh domiciled students from the £3000 fee, 
instead freezing their fee at £1200 with the Welsh government paying the 
additional £1800 on their behalf (see Chapter 2 for more details). 
These developments provoked wide debate in the Scottish press. There was great 
concern that the injection of additional money into the English, Welsh and 
6° As with other chapters, all figures are in 2006 prices unless otherwise stated 
61 The graduate endowment was a £2289 one-off payment all students had to pay upon graduation 
— see Section 2.4 for more details 
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Northern systems would result in their universities being able to provide better 
facilities, better pay and better resources than universities in Scotland62. 
Universities in Scotland have traditionally been funded at a higher rate than those 
in the rest of England, Northern Ireland and Wales. Figure 9.1 illustrates 
university funding per FTE (full-time equivalent student) in the UK from 
1994/95-2007/08, with Scotland clearly set apart from the remainder of the UK. 
Figure 9.1 University Funding per FTE, UK constituent countries — UK, EU and 
non-EU teaching and tuition, research, capital grants and all other sources of 
income (£), HESA 
The injection of additional funding per head received by English, Welsh and 
Northern Irish universities represents a clear challenge to Scotland's historically 
competitive funding position. This emphasizes an interesting and important "by 
product" from the divergence of HE finance policy in the constituent countries of 
the UK — in particular in Scotland. While Scottish students no longer have to pay 
fees to study at Scottish universities, the flipside is that Scottish universities do 
not have access to fee payments from these students, unlike their UK 
counterparts, resulting in a potentially large funding gap between the two 
countries. 
62 See for example http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/education/call-to-bring-back-university-
tuition-fees-1.918985 
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As discussed, the increase in financial inputs into English, Welsh and Northern 
Irish universities relative to Scottish universities provoked concern in Scotland for 
a number of reasons: 
1) University quality. Maintaining university quality, in terms of 
teaching, facilities and research, is clearly of vital political importance 
to Scotland63. Research in particular is an extremely lucrative field, 
and can be a highly important revenue stream so it is important for 
universities to maintain their research quality. This in turn requires a 
high level of funding. As seen in Figure 9.1, the Scottish government 
has provided a consistently high level of funding to its universities 
relative to those in the rest of the UK. By choosing to abolish tuition 
fees, the Scottish government will have to rely mainly on taxpayer 
money to finance its HE institutions, meaning quality could slip if 
other sectors of the economy are deemed needier and funding is 
prioritized away from the HE sector (Barr, 2004). 
2) University competitiveness. By extension, if universities in the rest of 
the UK are able to increase the quality of their facilities, teaching and 
research relative to those in Scotland, this could erode Scotland's 
competitiveness, and result in a potential "brain drain" of quality in 
Scotland as lecturers, researchers and even students are attracted South 
of the border. This issue is important, not only in terms of 
competitiveness with other UK constituent countries but also to 
competitiveness worldwide in attracting students. 
3) Political consequences. The possible funding gap between Scotland 
and the rest of the UK could also have significant political 
ramifications. Scottish MPs can vote on UK tuition fee legislation and 
will no doubt consider the impact on their competitive position when 
doing so. Therefore, it is of political importance to explore the impact 
of the tuition fees in terms of financial inputs to English universities 
versus Scotland. 
63 See for example the SNP Manifesto 2007, pp54 
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The overarching aim of this chapter, then, is to assess the extent of the funding 
gap between Scotland and the rest of the UK, looking at the short, medium and 
long term future for the position of Scottish Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) 
in terms of comparative funding per FTE compared to the other constituent 
countries in the UK, and how this has been influenced by the recent HE funding 
reforms, in particular the introduction of £3000 deferred fees in England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. The study concentrates particularly on a comparison 
between Scotland and England (though where readily available, data from Wales 
and NI are included), since England can be construed as fairly representative of 
Wales and Northern Ireland in terms of funding legislation, while Scotland is 
clearly set apart. 
9.2 How does Higher Education funding impact university 
quality and competitiveness? 
As discussed above, one of the key ways in which university funding may impact 
universities is by increasing the quality of the institution, in terms of facilities, 
teaching, research and resources. There is much existing literature regarding the 
advantage between universities in this sense. 
University quality tends to be measured in terms of university research and 
publications (often measured by RAE64 ranking), the quality of teaching (captured 
in various ways, including QAA65 scores), or the quality of the student-body 
intake (for example captured by the average A level score of attendants). See for 
example HEFCE's Information on Quality and Standards in Higher Education 
(2005), HEFCE's NSS (National Student Survey) and the TQI index (teaching 
quality index). A further body of literature ranks universities in terms of their 
attractiveness to students. This is usually measured by the ratio of applications to 
acceptances, the hypothesis being that those universities with a high volume of 
applicants for every acceptance are more elite, while those with fewer 
applications must lower their entry standards to fill their places. Other measures 
along these lines are cross border acceptances (the assumption being that students 
64 
 Research Assessment Exercise — see Research Assessment Exercise 2008: the outcome 
65 
 Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education 
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prefer to study close to home, but high quality institutions will encourage them to 
travel) and reliance on clearing. 
A number of studies have attempted to estimate university competitiveness, 
intrinsically linked to the quality of institution. Abbot and Leslie (2004) model 
student demand in terms of applications per university, as a function of entry 
standard of the university plus a group of variables thought to influence demand -
including a quality ranking variable, size of university, subject mix (some 
universities are less attractive because they have a heavy influence on science), 
dummies for pre- and post-1992, Oxbridge, plateglass, Russell group, and 
resources in terms of funding per head. 
They find strong regional influences on applications — universities in Scotland and 
Wales have lower demand from outside the region — so have negative 
coefficients. One explanation offered is the separate tradition of 4 year degrees, 
which may serve as a deterrent, particularly to English students. 
In a similar fashion, Hoare (1991) examines application types at UK universities, 
and finds further strong regional differences in application type. In Scotland 87% 
of all regionally originated applications are for local courses. Geographical 
isolation and distinctive education systems (i.e. Highers and O'Grades) are offered 
as explanations for the relatively high dependence of Scottish universities on local 
applications. These studies suggest low levels of competitiveness between 
England and Scotland. 
However, competitiveness of universities in terms of their financial inputs, 
measures closer in nature to those that will be discussed in this strand of the 
thesis, are also of vital importance to policy makers. 
Again, a number of studies have attempted to examine university competitiveness 
in terms of financial inputs. Depending on the country of study this can be either 
public or private (or both). American institutions for example, are famously well 
funded from private sources such as tuition fees (OECD Education at a Glance, 
2008) and generous donations from alumni. In these terms they are among the 
richest in the world. Despite this, UK and Australian universities have recently 
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emerged into the "global elite" (Marginson, 2005). This is in part due to the 
continued domination of English speaking institutions. Foreign students are 
highly attracted to English-language institutions due to the desirability of English-
language based skills in business, IT and scientific research. Such cross-border 
education has become a commercial business in the UK, bringing in large 
amounts of money from (unregulated) high tuition fees from overseas students. 
Furthermore, research tends to be dominated by English language institutions, and 
is an extremely lucrative field, again attracting large amounts of money into UK 
universities — underlying the financial importance of offering high quality 
research. 
While there may be evidence that increases in university funding per head 
improve competitiveness, however, there is little available evidence that increases 
in tuition fees of the nature implemented in the UK over the last decade, actually 
significantly increase university funding per head. 
The debate on tuition fees has focused on under-funding in universities (CBI, 
2009; Universities UK, 2009), and the Governments' decision to ask 
undergraduate students to contribute to their fees — yet to date there has been no 
real way of telling how funding purely for undergraduates has changed as a result, 
using published data. This is largely because published data are inadequate for 
ascertaining the impact of tuition fee reforms on university funding levels. 
To explain: published data are available on university funding per head (e.g. 
HESA66 data), but these widely used measures of HE funding per head are 
distorted by the inclusion of postgraduate, overseas student and research funding, 
so it is not possible to fully assess the impact of the funding reforms, which were 
purely focused at undergraduates, using these data. In order to fully understand 
the impact of the funding reforms on universities, a pure undergraduate funding 
series is needed. 
Furthermore, while it has been long understood that university funding per 
student in Scotland is significantly higher than that in the rest of the UK, given 
66 Higher Education Statistics Agency 
208 
that the widely published figures describing funding per FTE are inflated by the 
factors described above, these data do not give a true picture of funding per head 
in Scotland and the rest of the UK. 
Therefore a key aim of this strand of the thesis is to remove these effects, and 
create a series which looks at funding per head solely for UK and EU domiciled 
undergraduates. The creation of this series will enable exploration of Scotland and 
England's competitive position in terms of funding for UK and EU 
undergraduates, and will enable better analysis of the impact of the 2006/07 
deferred fee, and whether Scotland was able to maintain its competitive edge in 
the face of the large injection of funds to English universities. 
A further aim of this strand of the thesis is to gain a deeper understanding of 
Scotland's apparent historical advantage in funding per head compared to 
England. University funding has traditionally been allocated based on volumes of 
students enrolling at a university, but also the subjects they choose to study. These 
compositional differences are important factors in relative funding levels, and this 
strand of the thesis aims to investigate their contribution to funding levels, as well 
as overall generosity of funding in each country. 
This chapter will also consider future developments in tuition fees, and in 
particular the HE funding review in 2009 in which the cap on England's tuition 
fee levels could be raised. This again will have repercussions for Scotland's 
relative competitiveness in terms of funding levels. 
A final aim is to explore UK University funding per head relative to the rest of the 
OECD. Should universities in the UK wish to compete directly (in terms of 
funding per head) with those in the OECD it is necessary to understand the 
relative position in the current day, and the level of funding discrepancy between 
the UK and the highest-funded countries. 
The overarching aim of this chapter though, is to focus on what the increase in 
resources directed at English universities as a result of the introduction of 
deferred fees in 2006/07, will mean for relative funding of English and Scottish 
universities. 
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9.3 Second strand thesis outline 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 9.4 briefly sets out the data 
used and outlines the different funding per head series that are constructed. 
Section 9.5 considers how the historical comparison between English and Scottish 
universities is affected by the choice of different measures of university funding. 
In Section 9.6 a funding per head series purely for UK and EU domiciled 
undergraduates is constructed, with an illustration of how compositional 
differences in the courses taken by English and Scottish universities impact 
relative funding. From this series it is possible to accurately measure the impact 
of the recent reforms. Section 9.7 looks to the future, assessing how changes after 
the 2009 review in England may further affect the funding landscape between 
England and Scotland. Section 9.8 broadens the analysis by considering how 
factoring in student support in the form of loans and grants alters the relative 
picture between countries. Section 9.9 places the analysis in the context of 
funding within other OECD countries, and Section 9.10 concludes. 
9.4 Data sources 
The primary data source for this report is HESA (Higher Education Statistics 
Agency). At the time of writing, HESA data is available up to 2007/08. HESA 
data comprises detailed information on all students studying at UK universities, 
including country of origin, institution of study, subject of study (with details of 
19 different subject types) and level of study (undergraduate or postgraduate). 
The data are aggregated to university, country or subject level (i.e. individual 
student level data are not available) and comprise information on thousands of 
students. For example in 1998/99 there were 835,526 full-time undergraduate 
students studying in English universities, according to the HESA dataset. 
As well as holding information on student volumes, the dataset also comprises 
information on total funding awarded to universities in each of the constituent 
countries of the UK, as well as a breakdown of this funding in terms of funding 
for research, teaching, and capital, again by EU and non-EU student type. 
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As explained, while this dataset is extremely comprehensive, this information 
alone does not allow the calculation of a funding series specifically looking at UK 
domiciled undergraduates, since the data are not broken down to this level. 
Therefore, as will be explained throughout this chapter, additional information on 
allocation of funds by undergraduate is taken from HEFCE (Higher Education 
Funding Council for England), HEFCW (Higher Education Funding Council for 
Wales) and SFC (the Scottish Funding Council) grant letters, which are available 
up to and including 2007/08. 
9.5 Funding per FTE in the UK from 1994/95 — 2007/08 
In this analysis of funding per FTE, four measures of funding per FTE are 
constructed. A top-line measure, which comprises funding from all sources 
(including research, teaching and overseas students) illustrates Scotland's clear 
funding advantage over the rest of the UK. However, this measure includes 
capital and research funding, which while a highly lucrative source of income, is 
not relevant for this analysis, for reasons previously stated. Research and capital 
income is therefore stripped out, a measure for teaching and tuition only is duly 
constructed. This is the most widely used measure of funding per head, and the 
most frequently quoted. However, again this measure distorts the true picture, 
since teaching money includes that for postgraduates and FE students, and more 
importantly, tuition fees from overseas students. It is widely known that fees from 
overseas students outstrip those of home and EU students significantly. This 
measure of funding provides a very distorted view when considering the impact 
of Government policy, not least because these fees are not subject to Government 
regulations. Stripping out the effects of overseas fees, to look at teaching and 
tuition for home and EU students only, brings the series closer to one measuring 
the impact of Government policy on tuition fees, and paints a very different 
picture from the more commonly used measures, with Scotland's funding 
advantage somewhat reduced. 
The series of most interest, however, is a pure undergraduate funding series, since 
the recent tuition fee reforms have focused solely on this group. As stated, it is not 
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possible to construct such a measure using HESA data, because teaching and 
tuition funding is not disaggregated at this level — i.e. there is no way of knowing 
what proportion of teaching funds are meant specifically for undergraduates. 
Indeed the universities themselves are free to decide how to divide the money 
between student types, so such a break-down is not essential for their purposes. 
It is essential for the purposes of this paper, though. The debate on tuition fees has 
focused on under-funding in universities, and the Governments' decision to ask 
undergraduate students to contribute to their fees — yet to date there has been no 
real way of telling how funding purely for undergraduates has changed as a result. 
Instead those trying to understand the impact of the reforms have had to look at 
measures which are inflated by overseas tuition fees, research money and money 
for postgraduates. Of course, there is likely to be cross-subsidisation occurring in 
universities — e.g. money for post graduate students and research likely cross 
subsidizes under graduate students. However, understanding the influence of 
cross-subsidization is beyond the scope of this study. 
Thus, information from the funding councils of each country is combined with 
HESA data to construct a series of undergraduate funding per head. The method 
used is as follows. Funding is allocated to universities on the basis of subject type 
— each subject type has a price (Section 9.6 provides greater detail on the price of 
each subject) and university funding is calculated on the basis of 'volume times 
price' (where volume is the number of students at universities studying each 
subject from the HESA data). Therefore, a measure of undergraduate funding per 
head can be calculated by this simple methodology. 
This newly constructed measure of undergraduate funding adds a further 
dimension to understanding of funding, and in particular reveals the effect of 
compositional differences, as well as allowing the impact of undergraduate top-up 
fees to be examined, and different tuition fee scenarios to be considered. 
Each of the funding series constructed are detailed in the following sections. 
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9.5.1 Topline funding per FTE 
Includes: Teaching, Tuition, Research, Capital Grants, FE provision and all 
other sources for undergraduate, postgraduate and FE students from UK, EU and 
non-EU countries 
The first series examined is top-line funding per FTE. This measure of funding is 
for all students including undergraduates, postgraduates and further education 
students. It comprises all sources of university income, namely — teaching, tuition, 
research, capital investment and all other sources (see Figure 9.2). This measure is 
calculated over the ten years from 1994/95 to 2007/08 (the latest data available 
for this measure). 
Figure 9.2 Topline funding per FTE — teaching and tuition, research, capital grants 
and all other sources of income (£2006) 
This series clearly shows Scotland's funding advantage. Scottish funding per FTE 
is significantly (around £1000 on average) higher than England's over the course 
of the ten years this study examines — with Wales and Northern Ireland at very 
similar levels to England. Scottish funding peaks in 1995/96 at £7936 then begins 
to slide, so by 1998/99 it has fallen to £7023. This coincides with the introduction 
of tuition fees following the Dearing Report, whereupon funding per FTE starts to 
slowly rise. 
By 2001/02 Scotland has abandoned the tuition fee and introduced the graduate 
endowment. Funding per FTE continues to rise but fails to recover to 1994/95 
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levels. Note that England, Wales and NI show similar patterns to Scotland, but by 
2007/08 the gap between England and Scotland is also beginning to narrow. 
In order to understand what this overall measure of funding per FTE comprises, 
and how this distribution has changed, it is useful to examine the component parts 
of university funding. These are illustrated in Figure 9.3 below. 
Figure 9.3 Breakdown of university funding, England and Scotland 1995-2007 
(HESA) 
As Figure 9.3 illustrates, teaching and tuition money clearly makes up the 
majority of university income, with research, capital grants and other sources of 
income making up a further 15-20%. Over the timeline, both England and 
Scotland have seen the proportion of funding from teaching and tuition fees fall 
gradually while the proportion from research has remained fairly stable, although 
it has climbed to 16% in Scotland, compared to 12% in England67. 
This overall funding per head series, then illustrates at a very high level, the large 
advantage Scotland has over England, in terms of funding. At this high level, 
Scotland's comparative advantage appears to stem from more generous teaching 
67 Note that prior to 1998/99 funding from non-EU sources was not separately itemized in the 
HESA data; but was included in the total tuition figure. 
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and tuition funding. By examining the teaching and tuition series in more depth, 
clearer conclusions can be drawn about funding in each country. 
9.5.2 Funding per FTE — teaching and tuition only 
Includes: Teaching, Tuition for undergraduate, postgraduate and FE students 
from UK, EU and non-EU countries 
Removing research, capital investment, and other sources of funding creates a 
pure teaching and tuition fee series for UK, EU and non-EU postgraduate, 
undergraduate and further education students. The levels of funding from this 
series are described in Table 9.1 below: 
Table 9.1 Funding per FTE — teaching and tuition — all student types, 
UK, EU, non-EU (£2006) 
England (ave. 1995/96-2007/08) £5,625 
Scotland (ave. 1995/96-2007/08) £6,230 
Difference (Scotland — England) £605 
Removing these sources of income obviously reduces funding per head in 
Scotland compared to England. Indeed research is a particularly important 
element of funding in Scotland, making up 16% of income from Scottish 
universities in 2007/08. Overall research expenditure in Scotland was £245m in 
2007/08 — or £1493 per head. This is almost 50% higher than England's research 
funding of £999 per head, and so is a key contributor to Scotland's financial 
position. 
Nevertheless, without research included Scotland's funding per FTE is still 
around £600 higher than in England. This series is the one most frequently quoted 
in comparison figures. However, as this paper focuses on the effects of the recent 
changes in UK tuition fee policy, it is appropriate to look at the implications for 
teaching and tuition fees for UK and EU undergraduate students only — since 
these are the only students directly affected by such policies (graduate and non 
EU students are subject to different tuition fee rates). Therefore, it is important to 
examine a series in which funding from non-EU students is removed. 
Nevertheless, this study acknowledges the vital importance of funding from non-
EU sources as a key source of income for universities. Moreover, EU and UK 
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domiciled students may benefit from this funding, since it will improve university 
quality in general (though favouring non-EU students could decrease the supply 
of places for home students). For this reason, the next series to be examined is 
that of funding from non-EU students. 
9.5.3 Funding per FTE — teaching and tuition — non-EU students 
Includes: Teaching, Tuition for undergraduate, postgraduate and FE students 
from non-EU countries 
Although EU legislation forces universities to charge the same fees for EU 
students as home students, fees for overseas students (and home students from 
other constituent countries) are unregulated. Indeed, non-EU students can be a 
very lucrative source of income, with many universities charging around £10,000 
per year in fees. Table 9.2 illustrates this. Scotland's funding per FTE from non-
EU students has gradually risen each year from 1995/96 to reach £9,988 per FTE 
in 2007/08, compared with £9,115 per head in England. 
Table 9.2— Funding per FTE — teaching and tuition 
all student t m es, non-EU (HESA 
England (ave. 1995/96-2007/08) £7,973 
Scotland (ave. 1995/96-2007/08) £8,339 
Difference (Scotland — England) £366 
Given these funding levels, it is not surprising that UK universities want to attract 
non-EU students to study. In 2007/08 Non-EU students made up around 11% of 
Scotland's overall student base, and 12% of England's (see table 9.3). 
Table 9.3 Origins of students at UK universities, 2007/08 (HESA) 
England Wales Scotland NI 
UK 83% 84% 82% 91% 
EU 5% 5% 7% 6% 
non-EU 12% 11% 11% 3% 
Table 9.4 — Funding sources at UK universities 2007/08 (HESA)1 
England Wales Scotland NI 
UK & EU 84% 89% 84% 96% 
non-EU 16% 11% 16% 4% 
l As a proportion of teaching and tuition only 
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The contribution to overall funding levels of teaching and tuition is illustrated in 
Table 9.4. Both England and Scotland have become more reliant on funding from 
non-EU students over the past twelve years, so that by 2007/08, England derive 
16% of overall teaching and tuition revenue from non-EU students, while the 
equivalent figure for Scotland is also 16%. 
Given the continuing debate regarding funding shortages in UK universities, it is 
conceivable that, without regulation, the proportion of non-EU students in UK 
universities may rise even further. This could be conceived as an ongoing threat 
to the position of home students, who are financially less attractive to universities. 
Indeed in recent months there has been wide reportage in the press of universities 
offering clearing places to non-EU students in favour of home students, for this 
reason.
68 
This, therefore is an argument for raising the cap on fees and allowing universities 
to charge home students comparable rates. 
Having briefly investigated resources coming from abroad, the focus turns to 
examining teaching and tuition money coming from the UK and EU, for whom 
regulated tuition fees must be charged, and so for whom this study is of most 
relevance. 
9.5.4 Funding per FTE — teaching and tuition — UK and EU students 
only 
Includes: Teaching, Tuition for undergraduate, postgraduate and FE students 
from UK, EU and non-EU countries 
Removing sources of income from non-EU students results in a series illustrating 
funding per head for teaching and tuition only — for home and EU students —
again for graduates, undergraduates and further education students.69 Details are 
summarised in Table 9.5. 
68 See for example http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/education/article6788739.ece 
69 Note that FE courses are traditionally inexpensive compared to HE 
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Table 9.5 Funding per FTE — teaching and tuition 
UK & EU students, £2006 (HESA) 
England (ave. 1995/96-2007/08) £5,413 
Scotland (ave. 1995/96-2007/08) £5,950 
Difference (Scotland — England) £537 
This series provides a useful tool for comparing the financial landscape in the UK 
in terms of Government funding purely meant for teaching and tuition for UK 
domiciled students. As previously stated, it is worth noting that income from non-
EU students is obviously not solely for the benefit of non-EU students, but is used 
to subsidise all students — and is therefore an important element of funding. But 
for reasons previously stated non-EU funding is removed, to look purely at funds 
from UK and EU domiciled students. 
On this basis, table 9.5 shows Scottish universities' funding advantage being 
slightly impacted by the removal of non-EU students, with their advantage over 
England slipping from £605 to £537, when averaged over 10 years. 
Note that Wales and Northern Ireland are at similar levels to England, being 
funded around £600 per student lower than Scotland on average. 
Of course, this series still includes both graduate and undergraduates and so is not 
the best series to consider when examining how changes to undergraduate fees 
affect the competitive landscape in the UK. In order to understand the impact of 
the £3000 top-up fee which was charged only to undergraduates, it is necessary to 
look at funding per head for undergraduates only. This is where this chapter turns 
to next. 
Before this, Table 9.6 summarizes the results of sections 9.5.1 — 9.5.4 above, 
showing the effects of stripping out each funding element from the HESA data. It 
can clearly be seen that currently available HESA figures do not allow calculation 
of the series that is most relevant to analysing the impact of undergraduate top of 
fees in England — namely a teaching and tuition series for UK and EU domiciled 
undergraduates. 
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Table 9.6 Funding er FTE (1995/96-2007/08) summar 
Funding per FTE series Student types England Scotland 
Difference 
(England 
Scotland) 
Teaching, tuition, research, 
capital grants & all other 
sources 
Undergraduate and 
graduate, UK, EU 
and non-EU 
£6821 £7784 £963 
Teaching and tuition Undergraduate and 
graduate, UK, EU 
and non-EU 
£5625 £6230 £606 
Teaching and tuition Undergraduate and 
graduate, non-EU £7973 £8339 £366 
Teaching and tuition Undergraduate and 
graduate, UK and EU £5413 £5950 £537 
Teaching and tuition Undergraduate, UK 
and EU ? 9 ? 
The sections above have aimed to get as close as possible, using widely available 
higher education statistics, to producing a funding per FTE series which can be 
used to analyse the impact of the 2006 tuition fee reforms on university funding. 
As Table 9.6 shows, the most widely available series that are frequently used to 
gain an understanding of university funding are inflated with the inclusion of 
research and capital grants, as well as money coming in from non-EU students. 
The series above nevertheless reveal information about university funding, 
particularly the proportion of funds coming from non-regulated fees from non-EU 
students. Furthermore, given part of the aim of this chapter is to gain a clearer 
understanding of the funding gap that has traditionally held between England and 
Scotland, these figures also shed light on the sources of this gap. While a 
significant proportion of Scotland's funding advantage seems to arise from 
generous funding for research, and from non-EU students, there is still a £537 per 
student funding gap even after all this funding is stripped out. 
In the next section, the aim is to create a series purely looking at funding for 
undergraduates — thus allowing the analysis of the impact of raising tuition fees, 
and to shed further light on the sources of the funding disparity between England 
and Scotland and what this means for HE funding policy in these countries. 
219 
9.6 Constructing an undergraduate funding per FTE series in the 
UK from 1994/95 — 2007/08 
Each year the funding councils for England (HEFCE — the Higher Education 
Funding council), Wales (HEFCW) and Scotland (the Scottish funding council) 
announce their funding figures for the year ahead. Northern Ireland do not have a 
separate funding council, and funding is allocated using the same methodology as 
in England. 
Funding is allocated on the basis of subject, since certain subjects are more 
expensive to teach than others. Therefore, the funding a university gets depends 
primarily on its composition of students — or what its students are studying. A 
university with a high proportion of engineering students, for example, will 
receive more funding than one with a high proportion of mathematics students, 
since engineering, which requires specialized equipment and technology, is more 
expensive to teach than maths (which can be taught with a pen and paper). The 
funding councils set prices for each subject according to these criteria, although 
prices are assumed by the councils and may not reflect the true cost of each 
subject. 
In Scotland there are 13 different subjects each commanding a different price, 
while England has only 4 base prices. In general however, the subjects 
commanding the highest premium are medicine and veterinary science, followed 
by pre-clinical medicine, engineering, science and computing subjects (those 
subjects requiring a lab), creative arts and the built environment (mainly town 
planning) — which attract a premium as studio based subjects, the remaining 
subjects — maths, social sciences and humanities commanding the lowest 
premium. Table 9.7 summarizes the base prices for England and Scotland 
undergraduates over the past 10 years70. Note that these figures include income 
from tuition fees (i.e. that paid directly by students in England, and from 2001/02 
paid by the Scottish Executive on students behalf in Scotland). Details of the fees 
in place are also illustrated in the table (for more details on subjects included in 
70 Figures for Wales and NI are also available but excluded for reasons previously discussed. 
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each heading, see Appendix 8 (Chapter 9): Scottish Funding Council and Higher 
Education Funding Council Subject Breakdowns) 
Table 9.7 Unit prices 1998 — 2007; funding council £ per subject area £2006 (HEFCE & 
SFC I 
£ per subject* 
1998/99 2001/02 2007/08 
Eng Scot +/- Eng Scot +/- Eng Scot +/- 
Medicine, Vet 14481 13021 -1460 14407 13990 -418 16218 15085 -1133 
Pre-clinical 6458 7117 659 6403 7110 707 7634 7652 18 
Creative arts 4827 6669 1842 4803 6764 1961 6142 6917 775 
Engineering 6458 7694 1237 6403 7829 1426 7634 8051 417 
Science 6458 7317 859 6403 7445 1042 7634 7701 67 
Computing 6458 7011 554 6403 7134 730 7634 7029 -605 
Education 3218 6258 3040 3202 6507 3305 5022 7102 2080 
Built en'ment 4827 5851 1024 4803 5955 1152 6142 6153 11 
Mathematical 3218 5013 1795 3202 5103 1902 5022 5213 191 
Humanities 3218 4470 1252 3202 4551 1349 5022 4736 -286 
Social science 3218 3798 580 3202 3867 665 5022 3933 -1089 
Tuition fee 1200 1200 1200 1200 3000 17002 
I includes assumed income from tuition fees 2 £2700 for medical students 
As Table 9.7 illustrates, over the past 10 years, up to the introduction of tuition 
fees in England, Scottish students have benefitted from a higher rate of funding in 
each subject (with the exception of medicine, which is more generously funded in 
England). In particular, education, mathematics and humanities students have 
received consistently greater levels of funding in Scotland. 
The decision in Scotland to abolish tuition fees and introduce the graduate 
endowment, fully implemented in 2001/02, did not actually have a great impact 
on funding. This is because the Scottish executive simply pay the fees on the 
students' behalf meaning there is no loss to universities. Furthermore, the 
graduate endowment in Scotland is not considered in these or any other figures 
since this money is ring-fenced "for the purposes of student support" 7' and 
therefore Scottish universities do not benefit from this money. Indeed in 2001/02 
the funding gap between England and Scotland remained wide. 
However, the introduction of the variable tuition fee in England in 2006/07 
immediately reduced Scotland's funding advantage. The impact of the top-up fee 
in 2006/07 (continuing through 2007/08) resulted in English universities receiving 
" Education (Graduate Endowment and Student Support) (Scotland) Act 2001, 2 (1) 
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more money than their Scottish counterparts in a third of subjects, with pre-
clinical, science and built environment now all receiving very similar funding 
amounts in both countries 72. 
Funding levels per student are obviously only part of the story. The composition 
of students actually studying in each area is key to the analysis and is illustrated in 
Table 9.8 below. 
Table 9.8 Composition of students by subject area studied (HESA) 
1998/99 2001/02 2007/08 
Eng Scot +/- Eng Scot +/- Eng Scot +/- 
Medicine, Vet 2.9% 5.8% 3 3.0% 5.5% 2 3.4% 5.2% 2% 
Pre-clinical 12.2% 13.3% 1 14.1% 15.3% 1 12.6% 13.5% 1% 
Creative arts 8.8% 4.7% -4 9.5% 4.9% -5 10.3% 6.1% -4% 
Engineering 9.1% 9.6% 0 7.9% 9.0% 1 6.2% 7.8% 2% 
Science 12.6% 15.4% 3 11.3% 14.3% 3 13.2% 16.2% 3% 
Computing 6.5% 3.9% -3 8.0% 5.1% -3 4.5% 4.0% -1% 
Education 5.4% 4.5% -1 5.2% 4.5% -1 5.1% 3.7% -1% 
Built en'ment 2.6% 4.2% 2 2.2% 3.5% 1 2.6% 3.5% 1% 
Mathematical 1.7% 1.4% 0 1.6% 1.8% 0 1.9% 2.0% 0% 
Humanities 29.4% 30.1% 1 28.6% 28.6% 0 30.9% 29.2% -2% 
Social science 8.9% 7.2% -2 8.7% 7.5% -1 9.3% 8.7% -1% 
Looking, then, at volumes of students over the same time period, it is apparent 
that the great majority of students in England and Scotland are in the humanities -
some 30% in each country. Other popular subjects are pre-clinical, science and 
social sciences. 
The composition of students is very stable for each country, although in Scotland 
there is an apparent slide in the proportion of clinical and engineering students 
between 1996/07 and 2007/08 (although actual numbers have risen). This is 
illustrated below, in Figures 9.4 and 9.5. 
72 The changes to tuition fees in 2006/07 apply only to students entering university that year. 
Therefore, average tuition fees paid in 2007/08 will be somewhat lower than the stated amounts. 
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Figure 9.4 changing composition of subjects — England (HESA) 
Figure 9.5 changing composition of subjects — Scotland (HESA) 
In comparison to England, Scotland has a large proportion of students in high 
premium subjects — i.e. medicine, science and engineering. Examining the market 
shares for each subject — i.e. the proportion of all students in the UK studying for 
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example, medicine in Scotland emphasises this point (see Figure 9.6). In 
comparison to its overall market share of 10% of UK students (i.e. 10% of all 
UK-based students study in Scottish universities), Scotland has a 
disproportionately high share of students in high premium subjects such as 
medicine and veterinary science, engineering, science and the built environment 
and this is a major part of the reason for their higher funding per head. This 
clearly distorts the comparison between England and Scotland even further —
while Scotland gain more money from having more students studying these high 
premium subjects, the subjects themselves are more expensive to teach. This fact 
will be explored in more detail later in this section. 
As a rule, England's market share of these premium subjects tends to be below its 
overall average, while computing and creative arts are more popular South of the 
border. 
Figure 9.6 Market shares by volume of students — 2007/08 (HESA) 
Although universities receive further funding according to other criteria (e.g. 
volume of disabled students, small institution premium etc73) these SFC and 
HEFCE base prices above, multiplied by the volume of students in each category, 
can provide a simple measure of undergraduate funding per FTE. This calculation 
73 Funding from widening access premiums makes up approximately 5% of recurrent grants in 
England (source HEFCE, 2006) 
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is made using the base prices and volumes for each year between 1994-2007 and 
then extrapolated using knowledge of tuition fees from 2008-2009, with volumes 
of students in each subject and base prices otherwise held steady from 2008-2009. 
Note that this series differs from those described in Section 3 in that both the 
numerator (overall funding) and the denominator (number of FTE students) have 
been reduced. Overall funding purely for undergraduates will be naturally lower 
than that for all student types, but the volume of students has also been reduced to 
purely undergraduates74. 
The resulting series for each country is illustrated in Figure 9.7. (including 
projections to 2009 when the next funding review will take place). The series for 
Wales is also included, which as discussed, is relatively similar to that in England. 
As funding in Northern Ireland is calculated on a different basis the results for 
this country are not present here. 
This shows at first hand the impact of tuition fees upon Scotland and England's 
relative funding positions. 
Scotland's undergraduate funding per FTE is significantly higher than England's 
up to 2004/05 when the gap begins to narrow. In 2006/07, England's introduction 
of the £3000 deferred fee narrows the gap significantly. As only those entering in 
2006/07 are responsible for paying the fee, however, fee revenues are not at the 
full potential, so Scotland maintains its funding advantage. By 2007/08, 75% of 
students in England are paying the fee, reducing Scotland's lead to just £207 per 
head (compared to a high of £1652 in 2003/04). The impact of the top-up fee is 
not fully realized until 2008/09, by which time 100% of undergraduates in 
England are paying £3000. At this point, Scotland's undergraduate funding per 
head is projected to be £70 per head lower than England's. 
Note that the effects of the bursary in England are netted out from the total tuition 
fee figure, since it is compulsory for English universities to give back a minimum 
of £300 per low-income student from the income gained through fees. 
74 Undergraduates make up 84% of all student types in the UK (source HESA 2004/05) 
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A straw poll of several university websites indicates the mean bursary figure may 
be much higher, at around £1000, but there are no official figures on bursary 
spend — and much of this spend could be construed as a marketing cost to attract 
new students. Thus, only the minimum compulsory amount of £300 for every 
low-income student starting in 2006/07 is subtracted. Note that if universities 
were giving away £1000 in bursaries for every £3000 received in tuition fees, and 
not offsetting these costs anywhere else (e.g. from marketing budgets) England's 
competitive position would be much reduced. 
Figure 9.7 Funding per FTE — teaching and tuition — UK and EU undergraduates 
only, £2006 
Figures for 2008/09 — 2009/10 based on estimates 
Up to the point of undertaking this analysis, HEFCE have not reduced their 
overall funding levels since the top-up fee was implemented — meaning the top-up 
fee represents a real increase in per capita funding. While it is by no means 
certain that they will maintain their current levels of funding in the long run, the 
additional funding from fees has resulted in an overall increase in income to 
English universities. 
The distribution of income between the teaching grant and income from tuition 
fees is also altered by the reforms, so that in 2006/07 England derives 33% of 
226 
pr
o
po
rti
on
 
 
o
f
 FT
E 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
• tuition 
mteaching 
Ni 	 Ni 	 Ni 	 Ni 	 Ni 	 Ni 	 Ni 	 Ni 
co- co c) o o o o o o o 
co co c) o o o o co c) o 
cc) 	 co 	 o 	 _, 	 Ni 	 0) 	 -o. 	 CI) 	 C) 	 --1 CO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CO 	 0 	 _, 	 Ni 	 Oa 	 -1=. 	 cri 	 a) 	 -.1 	 oo 
academic year 
o teaching 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
pr
o
po
rti
on
 
 
o
f
 FT
E 
•Co- r...) 	 Ni 	 Ni 	 Ni 	 Ni 	 Ni 	 Ni 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O CO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 03 	 CO 	 C3 	 Ni 	 C.) 	 4=. 	 CJl 	 C) CO 0 CD 0 0 0 CO 0 0 0 (.0 	 n 
academic year 
• tuition 
undergraduate university funding from tuition fees, compared to around 23% in 
previous years, and around 20% in Scotland (see figures 9.8 and 9.9). 
Figure 9.8 Distribution of university income (undergraduate students) — England 
Figure 9.9 Distribution of university income (undergraduate students) - Scotland 
The result of this analysis is clear — by 2009, given that Englands new revenue 
from tuition fees will have been fully realized, funding per head in English 
universities will be level with that in Scotland. In terms of competitivness 
measured on simple funding per university, Scotland will no longer have their 
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advantage over England (which was largely driven by subject composition). This 
finding has political relevance to the Scottish Government, in terms of 
maintaining quality of universities in Scotland versus their neighbours in the rest 
of the UK, the Scottish Funding Council in terms of their funding decisions and to 
Scottish universities themselves in terms of their strategies to attract high revenue 
students. 
However, in order for policy makers to act on this information, it is crucial to gain 
a deeper understanding of the nature of the differences in funding. 
This entanglement of funding and subject together distorts comparison between 
countries with different subject mixes and different levels of funding per subject —
apparent advantage driven purely by subject mix is not truly a funding advantage 
if the subjects in question are much more expensive to teach. This cannot be seen 
by just examining topline figures. 
The next section elaborates on the findings above, by decomposing the 
differences in the new undergraduate funding series, into price and composition 
components. This will show the true source of the funding differentials between 
countries. 
9.6.1 Decomposing undergraduate funding per head 
As discussed above, undergraduate funding per FTE is calculated simply as: 
Funding per FTE= volume of students x unit price per subject 
	
9.1 
So the difference between FTE in England v Scotland will comprise the 
difference arising from composition of students plus the difference arising from 
price per subject (including tuition fees). 
Using simple calculus, the FTE series can be decomposed in order to understand 
where the differences in funding are coming from75. 
75  This is accomplished using the product rule; because prices and compositions are fairly similar 
in each country, average prices and compositions of both countries are used as factors. 
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The decompositions show what the difference between Scotland and England's 
funding per FTE is made up of — i.e. how much of the difference is due to pure 
funding effects (i.e. differences in the funding per subject) and how much is due 
to pure composition effects (i.e. the differences in the volumes of students 
choosing each subject). 
The funding effect shows the difference in Scotland v England if all the 
compositional effects were stripped out, and the composition effect shows the 
differences if all the funding effects were stripped out. 
Decompositions for the following key timelines are presented — 1998/99 when 
both England and Scotland's funding regimes were the same, 2001/02 by which 
time Scotland's up-front tuition fees had been abolished and endowment 
introduced, 2006/07 when England implemented the £3000 fee and bursary, and 
the most recent data for 2007/08 (see Tables 9.9 — 9.12). The current situation in 
Scotland is also compared with that in 1994/95 (see figure 9.13). 
Table 9.9 1998/99 - before devolution. 
Scotland 1998/99 v England 1998/99 funding effect composition effect 
Clinical and Veterinary Practice -63.3 392.3 
Pre-clinical 84.0 74.6 
Creative arts, hospitality & design 124.5 -239.1 
Engineering and Technology 115.2 34.3 
Science 120.2 188.9 
Computing and Information Science 28.7 -174.8 
Education 150.3 -38.6 
Built environment 34.7 84.7 
Mathematics, Statistics and OR 27.7 -11.1 
Humanities, Languages and Business 372.7 28.9 
Social Sciences 46.7 -58.8 
Total 1041.3 281.2 
Scotland 1998 - England 1998 1322 
Scotland £ per FTE 6359 
England £ per FTE  5037 
In Table 9.9, both systems were the same and both countries charged their 
students an up-front fee of £1000 (£1200 in 2006/07 prices). Scotland's funding 
per FTE, at £6359, is significantly higher than in the previous few years, but has 
not recovered to the heights of 1994/95. Scotland's funding per head is £1322 
higher than England's, largely as a result of higher funding across the board (and 
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particularly in education, humanities and creative arts, which are shaded in the 
table above). 
Interestingly, although the majority of difference is generated through funding 
effects (with the total difference through funding standing at £1041), the single 
largest differentiator between the 2 countries is as a result of the composition of 
medical students in Scotland. Although English medical students receive slightly 
more funding per head, Scotland has a higher composition of medical students 
(6% vs 3% in England) and gains £392 per head in funding advantage through 
this fact alone. Other significant compositional differences result from high 
proportions of science and built environment students in Scotland, which again 
receive high funding premiums. However, England's high proportion of students 
in creative arts and computing results in a combined loss of ground of £413 on 
average. 
Table 9.10 2001/02 — Scotland's tuition fees abolished 
Scotland 2001/02 v England 2001/02 funding effect composition effect 
Clinical and Veterinary Practice -17.8 346.6 
Pre-clinical 103.7 80.2 
Creative arts, hospitality & design 140.8 -269.1 
Engineering and Technology 120.4 78.3 
Science 133.5 203.5 
Computing and Information Science 47.9 -190.7 
Education 160.6 -30.9 
Built environment 32.9 74.7 
Mathematics, Statistics and OR 32.2 11.5 
Humanities, Languages and Business 385.4 0.5 
Social Sciences 53.8 -43.9 
Total 1193.5 260.8 
Scotland 1998 - England 1998 1454.3 
Scotland £ per FTE 6506 
England £ per FTE 5051 
Table 9.10 shows the first policy divergence of the English and Scottish systems —
Scotland's up-front fee of £1200 is now abolished and the graduate endowment 
has been introduced. Scotland's funding per FTE, at £6506, is at its highest since 
HESA records begin in 1994, and is £1454 higher than in England. 
Again, the differences arise largely through funding effects and in a similar 
pattern to the situation immediately before devolution — Scotland's largest 
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advantage arises through funding effects in general, but £346 of its advantage 
arises from Scotland's high proportion of medical students. This is a slight drop 
from 1998, as the proportion of medical students has fallen from to 5.8% to 5.5% 
(while in England the proportion has risen slightly, from 2.9% to 3%). Science 
has gained importance in Scotland - the proportion of students actually declines 
between 1998 - 2001, but remains high at 14.5% (vs 11% in England) and 
funding per student increases. 
The next significant occurrence arises after the 2004 HE Act, when England 
abolish the upfront fee and introduce deferred fees and bursaries for new students. 
At this point Scotland have increased their tuition fee to £1700 (although still paid 
for by the Scottish government) and increased their fee for medical students to 
£2700, as well as making significant increases in funding for all subjects. The 
results of this are illustrated in Table 9.11. 
Table 9.11 2006/07 - £3000 variable fee adopted in England 
Scotland 2006/07 v England 2006/07 funding effect composition effect 
Clinical and Veterinary Practice -26.8 270.3 
Pre-clinical 79.2 79.1 
Creative arts, hospitality & design 106.3 -277.2 
Engineering and Technology 65.5 120.3 
Science 88.2 197.6 
Computing and Information Science -2.5 -24.9 
Education 114.8 -53.0 
Built environment 16.6 58.1 
Mathematics, Statistics and OR 14.0 7.6 
Humanities, Languages and Business 82.6 -100.6 
Social Sciences -46.3 -13.6 
Total 491.6 263.9 
Scotland - England 755.5 
Scotland £ per FTE 6604 
England £ per FTE 5849 
As a result of the additional money from the new £3000 top-up fee, England's 
funding per FTE reaches a 10 year high of £5849. While some funding effects 
begin to seep through in 2006/07, the effect of the top-up fee is yet to be fully felt 
(as only around a third of all undergraduates pay the fee in 2006/07), so Scotland 
maintains its competitive position. Nevertheless, but the gap between England 
and Scotland is reduced to £755 (compared to £1197 the previous year). 
231 
Again, it can be seen that the main reason for Scotland's apparent funding 
advantage arises from their high proportion of medical and science students -
because these subjects are more expensive to teach. Also notable is the dramatic 
fall in Scotlands advantage through pure funding down to £491 vs £1193 in 
2001/02. 
Table 9.12 shows the decomposition for 2007/08. At this point, 75% of 
undergraduates in England are paying a £3000 top-up fee, and there is now very 
little difference between the two countries in terms of funding per head - only 
£207 per student per year, compared to Scotland's competitive high of £1652 per 
student in 2003/04. If there were no compositional differences, England's funding 
per head would be £57 higher than Scotland's, with several subjects receiving 
higher funding per head than in Scotland. 
Table 9.12 2007/08 - Most recent information 
Scotland 2007/08 v England 2007/08 funding effect composition effect 
Clinical and Veterinary Practice -48.2 280.8 
Pre-clinical 2.3 69.8 
Creative arts, hospitality & design 63.6 -271.1 
Engineering and Technology 29.2 124.2 
Science 9.8 228.5 
Computing and Information Science -26.0 -37.9 
Education 91.5 -89.2 
Built environment 0.3 59.4 
Mathematics, Statistics and OR 3.7 8.6 
Humanities, Languages and Business -86.0 -84.4 
Social Sciences -98.1 -23.9 
Total -57.7 264.7 
Scotland 2007/08 - England 2007/08 207.0 
Scotland £ per FTE 6705 
England £ per FTE 6498 
Once again, Scotland's funding position is driven ahead almost exclusively by the 
high proportion of medical, engineering and science students (and the generous 
funding afforded to them76). Controlling for these compositional differences (and 
therefore giving a truer measure of competitiveness) would change their position 
significantly. 
76 It is important to note that while medical students receive more funding in Scotland, this report 
does not take into account the actual cost of providing medical tuition 
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From 2008/09 onwards, 100% of English undergrads pay the full fee. With no 
further changes to funding, this will result in England overtaking funding in 
Scotland. 
Finally, Table 9.13 shows the differences between funding per FTE in Scotland in 
1994 vs 2007/08. In 1994, funding per head was suffering as a result of the 1992 
reforms, when student volumes rose substantially, and although funding per FTE 
was relatively high, declined steadily until 1997. Funding then began to rise to 
another peak in 2001 after the tuition fee had been abolished. Funding then 
slumped again, but the 2006/07 funding injections have brought Scotland's 
funding per head back up, and indeed by 2007/08 funding is at a high. 
Increases in funding in particular for medical, science and humanities students 
have contributed to the current funding per head, but compositional differences 
have actually dampened overall funding differences. In particular, small declines 
in medical, engineering and science students have eroded funding per FTE. 
Table 9.13 Scotland 2007/08 vs Scotland 1994/95 
Scotland 2007/08 v Scotland 1994/95 funding effect composition effect 
Clinical and Veterinary Practice 60.7 -122.1 
Pre-clinical 16.9 509.2 
Creative arts, hospitality & design 8.1 113.8 
Engineering and Technology 53.2 -351.2 
Science 103.4 -1.9 
Computing and Information Science -1.3 35.8 
Education 31.2 -135.1 
Built environment 5.4 -69.0 
Mathematics, Statistics and OR 2.0 5.2 
Humanities, Languages and Business 44.5 -84.0 
Social Sciences -0.4 51.4 
Total 323.4 -47.8 
Scotland 2007 - Scotland 1994 275.6 
Scotland £ per FTE 2007/08 6705 
Scotland £ per FTE 1994/95 6429 
These decompositions are highly illuminating. The results for 2007/08 in 
particular indicate that, if Scotland had the same composition of students as 
England, Scottish universities would be funded at a lower rate per student than in 
England. 
One way to increase funding at a university would be for the university to attract 
more high-premium students. However, arguably, this would not improve the 
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funding situation since such students are more expensive to teach and require 
more sophisticated equipment etc — the main reason for allocating such students 
high funds. Therefore the truest picture of the funding differential must be 
through pure funding effects. These show Scotland's competitive advantage to 
have been completely eroded as a result of the £3000 fee increase. The 
ramifications are clear; if Scotland wishes its universities to remain funded on a 
par with England, they must increase funding. Since the current SNP Government 
in Scotland is committed to protecting Scottish students from tuition fees, it is 
highly unlikely that additional revenue will be raised from this source, leaving the 
public sector the most likely source of funding. However, it is unclear as to 
whether funding to Scottish universities is likely to increase in the near future. 
The funding review in England, however, is set to occur in late 2009. There has 
been wide speculation around the outcome of this review, with many believing 
that the cap on fees in England and Northern Ireland will be lifted to as much as 
£5000. The next Section in this Chapter examines this possibility in terms of its 
impact on relative funding per head versus Scotland. 
9.7 Future scenarios 
The next Governmental review of tuition fee policy is due in 2009. There has 
been wide speculation around the outcome of this review, with many believing 
that the cap on fees will be lifted. The recent political changes in Scotland 
indicate that the two countries will continue to diverge in terms of higher 
education funding legislation. In the light of this, some possible future scenarios 
are considered. 
The first is to consider what would happen if England were to lift the cap on 
tuition fees after the review in 2009. The projection is based on a £5k fee in 
England, implemented in 2010. Although England's funding per FTE would 
increase by a further £2k, to £8925 once fully realized, (bearing in mind it would 
take a few years for England to fully feel the impact), there would be slightly less 
impact on Scotland since by this time all Scottish universities will receive a 
tuition fee of £1700 per student (and £2700 for medical students). Nevertheless, 
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Scotland's funding per head would end up around £2000 lower than England in 
this scenario (see figure 9.10). 
Figure 9.10 — Effect of a lift in England's fee cap in 2010 to £5000 
The next and final scenario considered, is if the cap remains in place after the 
2009 review. By this time (assuming constant funding) all of English students 
would be paying £3000 per year, and all of Scottish students would be paying 
£1700 (and £2700 for medics). The projections illustrated in Figure 9.11 show 
that in the long term, Scotland would fail to regain their competitive position, 
although as a result of the increased tuition fees in Scotland, the funding per head 
gap between the two countries would not widen. 
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Figure 9.11 Effect of England freezing the £3000 tuition fee cap 
At the time of writing this thesis, the first scenario seems the most likely, with 
speculation that the tuition fee cap may even be raised as high as £7000. 
Policy makers in Scotland must therefore be prepared to react to such a scenario, 
at which point the funding advantage would lie firmly in England's favour. 
9.8 Income from other sources 
While this study has primarily been focused on exploring income from teaching 
and tuition, it is of relevance to consider Government funding of all kinds, to 
complete the picture of funding for undergraduates. 
Table 9 shows funding based on students background income for 2007/08 (for an 
undergraduate student under 25 who will study full-time away from home). 
English students in 2007/08 benefit from significantly higher loans and slightly 
higher maintenance grants than in Scotland, plus the bursary for those from low-
income households. Although the differences in overall funding per head are 
small, this shows that English students' resources, including money allocated for 
their teaching and tuition, outstrips Scottish students for all income groups. 
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Table 9.14 Funding from all sources, 2007/08 £2006, (DIUS) 
England 
parental income £p.a. 
teaching and tuition (excl bursary) 
maintenance loan 
maintenance grant 
bursary 
total 
Scotland 
parental income £p.a. 
teaching and tuition 
loan 
bursary 
additional loan 
total 
17,000 25,000 35,000 45,000 
6,498 6,498 6,498 6,498 
3,280 3,280 4,109 3,963 
2,765 1,584 401 
300 - 
12,843 11,362 11,008 10,461 
17,000 25,000 35,000 45,000 
6,705 6,705 6,705 6,705 
1,890 2,797 3,031 1,920 
2,510 1,345 - - 
575 - 
11,680 10,847 9,736 8,625 
9.9 Funding per head in the UK relative to OECD countries 
While this study has been concerned with funding per head within the UK, it is of 
interest to compare the UK as a whole with a range of other OECD countries. 
Figure 9.12 shows the total annual expenditure per head on tertiary education in 
28 OECD countries. As these figures are calculated using the UOE (UNESCO-
OECD-Eurostat) data collection methodology77, they are not directly comparable 
with those cited throughout this paper. However this chart serves as a useful 
benchmark for comparison. 
As the most recent OECD information is for 2003, the effects of the UK 2004 
reforms and the top-up fee in particular, are not realized in figure 20. Furthermore 
OECD data does not contain splits for UK constituent countries. 
In 2003 funding per head in the UK was slightly above the OECD average and 
ranked llth of the 28 countries listed. Were the effects of the top-up fee included, 
this would likely move the UK's expenditure per student up to around the levels 
experienced in the well-funded Scandinavian countries. As Scotland is at similar 
levels to England in terms of funding per head, this implies Scotland is well 
77 See OECD Education at a Glance, 2006, Annex 3 at www.oecd.org/edu/eag2006 for details 
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placed within the OECD. The current £3000 top-up fee is still too low, however, 
to push England into the realms of the US, Canada and Switzerland where the 
average funding per head stands at around £16,000. Similarly, Scotland would 
have to find significant additional resources to compete on this level 
Figure 9.15 OECD Annual expenditure per student on core services, ancillary 
services, £2006 (OECD Education at a glance, 2006) 
While there are many world-class universities in these regions, and, as discussed, 
UK universities' ability to attract overseas students is a crucial part of their 
overall revenue, indicating that increasing funding levels towards those of 
overseas institutions will increase the relative quality of their institutions and 
hence their ability to attract overseas students. UK university funding levels 
should arguably be set in terms of the economic benefit of higher education, 
rather than their global ranking. However 
9.10 Conclusions 
This strand of the thesis has examined how recent higher education funding 
policy reforms have affected the relative funding position of English compared to 
Scottish universities, concentrating specifically on funding for home (including 
UK and EU) undergraduate students, measuring funding per student on a 
consistent basis, and taking into account of the compositional differences in the 
courses studied. 
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Widely used funding per head figures do not provide an accurate picture of home 
domiciled undergraduate funding, which is necessary to understand the impact of 
increasing tuition fees for undergraduate students. This is because they include 
funding for research, postgraduate and overseas students. The empirical work of 
this study focused on creating a consistent series of funding per full-time 
equivalent undergraduate over time for England and Scotland, stripping out 
funding for research, non-EU students, and post-graduate degrees. The series 
created in this strand of the thesis also takes into account the different 
composition of undergraduate degree subjects taken in England and Scotland. 
The findings indicate that: 
1. Funding comparative funding advantage over England is significantly 
reduced (though still significant) when effects of research, overseas students and 
post-graduate students are removed. It has been long understood that university 
funding per student in Scotland is significantly higher than that in the rest of the 
UK. However, the widely published figures describing funding per FTE are 
inflated by these effects. Removing them, and looking at funding per head solely 
for UK and EU domiciled undergraduates, Scotland's lead over England is 
significantly reduced — partly because of lucrative research funding in Scotland. 
2. The apparent historical advantage in funding per head in Scottish 
institutions compared to English ones has been largely driven by compositional 
differences — Scotland has a high proportion of medical, science and engineering 
undergraduates — subjects which command greater funding due to their relative 
complexity to teach. Because of the expensive nature of these courses, funding 
per head appears relatively high in Scotland. Removing the effects of these 
compositional differences would result in funding in England being above that of 
Scotland's in 2007/08 for home undergraduates. 
3. As a result of the 2004 reforms in England (fully enacted during 2008/09), 
England's undergraduate funding per head has increased by 25% between 
2005/06 and 2007/08. While Scotland has maintained its competitive edge in the 
face of this, its lead has been reduced so that the two countries are now almost 
level in terms of funding per head. The top-up fee introduced in 2006/07 will 
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bring funding per head in England to similar levels as that experienced in 
Scotland, suggesting that any historical advantage in the relative funding of 
Scottish students — compositional differences notwithstanding — will disappear 
unless additional new sources of public or private funding for Scottish universities 
are found. 
4. Following the review in 2009, if the cap on England's tuition fees is kept 
steady at £3000 and current funding levels are maintained, Scotland will remain 
on an even keel with England. Should England raise the cap on fees in 2010 to 
£5000, this would result in an overall rise in funding per head to £8925 — around 
£2000 per head higher than in Scotland. 
5. Following the 2004 reforms, UK (including England and Scotland) 
university funding per head is well-placed by OECD comparison, and is similar to 
that experienced in the Scandinavian countries. Should UK universities want to 
compete directly with funding levels in the US, however, top up fees (and/or 
Government expenditure on higher education) will have to rise substantially. But 
this is by no means a necessary step. 
The results of this strand of the thesis have important repercussions for policy 
makers in England and Scotland. The current Scottish Government is strongly 
committed to the global competitiveness of its universities78, and the results imply 
that additional sources of public (or private) will have to be found if its 
universities are to remain competitive with England as well as EU and non-EU 
countries at least in terms of undergraduate funding. English universities, 
meanwhile, appear to be gaining ground on their traditionally better funded 
Scottish neighbours, suggesting their policy of cost sharing through tuition fees is 
effective in boosting university funds. 
This study, however, is limited purely to undergraduate funding measures, since 
the aim was to understand the impact of the 2006 tuition fee reforms in England. 
Therefore the final series analyzed takes no account of money from other sources 
such as research or non-EU students — lucrative sources of funding for both 
78 "Our universities compete on a global basis in research and development, and we need to 
provide more government support for them to continue to do so as a key driver in Scotland's 
economic and enterprise agenda." SNP Manifesto, 2007 
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England and Scotland, competition through the reputation of Scottish universities 
which entices students from home and abroad to study in the country. 
Funding from non-EU sources is a highly topical matter. At the time of writing 
this thesis, there has been a dramatic increase in university applications in 2009 
due to the effects of the recession. Many universities, because of the governments 
caps on amount of EU students it is prepared to fund, are favouring overseas in 
their clearing places. The increased demand for non-EU students is an emerging 
issue and opportunity for future research. 
A further opportunity for future research could be to examine funding at 
individual institutions. One limitation of this study is that it focuses purely on 
average funding levels in England and Scotland, while in practice there is 
considerable heterogeneity in funding by institution driven by volume and types 
of students as well as research and other grants awarded. 
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Cost-sharing versus free education — 
two countries, two agendas 
This thesis as a whole as explored the implications of a cost sharing in higher 
education, both from the point of view of students themselves in Strand 1, and 
universities in strand 2. 
While not the main focus of this thesis, an underlying theme in both strands is the 
different agendas of England and Scotland in terms of HE funding policy. Thus, 
in comparing the agendas of the two countries, this thesis also compares two 
distinct theories of education funding. 
Scotland can be thought of as representing a more means-tested approach to HE 
finance, with the most recent SNP's education manifesto reflecting this "We 
believe that access to further and higher education should be based on the ability 
to learn, not the ability to pay." (Manifesto, 2007). 
England, meanwhile, is representative of a more universal stance, with students 
from all backgrounds paying the same levels of tuition fees and maintenance 
loans being at similar levels for most students. As yet there are no details of 
whether tuition fees will be raised in 2009 or kept at their current rates (£3,225 in 
current prices for the academic year 2009/10) but there is little doubt that students 
will have to continue to contribute to the costs of their education given the current 
economic situation. 
Comparing these two viewpoints on the basis of the evidence in this paper reveals 
the repercussions for individuals and universities. 
Under the Scottish system, individuals are certainly better off in terms of having 
significantly less debt after they graduate than English students. The first strand of 
thesis concentrates on costs and support at the point of entry to universities. By 
this definition, under the current SNP system Scottish students are worse off than 
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in England. English students have access to more upfront support through loans as 
well as similar amounts of maintenance grants to those in Scotland, meaning they 
are more able to meet upfront living costs. Furthermore, fees in England are 
covered with a loan, thus there are no upfront costs associated with fees. 
Since a key finding of this thesis is the large positive effect of support on 
likeliness to participate in HE this implies that the English system is better placed 
to increase levels of participation among youths of school leaving age. 
While this implies Scotland's current system does not support their agenda to 
widen participation, it is important to note that this thesis does not take into 
account the impact of debt levels on participation, nor the parental contribution 
that may be made in many cases, which may reduce costs faced by students in 
both countries. 
In terms of funding to universities, as seen in the second strand of this thesis, 
Scotland's decision to remove tuition fees has resulted in its university funding 
per undergraduate becoming level with England's for the first time since HESA 
records began. The SNP manifesto again pledges commitment to maintaining 
competitiveness of Scottish universities on a global basis. The research in this 
thesis indicates that the position of Scottish universities is threatened by countries, 
including England, who adopt student contributions, so the Scottish Government 
must act with increased public sector spending on education if they are to 
maintain this agenda. 
The review of higher education funding in England and Northern Ireland is due in 
late 2009. The outcome of this review may be to alter the funding balance 
between England and Scotland even further. As yet it remains to be seen how 
much more these two neighboring, but increasingly politically dissimilar 
countries will continue to diverge, and what the repercussions will be for their 
higher education sectors. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 (Chapter 1): Universities in the UK 
Ancient Universities 
The "ancient" universities in United Kingdom and Ireland are, in order of 
formation: 
University of Oxford — founded before 1167 
University of Cambridge — founded 1209 
University of St Andrews — founded 1413 (incorporating the University of Dundee from 1897 to 
1967) 
University of Glasgow — founded 1451 
University of Aberdeen — founded 1495 (as King's College, Aberdeen) 
University of Edinburgh — founded 1582 
University of Dublin (Trinity College, Dublin) — founded 1592 
Following the creation of the ancient universities, no more universities were 
created in the region until the late 18th century: 
St Patrick's College Maynooth — established 1795. 
St Davids College Lampeter — established in 1822 (Royal Charter 1828), 
University College London — established 1826 
King's College London — established 1829 (both this and University College London received 
their Royal Charters and became part of the University of London in 1836) 
University of Durham — established 1832 (Royal Charter 1837). 
Red Brick Universities 
The "red brick" universities in the United Kingdom and Ireland are: 
The University of Birmingham - royal charter granted in 1900. 
The University of Liverpool - royal charter granted in 1903. 
The University of Leeds - royal charter granted in 1904. 
The University of Sheffield - royal charter granted in 1905. 
The University of Bristol - royal charter granted in 1909. 
The University of Manchester - formed in 2004 with the merger of Victoria University (1880) and 
UMIST (1956). 
University of Dundee (originally a constituent college of the University of St Andrews) 
University of Exeter (originally an extension college of the University of London) 
University of Hull 
University of Leicester 
Newcastle University (originally two extension colleges of the University of Durham) 
University of Nottingham 
University of Southampton 
Plate-Glass Universities 
The "plate-glass" universities in the United Kingdom and Ireland are: 
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University of East Anglia (1963) 
University of Essex (1964/5) 
University of Kent (1965) 
Lancaster University (1964) 
University of Sussex (1961) 
University of Warwick (1965) 
University of York (1963) 
Other universities sometimes referred to as plate-glass universities: 
Aston University (1966) 
University of Bath (1966) 
University of Bradford (1966) 
Brunel University (1966) 
City University, London (1966) 
Heriot-Watt University (1966) 
Keele University (1962) 
Loughborough University (1966) 
University of Salford (1967) 
University of Stirling (1967) 
University of Strathclyde (1964) 
University of Surrey (1966) 
University of Ulster (1968) 
Post-1992 Universities 
Post-1992 universities formerly designated "Polytechnic Universities" are: 
Anglia Ruskin University — formerly Cambridgeshire College of Art and Technology, Anglia 
Polytechnic then Anglia Polytechnic University 
Birmingham City University — formerly the University of Central England in Birmingham and 
before that, Birmingham Polytechnic 
University of Brighton — formerly Brighton Polytechnic 
Bournemouth University — formerly Bournemouth Municipal College, Bournemouth College of 
Technology, Dorset Institute of Higher Education then Bournemouth Polytechnic 
University of Central Lancashire — formerly Lancashire Polytechnic 
Coventry University — formerly Lanchester Polytechnic then Coventry Polytechnic 
De Montfort University — formerly Leicester Polytechnic 
University of East London — formerly the West Ham College of Technology then North East 
London Polytechnic 
University of Glamorgan — formerly Glamorgan Polytechnic then The Polytechnic of Wales 
Glasgow Caledonian University — formed from the merger of Glasgow Polytechnic and The 
Queen's College, Glasgow 
University of Greenwich — formerly Thames Polytechnic 
University of Hertfordshire — formerly Hatfield Technical College then Hatfield Polytechnic 
University of Huddersfield — formerly Huddersfield Polytechnic 
Kingston University — formerly Kingston Polytechnic, and before that the Kingston Technical 
Institute, 
Leeds Metropolitan University — formerly Leeds Polytechnic 
University of Lincoln — formerly Humberside Polytechnic, then University of Humberside and 
then University of Lincolnshire and Humberside 
Liverpool John Moores University — formerly Liverpool Polytechnic 
London Metropolitan University — merger of London Guildhall University, formerly the City of 
London Polytechnic, and University of North London, formerly the Polytechnic of North London 
London South Bank University — formerly South Bank Polytechnic 
Manchester Metropolitan University — formerly Manchester Polytechnic 
Middlesex University — formerly Middlesex Polytechnic 
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Napier University — formerly Napier Technical College, Napier College of Commerce and 
Technology then Napier Polytechnic 
Northumbria University — formerly Newcastle Polytechnic, formed from the merger of Rutherford 
College of Technology, the College of Art & Industrial Design and the Municipal College of 
Commerce 
Nottingham Trent University — formerly Trent Polytechnic then Nottingham Polytechnic 
Oxford Brookes University — formerly Oxford School of Art then Oxford Polytechnic 
University of Plymouth — formerly Polytechnic South West, formed from Plymouth Polytechnic, 
Rolle College, Seale-Hayne College and Plymouth School of Maritime Studies 
University of Portsmouth — formerly Portsmouth Polytechnic 
Sheffield Hallam University — formerly Sheffield Polytechnic then Sheffield City Polytechnic 
Staffordshire 	 University 	 — 	 formerly 	 Staffordshire 	 Polytechnic 	 (originally 	 called 	 North 
Staffordshire Polytechnic) 	 having previously been the 	 separate 	 Staffordshire 	 College 	 of 
Technology, the Stoke-on-Trent College of Art and the North Staffordshire College of Technology 
University of Sunderland — formerly Sunderland Technical College then Sunderland Polytechnic 
University of Teesside — formerly Teesside Polytechnic 
Thames Valley University — formed from the merger of Thames Valley College and Ealing 
College of Higher Education as Polytechnic of West London 
University of the West of England — formerly Bristol Polytechnic 
University of Westminster — formerly The Royal Polytechnic Institution (1838), Regent Street 
Polytechnic then The Polytechnic of Central London 
University of Wolverhampton — formerly Wolverhampton Polytechnic 
Post-1992 (or "modern") universities not formerly designated 
"Polytechnics" 
University of Abertay Dundee — formerly Dundee Institute of Technology 
University of the Arts London — formerly London Institute 
Bath Spa University — formerly Bath College of Higher Education 
University of Bedfordshire — formerly University of Luton, created by the merger of the 
University of Luton and De Montfort University's, Bedford campus 
Bishop Grosseteste University College Lincoln — formerly Bishop Grosseteste College 
University of Bolton — formerly Bolton Institute of Higher Education 
Buckinghamshire New University — formerly Buckinghamshire Chilterns University College, and 
before that Buckinghamshire College of Higher Education, and earlier the High Wycombe College 
of Art and Technology 
Canterbury Christ Church University — formerly Christ Church College 
University of Chester — formerly Chester College of Higher Education 
University of Chichester — formerly Chichester Institute of Higher Education then University 
College Chichester 
University of Cumbria — formed in January 2007 from the merger of St Martin's College, the 
Cumbria Institute of the Arts (CIA) and the Cumbrian campuses of the University of Central 
Lancashire 
University of Derby — formerly the Derbyshire College of Higher Education 
Edge Hill University — based in Ormskirk, Lancashire, formerly Edge Hill College 
University of Gloucestershire — formerly Cheltenham & Gloucester College of Higher Education 
Glynd*r University - formerly the North East Wales Institute of Higher Education 
Liverpool Hope University — formerly a fully accredited institution of the University of Liverpool, 
then Liverpool Hope University College 
Newman University College - formerly Newman College of Higher Education 
University of Wales, Newport — formerly Gwent College of Higher Education then University of 
Wales College, Newport 
University of Northampton — formerly Northampton Technical College, Nene College then 
University College Northampton 
Queen Margaret University — formerly Queen Margaret College then Queen Margaret University 
College 
Robert Gordon University — based in Aberdeen, formerly Robert Gordon's Technical College then 
the Robert Gordon Institute of Technology 
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Roehampton University — formerly Roehampton Institute 
Southampton Solent University — formerly Southampton Institute of Higher Education 
Swansea Metropolitan University — formerly Swansea Institute of Higher Education 
University of Wales Institute, Cardiff - One of three universities in Cardiff 
University of the West of Scotland — formerly University of Paisley 
University of Winchester — formerly King Alfred's College 
University of Worcester — formerly part of the University of Birmingham Department of 
Education then Worcester College of Higher Education 
York St John University — formerly the College of Ripon and York St John then York St John 
College 
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Appendix 2 (Chapter 5): Education systems in England and 
Scotland 
English System 
The school year begins on the 1st of September. Education is compulsory for all 
children from the term after their fifth birthday to the last Friday in June of the 
school year in which they turn 16. This will be raised in 2013 to the year in which 
they turn 17 and in 2015 to the year in which they turn 18. In the vast majority of 
cases, pupils progress from primary to secondary levels at age 11; in some areas 
either or both of the primary and secondary levels are further subdivided. A few 
areas have three-tier education systems with an intermediate middle level from 
age 9 to 13. 
The following table shows common patterns for schooling in England. 
Appendix Table 1 
Age on 1st Sept Year Curriculum stage Schools 
3 Nursery Nursery school 
Foundation Stage 
4 Reception 
5 Year 1 Infant school 
Key Stage 1 
6 Year 2 First school 
Year 3 Primary school 
8 Year 4 
Key Stage 2 Junior school 
9 Year 5 
10 Year 6 
Middle school 
11 Year 7 
12 Year 8 Key Stage 3 
13 Year 9 Secondary school 
14 Year 10 Secondary school with Sixth Form 
Key Stage 1 / GCSE 
15 Year 11 Upper school 
16 Year 12 
Sixth Form I A-level Sixth form college 
17 Year 13 
Scottish System 
Children start primary school aged between 41/2 and 51/2 depending on when the 
child's birthday falls. Scottish school policy places all those born between March 
of a given year and February of the following year in the same year group. 
Children born between March and August start school in August at between 51/2 
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and 5 years old, and those born between September and February start school in 
the previous August at between age 4 years 11 months and 41/2 years old. The 
Scottish system is the most flexible in the UK, however, as parents of children 
born between September and December can request a deferral for 1 year (not 
automatic, requires to be approved), whilst children born between January and 
February can opt to hold their child back a year and let them start school the 
following August. This usually allows those not ready for formal education to 
have an extra year at nursery school. (Funding is only available for children born 
in January and February). 
Pupils remain at primary school for seven years. Then aged eleven or twelve, they 
start secondary school for a compulsory four years with the following two years 
being optional. In Scotland, pupils sit Standard Grade or Intermediate exams at 
the age of fifteen/sixteen, for normally eight subjects including compulsory exams 
in English, Mathematics, a Science subject (Physics, Biology or Chemistry) and a 
Social Subject (Geography, History or Modern Studies). It is now required by the 
Scottish Parliament for students to have two hours of physical education a week; 
each school may vary these compulsory combinations. The school leaving age is 
generally sixteen (after completion of Standard Grades), after which students may 
choose to remain at school and study for Higher Grade and Advanced Higher 
exams. Increasingly, students in S3 and S4 are able to take Intermediate courses, 
as these have become more popular and are more closely linked to Highers. 
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Appendix 3 (Chapter 5): Estimating models without "independent" 
youths 
The following table contains all panel models re-estimated excluding youths 
living independently (i.e. with unknown parental income). It is reassuring that, 
particularly in the case of the preferred FE model, the coefficients are very similar 
to those of Table 7.4, in which the values of grants and fees are estimated for 
those youths with missing parental incomes. 
Appendix Table 2 
(1) 
OLS/RE 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
FD 
(4) 
Dynamic 
0.011 0.029 0.021 0.02 
(0.008) (0.000)** (0.02) (0.014) 
-0.017 -0.043 -0.058 -0.036 
(0.014) (0.015)** (0.041) (0.027) 
0.021 0.053 0.042 0.05 
(0.012) (0.015)** (0.025) (0.015)** 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 
(0.000)** (0.001) (0.013) (0.001)** 
-0.040 -0.111 0.024 0.021 
(0.025) (0.046)* (0.082) (0.061) 
0.233 0.200 0.188 0.190 
(0.034)** (0.032)** (0.063)** (0.058)" 
-0.078 -0.062 -0.014 -0.057 
(0.031)* (0.028)* (0.068) (0.063) 
-0.091 -0.064 -0.046 -0.127 
(0.031)** (0.028)* (0.062) (0.055)* 
-0.097 -0.097 -0.155 -0.106 
(0.046)* (0.034)** (0.066)* (0.072) 
-0.116 -0.100 -0.126 -0.088 
(0.038)" (0.030)** (0.058)* (0.070) 
0.003 0.008 0.016 0.012 
(0.001)** (0.003)* (0.019) (0.006) 
0.009 
(0.049) 
-0.052 
(0.048) 
3,382.599 2,269.785 -0.545 
(1,150.027) 
** (1,410.435) (0.195)** 
Y Y Y Y 
grant 
fee 
loan 
parental income 
white 
GCSE 
father, NVQ Level 2-31 
father, NVQ Level <2 
mother, NVQ Level 2-3 
mother, NVQ Level <2 
unemployment rate 
Pt-1 
Pt-2 
Constant 
Time trend (lin & n-lin) 
Observations 	 1488 	 1488 
R-squared 	 0.33 	 0.13 
Number of groups 
	 144 	 144 	 1442 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
'In each case, omitted category is "parent educated to >NVQ level 4" 
2 Number of instruments=141 
0 
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Appendix 4 (Chapter 5): Missing parental income data in the LFS 
The following table contains descriptive statistics for those who are of school-
leaving age and therefore eligible for university in the LFS sample of use, but 
have missing parental income data, and are therefore excluded from the sample. 
Note that these youths live either in the parental home or in a hall of residence, so 
do not overlap with those youths living independently, for whom levels of grants, 
fees and loans are estimated. 
Appendix Table 3 
 
All Missing income 
13.7 
15.8 
84.1 
% all sample 
% of all participants 
% of all non-participants 
16.1 
83.9 
ethnicity 
white (%) 
non-white (%) 
missing (%) 
youth's education 
GCSEs >=5 (%) 
GCSES < 5 (%) 
missing (%) 
gender 
male 
female 
parent's education I 
NVQ level 4 + 
NVQ level 2 or 3 
NVQ level <2 
missing (%) 
mean parental income £ 
region 
england 
scotland 
wales 
northern ireland 
sample size 
85.6 72.2 
8.3 7.1 
6.1 20.7 
47.3 46.9 
49.6 49.9 
3.1 3.2 
51.4 52.5 
48.6 47.4 
34.8 33.9 
22.3 23.0 
27.1 26.0 
15.8 17.2 
22278.7 
80.4 
	
80.9 
9.1 
	
8.3 
5.3 
	
5.5 
5.2 
	
5.3 
24732 
	
3921 
As is apparent, characteristics of those with missing parental income data are very 
similar to those in the remaining sample, although there is more missing 
information on ethnicity among this group. Parental education data is not 
generally found to be missing from this sample, and is similar by comparison, 
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suggesting excluding these missing income students from the sample will not 
cause sample bias. 
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Appendix 5 (Chapter 5): NVQ Level Framework 
The table below describes the qualifications, both vocational and academic, by 
NVQ level, used in the economic models described in Chapters 6 and 7. The table 
is taken from Deaden et al (2002). 
Appendix Table 4 
Qvairratias with 	 IFS railifratitars inclatekd 	 NVQ level 
Ac ademie qu atific ations 
CSEs 
04evels (grades A-C) 
A-levels 
b her HE qualification 
ill diploma 
I ir,t degree 
lliclxr Decree 
cur i ona I qu aid i ea tions 
i tor' 4mtlificati,ns 
NVQ level I 
NVQ level 2 
NVQ level 3-5 
RSA low 
RSA high 
City and Guilds 'other' 
City and Gilds Craft 
City and Guilds Adv. t'ratt 
site first cercldiplotna 
ONC/OND STEC National 
HNC/FIND STEC Higher 
Nursing 
Teaching 
Professional qual i tic ai ion  
CSE below grade I 
0-km1/GCSE grades A -C 	 2 
CSE grade I 
A-level 
Scottish Certificate of 6111 Year Studies 	 3 
SCE Higher 
A/S level 
Other HE qualifications below degree level 	 4 
Diplomas in Higher Education 	 4 
First Degree 	 5 
Higher Degree 	 5 
YT certificate 
SCOTVEC National certificate modules 
Any other qualifications 
NVQ level 1 
GNVQ foundation 
NVQ level 2 	 2 
GNVQ intermediate 
NVQ level 3/GNVQ 	 3 
GNVQ advanced 
	 3 
NVQ keel 4 	 4 
NVQ level 5 	 5 
RSA other qualitc limns (Stage 1,  II and III) 
RSA diploma 
RSA Advanced DiplomaXertificate 	 3 
RSA Higher Diploma 	 4 
City and Guilds 'other1tivarripart 
City and Guilds craft/part 11 	 2 
City and Guilds Advanced Craft/part III 	 3 
STEC first certificate' 
STEC first diploma 	 2 
ONC/OND 
	
3 
13TEC/SCOTVEC National 
HNC/HND 	 4 
IITEC/SCOTVEC ligher 
Nursing quagitation 	 4 
Teaching - further educat ton 
Teaching - secondary education 	 4 
Teaching - primary 
Teaching - level not stated 
Other e.g.. member of prokssional institute 
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Appendix 6 (Chapter 6): Higher Education Finance in England 
and Scotland before and after devolution 
Appendix Table 5 shows maximum rates of loans, fees and grants in the UK from 
1975-2005/06. These rates are applicable for all UK students including Scotland, 
until 2000, at which point the Scottish system departed, following devolution in 
1999. 
Appendix Table 5: Rates of Loans and Grants in the UK 1975-2005 (DfES) 
Rates of Loans & Grants since 1975 
K.),  
Nuys ss brocset , rammer! pi mar Ns* 0 -laden rare 
No cricket -, nocarnum NS yhy :Me of Molest ow 
Cid " these Aisdentt e'oo =MI ta- :Ace •r(olx, &immix. it* 
.4. , t‘ese ablora oho reeled deer ,eutse en Seriserhes /Wee a,  3 ,.. 
Year Parental Home London Elsewhere 
E E i 
1975/76 15701 4810) (740) 
1976/77 (675) (955) (875) 
1977178 (785) 4 1.145) (1.010) 
1978:79 (870) 41.315) (1.100) 
979:80 (995) 41.485) (1.245) 
1980/81 (1.125) (1.695) (1.430) 
1981/82 (1.180) (1.825) (1.535) 
1982.133 (1.225) 41.900) (1.595) 
1983.84 0 .2751 41.97S) (1.660) 
1984.85 0 435) 42.1091 (1.775) 
1985.86 (1 A80) (2.165) (1.830) 
1986/87 (1.510) 42.246) (1.901) 
1987/88 (I 567) 42.3)0) (1.972) 
1988/89 (1.630) 42.425) (2.050) 
1984/90 (1.7101 (2.6501 (2.155) 
INTRODUCTION OF MORTGAGE-STYLE STUDENT LOANS 
990 9' 330*(1.795) 440+(2.845) 4204(2.265) 
: 991. 92 4604 (1.795) 660+(2.8451 583+12.265) 
1992/93 5704(1.795) 830*(2.945) 715*(2.265) 
1993:94 6404(1.795) 940+(2.8451 9034(1265) 
-994.95 9154(1.615) 1375+ (2.560) i 150*(2.040) 
1995:96 10654 (1.530) ? 695+ (2.340) 13854(1.885) 
1996/97 1260*(1.4001 2035+12.1051 164+(1.710) 
1997198 1290+(1.435) 2085*(2.160) 1685+41.755) 
IMPOOOCTiON OF TUTION FEES AND INCOME-CONTINGENT STUDENT LOANS 
99999 	 j 1325+(1480) 041 2145+42225) 4141 1735+41810) OW 
2325+1483, Mar 3145+11.2251 New  27354(813) N., 
,999.30 
	
' 	 .360+(15151 Om 2200+42280) 011  1780+0855) Old 
1 2875. New 4480* Nee 363S. Nor 
?0+M0 ) 'i 3954415551 °id 2255+ (23351 Cil  1825+(1900) Oia 
2950. Now 4590. u*w 3725* No. 
2001.32 	 1 .1395*(1555) 041  2255+42335) 09  1825+(1900) cam 
3020. Mw 4700' New 3815* New 
2002:03 	 f 14654(16251 74 2365+,24501 °9  1915*(1990) cai 
1 3090' New 48' 5. "*'' 3905' New 
2003:34 	 1 : 500+ (15301 011 2420+42410) 09 1960+(1960) .1 
1 3165. 4930. New 4000' 
New 
2004- 35 	 ' :535+ f 17 51 pd 2480*(2570) 041  2005+420901 Chi 
3240..410001 New  50504+413)01 N. 409S 4. ( I 0001 'Kw 
I 
STULME/175 CURRENTLY IN THE SYSTEM 
2005.06 	 i :535+11745) Old 2480+,26351 04J 2005+421401 361 
I 33234+41000j :Mew  S 1 75 ,4413001 W. 41 9S e4( IWO) New 
• 2! Tee ev .1 et," e ewers vested 
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contains information for Scotland, for 2002, following 
loans and grants which occurred over the period 2000-2001. 
Appendix Table 6 
readjustment of fees, 
Appendix Table 6 Rates of loans and grants in Scotland, 2002 ( The Scottish 
Government) 
Annual parental income* Parental support Bursary Loan Total supportpackage 
10,240 2,050 ,365 4,415 
11 15,000 1,263 ,152 4,415 
20,000 695 3,209 3,905 
20,480 45 644 3,216 3,905 
25,000 547 150 3,208 3,905 
30,000 1,102 2,803 3,905 
35,000 1,658 2,247 3,905 
40.000 2,213 1,692 3,905 
45.000 2,897 1,008 3,905 
50.000 and above 3,135 770 3,905 
255 
Appendix 7 (Chapter 7): Dynamic model selection 
Appendix Table 7 shows a number of specifications tested in the dynamic model 
selection. The first column shows the preferred specification. Columns 2-3 show 
the specification using different lag lengths as instrumental variables for the 
lagged dependent variables. In each case, these models fail to identify the loan, 
fee and grant variables. 
Column 4 shows the specification with lagged grant, fee and loan variables as 
well as lagged dependent variables. None of the lagged explanatory variables are 
found to be significant. 
Finally, Column 5 displays an alternative specification for the composite net costs 
variable. The lagged variable is not found to be significant. 
Note, full set of explanatory variables is present in each case but suppressed for 
ease of reading. 
Appendix Table 7 Alternative specifications of Dynamic models 
(1) 
preferred 
specification 
(2) 
lags 2,3 
(3) 
lags 2,4 
(4) 
lagged X 
(5) 
lagged net 
costs 
P t-1 -0.078 0.008 -0.027 0.047 0.054 
(0.025)** (0.081) (0.081) (0.040) (0.087) 
P t-2 -0.103 -0.036 -0.026 -0.012 -0.023 
(0.025)** (0.029) (0.031) (0.035) (0.030) 
grant 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.039 
(0.011)* (0.015) (0.016) (0.019)* 
grant t-1 -0.030 
(0.029) 
fee -0.039 -0.022 -0.024 -0.040 
(0.012)** (0.027) (0.027) (0.035) 
fee t-1 0.033 
(0.023) 
loan 0.047 0.036 0.039 0.034 
(0.014)** (0.017)* (0.017)* (0.022) 
loan t-1 -0.017 
(0.021) 
net costs -0.072 
(0.021)** 
net costs t-1 0.035 
(0.019) 
Constant -0.340 -0.283 -0.300 -0.220 
(0.172)* (0.182) (0.181) (0.170) 
Obs. 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582 
Groups 144 144 144 144 144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Appendix 8 (Chapter 9): Scottish Funding Council and Higher 
Education Funding Council Subject Breakdowns 
Appendix Tables 8-9 contain detailed funding information for universities in 
England and Scotland, according to HEFCE and SFC rules. 
Appendix Table 8 HEFCE price group codes (English and Northern Irish institutions)  
Higher education institutions  
Cost centre 
1 Clinical medicine 
2 Clinical dentistry 
3 Veterinary science 
4 Anatomy and physiology 
5 Nursing and paramedical studies 
6 Health and community studies 
7 Psychology and behavioural sciences 
8 Pharmacy and pharmacology 
10 Biosciences 
11 Chemistry 
12 Physics 
13 Agriculture and forestry 
14 Earth, marine and environmental sciences 
16 General engineering 
17 Chemical engineering 
18 Mineral, metallurgy and materials engineering 
19 Civil engineering 
20 Electrical, electronic and computer engineering 
21 Mechanical, aero and production engineering 
23 Architecture, built environment and planning 
24 Mathematics 
25 Information technology, systems sciences and computer software 
engineering 
26 Catering and hospitality management 
27 Business and management studies 
28 Geography 
29 Social studies 
30 Media studies 
31 Humanities 
33 Design and creative arts 
34 Education 
35 Modern languages 
37 Archaeology 
38 Sports science and leisure studies 
41 Continuing education 
99 Cost centre not assignable 
  
Price 
group(s) 
A, B 
A, B 
A, B 
B 
C 
C 
C 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
C 
C 
C 
  
 
C 
D 
C 
D 
Media studies 
D 
C 
C, D 
C 
C 
B, C, D 
D 
D 
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Appendix Table 9 Scottish Funding Council price group codes (SFC) 
High (cost factor 1.6) 
Clinical Laboratory Sciences (1) 
Anatomy (6) 
Physiology (7) 
Pharmacology (8) 
Pharmacy (9) 
Biological Sciences (14) 
Agriculture (15) 
Food Science and Technology (16) 
Veterinary Science (17) 
Chemistry (18) 
Physics (19) 
Earth Sciences (20) 
Environmental Sciences (21) 
Computer Science (25)  
General Engineering (26)  
Chemical Engineering (27)  
Civil Engineering (28)  
Electrical and Electronic Engineering (29)  
Mechanical, Aeronautical and 
Manufacturing Engineering (30)  
Mineral and Mining Engineering (31)  
Metallurgy and Materials (32)  
Intermediate (cost factor 1.2) 
Community-based Clinical Subjects (2) 
Hospital-based Clinical Subjects (3) 
Clinical Dentistry (4) 
Pre-clinical Studies (5) 
Nursing (10) 
Other Studies and Professions Allied 
to Medicine (11) 
Psychology (13) 
Pure Mathematics (22) 
Applied Mathematics (23) 
Statistics and Operational Research (24) 
Built Environment (33) 
Geography (35) 
Economics and Econometrics (38) 
Linguistics (56) 
Archaeology (58) 
Library and Information Management (61) 
Art and Design (64) 
Sports Related Subjects (69) 
Low (cost factor 1.0) 
Town and Country Planning (34) 
Law (36) 
Anthropology (37) 
Politics and International Studies (39)  
Social Policy and Administration (40)  
Social Work (41)  
Sociology (42)  
Business and Management Studies (43)  
ctd over 
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Low (cost factor 1.0), ctd 
Accounting and Finance 	 (44) 
American Studies 	 (45) 
Middle Eastern and African Studies 	 (46) 
Asian Studies 	 (47) 
European Studies 	 (48) 
Celtic Studies 	 (49) 
English Language and Literature 	 (50) 
French 
	 (51) 
German, Dutch and Scandinavian 
Languages 	 (52) 
Italian 	 (53) 
Russian, Slavonic and East European 
Languages 	 (54) 
Iberian and Latin American Languages 	 (55) 
Classics, Ancient History, Byzantine and 
Modern Greek Studies 	 (57) 
History 	 (59) 
History of Art, Architecture and Design 	 (60) 
Philosophy 	 (62) 
Theology, Divinity and Religious Studies 	 (63) 
Communication, Cultural and Media Studies 	 (65) 
Drama, Dance and Performing Arts 	 (66) 
Music 	 (67) 
Education 	 (68) 
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